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USING OPERATIONAL RISK TO INCREASE  
 




A key activity in the systems engineering process is 
managing risk. Systems engineers transform end-user needs into 
requirements that then drive design, development, and deployment 
activities. Experienced systems engineers are aware of both 
programmatic risk and technical risk and how these risks impact 
program outcomes. A programmatic change to cost, schedule, 
process, team structure, or a wide variety of other elements may 
impact the engineering effort and increase the risk of failing 
to deliver a product or capability when needed, with all 
required functionality, at the promised cost.  
Technical challenges may introduce risk as well. If a sub-
component or element of the design is immature or doesn’t 
perform as expected, additional effort may be required to re-
design the element or may even necessitate a change in 
requirements or a complete system re-design.  
Anticipating programmatic and technical risks and 
implementing plans to mitigate these risks is part of the 
systems engineering process. Even with a potent risk management 
process in place, end-users reject new capabilities when the 
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delivered capabilities fail to perform to their expectations or 
fail to address the end-user’s operational need.  
The time between the identification of an operational need 
and the delivery of the resulting capability may be months or 
even years. When delivered, the new capability either does not 
fulfil the original need or the need has evolved over time. This 
disconnect increases operational risk to the end-user’s mission 
or business objectives. When systems engineers explicitly 
identify and mitigate operational risk, in addition to 
programmatic and technical risk, program outcomes are more 
likely to meet the end-user’s real operational need.  
The purpose of this research is first to define the 
activities that could be used by systems engineers to ensure 
that engineering activities are influenced by operational risk 
considerations. Secondly, to determine if a focus on operational 
risk during the systems engineering lifecycle has a positive 
impact on program outcomes.  
A structured approach to addressing operational risk during 
the systems engineering process, Operational Risk-Driven 
Engineering Requirements/Engineering Development (ORDERED), is 
introduced. ORDERED includes an exhaustive operational risk 
taxonomy designed to assist systems engineers with incorporating 
the end-user’s evolving operational risk considerations into 
systems engineering activities.  
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To examine the relationship between operational risk 
considerations during the systems engineering process and 
program outcomes, a survey instrument was developed and 
administered. In addition, a system dynamics model was developed 
to examine the relationship between operational risk and 
technical debt. Finally, case studies of successful and 
challenged programs were evaluated against characteristics of 
successfully addressing operational risk during the program 
lifecycle. These activities lead to the conclusion that a focus 
on operational risk during the systems engineering lifecycle has 
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Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and 
means to enable the realization of successful systems1. The 
practices, approaches, methods, and tools of systems engineering 
have been codified over time and have evolved as technology, 
system, and operational complexity increases. The purpose of 
having a set of proven practices for engineers to follow is to 
reduce system development risk and to increase the probability 
of delivering a system that meets an operational need2.  
The tools applied to a given problem are selected based on 
an understanding of certain quality attributes of the product 
under development or the management aspects of the team 
producing the product within cost and schedule constraints. 
Therefore, a given practice is considered effective only if it 
reduces technical, programmatic, and/or operational risk.  
Technical risk identification and mitigation is concerned 
with the quality attributes of the end product. For example, a 
product may have stringent reliability requirements. Another 
product may have real-time processing requirements.  
The systems engineering methods and tools for mitigating 
reliability risks may include using design patterns such as 
redundant hardware and software or fault detection and 
remediation mechanisms. Products with real-time requirements 
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might use design patterns with the ability to ensure 
schedulability, and the program team may need to use advanced 
models to analyze process behavior.  
Programmatic risk identification and mitigation is 
concerned with the management aspects of the development 
lifecycle. If a program has multiple customers who are prone to 
having conflicting requirements, rapid-prototyping and user 
juries may be used as approaches to mitigate stakeholder 
involvement risks. If the product is dependent on other 
components or products that are developed simultaneously, the 
program may use cross-program tools such as employing an 
Interface Control Working Group to mitigate the risk of the 
inter-operating systems having deployment issues.  
Operational risk identification and mitigation is concerned 
with improving business and mission effectiveness by developing 
and deploying capabilities that mitigate evolving operational 
risk. If a military unit is no longer able to detect a new 
weapon system developed by an adversary, operational risk 
increases, and operational needs are identified, highlighting 
the requirement for new capabilities to defeat the mission 
threat.  
If the cost of operating multiple systems decreases the 
effectiveness or long-term viability of the operational 
organization, business needs are identified that require 
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decreasing cost and operational complexity by integrating 
disparate systems into fewer systems.  
The measure of effectiveness of any given systems 
engineering practice is the ability of that practice to mitigate 
technical, programmatic, and/or operational risk. Technical and 
programmatic risk identification and mitigation are the focus of 
most program and systems engineering risk management processes. 
When a program team has a mature risk management process, it 
continually identifies risks that may impact its ability to 
produce a product that meets customer requirements within cost 
and schedule constraints.  
One missing aspect of most systems engineering risk 
management processes such as those described in the Guide to the 
Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge3 or the INCOSE Systems 
Engineering Handbook1 is a focus on operational risk. That is, 
the evolving risk to the business or mission needs of the end-
user. This lack of focus on operational risk during the 
engineering process encourages the creation of a chasm between 
evolving need and delivered product capabilities. The longer the 
development process, the wider that gap, and the end-user may be 
less receptive to deeming the capability operationally 
effective. 
Wrubel and Gross describe this disconnect, stating, 
...requirements for any given system are highly likely to evolve 
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between the development of a system concept and the time at 
which the system is operationally deployed as new threats, 
vulnerabilities, technologies, and conditions emerge, and users 
adapt their understanding of their needs as system development 
progresses4.  
In his 2015 report to Congress about the state of Defense 
acquisition, the Honorable Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, observed that 
the Department of Defense was optimizing cost and schedule 
performance over technical advancement. He stated ...there is 
evidence that we have been pursuing less complex systems with 
about the same or less risk since 2009. This aligns with my 
concern that in some areas we may not be pushing the state-of-
the-art enough in terms of technical performance. This endangers 
our military technical superiority. In my view, our new product 
pipeline is not as robust as it should be at a time when our 
technological superiority is being seriously challenged by 
potential adversaries. Not all cost growth is bad. We need to 
respond to changing and emerging threats5. 
These emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and technology 
changes increase operational risk. When the operational risk is 
great, end-users bypass the traditional engineering process and 
create more streamlined avenues to acquire capability. 
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During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States Army 
faced a new and evolving threat. Enemy forces were no match for 
a traditional military, so they relied on asymmetric tactics. 
Improvised Explosive Devices became the weapon of choice because 
they were easy to build and deploy and were highly effective. 
The Army wasn’t prepared in terms of either detection and defeat 
systems or from a psychological perspective.  
Coupled with an acquisition process that was too slow to 
react to the evolving operational threat and outcry from both 
service members and the general population, the Army created the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) 
with the sole purpose of defeating this new operational risk. 
JIEDDO was able to bypass the Army’s acquisition process and get 
equipment and capabilities to the field quickly.  
From a tactical perspective, the focus on defeating a 
specific operational risk was successful. Capabilities were 
fielded, and lives were saved. From a strategic perspective, 
these quickly-fielded systems lack certain longer-term quality 
attributes such as robustness, evolvability, and maintainability 
that would have been considered in a traditional systems 
engineering approach. The resulting capabilities increased total 
cost of ownership and logistical complexity6. 
When system requirements are created to reduce strategic 
risk such as affordability or other long-term efficiencies, the 
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resulting systems could be viewed as less relevant from a 
tactical or operational perspective. The driving strategic 
requirements are associated with lifecycle cost reduction, 
reducing redundant systems, or integrating capabilities rather 
than mitigating near-term operational risk.  
The Air Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System had 
only a vague set of objectives when it began development in 
20047. According to a report by the United States Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, these objectives 
resulted in ...a new, fully-integrated logistics system that 
would replace an unspecified number of older, unconnected 
logistics systems. This lack of clarity and disconnect between 
solving critical operational threats and risks resulted in $1.1 
billion in wasted funding and a system that was not deployable. 
According to Senator John McCain (R-Arizona), The Air 
Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System, or E.C.S.S., is a 
prime example of how a system designed to save money can 
actually waste billions of taxpayer dollars without producing 
any usable capability8.  
To increase the effectiveness of systems engineering, its 
practices, methods, and tools, must have a greater emphasis on 
eliciting and understanding operational risk and the development 
of enhanced methods to continually track and react to evolving 
operational threat and risk during the development, deployment, 
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and sustainment phases of the system lifecycle. To that end, 
this dissertation introduces an approach to influence systems 
engineering activities with the objective of improving the 
operability and acceptance of engineered solutions through the 
use of operational risk considerations.  
It also explores the relationship between a focus on 
operational risk and program outcomes. This approach is referred 
to here as Operational Risk-Driven Engineering 
Requirements/Engineering Development (ORDERED) and is 
graphically shown in Figure 1.  
 





The ORDERED process starts in Operations and Maintenance 
whereas most systems engineering lifecycle models end in 
Operations and Maintenance. Ideally, new systems are developed 
to mitigate operational threats or needs. These needs arise from 
exploring both the mission aspects of operations as well as the 
business aspects of managing the operational organization. 
Operational risks are identified that describe the gap 
between current operations and maintenance activities and the 
evolving mission and business threats and needs. Operational 
risks are then analyzed and operational risk scenarios 
developed.  
Scenario-based engineering is a standard approach when 
developing complex systems to describe expected behavior or 
outcomes9, however, operational risk scenarios as used in ORDERED 
describe unwanted behavior or outcomes. These scenarios are then 
used to inform systems engineering lifecycle activities to 
ensure that the capability or system under development mitigates 
evolving operational risk, increasing the operational 
acceptability of the capability or system when deployed.  
Chapter 2 introduces basic risk management concepts and 
discusses how operational risk considerations are ignored in 
traditional risk management approaches. Chapter 3 describes the  
concept of operational risk, how the concept is considered 
traditionally in banking and military operations, and proposes a 
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more general definition to apply to a wider set of operational 
organizations.  
Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between operational 
risk and systems engineering activities and how a failure to 
consider evolving operational risk during system development may 
negatively impact program outcomes. Chapter 5 details the 
ORDERED process and how operational risk may be used to 
influence systems engineering activities as well as how systems 
engineering activities may be used to mitigate operational risk. 
Chapter 6 illustrates the results of a survey constructed 
to measure the relationship between a focus on operational risk 
during the program lifecycle and resulting program outcomes. 
Chapter 7 introduces a simple model of operational risk and its 
relationship to technical debt and program cost.  
Chapter 8 codifies the characteristics of an effective 
focus on operational risk during the systems engineering process 
and evaluates successful and challenged programs against these 
characteristics to validate the assertion that a focus on 
operational risk during the systems engineering process has a 
positive impact on program outcomes. Chapter 9 summarizes the 
results of the research and recommends areas requiring further 
exploration.   
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Managing program risk is not a new concept. Engineers and 
program managers considered events, activities, processes, 
systems, and other impediments to success as soon as humankind 
began undertaking complex solutions to major challenges.  
The wonder of an engineering accomplishment such as the 
Great Pyramids in Egypt stand as a testament to the ability of 
humankind to overcome great obstacles in building structures 
that appear to be unachievable given the tools, processes, 
methods, workforce, and environmental considerations at the 
time. While the Pyramids themselves have been the focus of 
restoration and archeological attention, the towns where these 
planners and workman lived provide insight into the planning, 
structure, and foresight required to accomplish these great 
engineering feats.  
One particular city, Kahun, was built circa 1895 B.C., and 
its excavation illustrates the lives of the planners and workers 
who built the Pyramids. Kahun was part of a pyramid complex and 
was designed by a single architect, and its construction was 
purposeful10, laid out to mitigate many obstacles facing the 
workers. The study of the process and methods of building 
pyramids sheds light into the risk mitigation activities applied 
11 
 
during design and construction, such as complex irrigation 
systems employed to allow for ease of construction. 
Massive canals were built to re-direct the Nile River to 
improve the ability to get raw materials close to the build 
sites, reducing the risk of program failure. In addition, 
political risks were considered and mitigated.  
Similar to modern large-scale programs within the U.S. 
Department of Defense, where components are designed and 
developed in geographically disperse locations around the U.S. 
to garner support for the program, the pyramid builders also 
needed to collect political support and extend the reach of the 
Egyptian kings to the outer limits of the Egyptian empire. 
The many logistical needs and raw materials required, 
including cooper, granite, limestone, and food, were transported 
from great distances within Egypt in order to show power and 
mitigate the risk of Bedouin warriors disrupting the program11.  
In 1857, Theodore Judah, a civil engineer, developed a 
detailed plan to build the Pacific Railroad12. While Judah’s plan 
was more of a call to action for building the railroad, 
throughout his plan he introduced risks and proposed mitigation 
actions to convince financial backers of the viability of his 
plan. He didn’t specifically use the term risk, but rather 
introduced threats to program success and plans of action to 
overcome these threats.  
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One threat he identified had to do with the unknowns of 
completing the program on time within a reasonable cost. To 
mitigate this threat, he proposed an incremental approach to 
building the railroad, starting at both ends and measuring 
actual progress, allowing for incremental decision points to 
continue the program, discontinue, or adjust the plan.  
This concept is also included in the more recent 
Incremental Commitment Model13, which uses risk-driven anchor-
point milestones rather than traditional systems engineering 
design reviews to allow for making a feasibility decision about 
continuing a program.  
Another threat to the Pacific Railroad that Judah 
identified had to do with the lack of infrastructure required 
along the chosen route. He proposed to mitigate this threat by 
first building a wagon road along the route to allow for 
settlement prior to construction. The wagon road with 
settlements and depots along the route would also mitigate 
another threat that he identified: the danger posed by hostile 
Indians destroying the railroad.  
He argued that settlement along the wagon route would deter 
attacks and stated, What more terrible rod of power we hold over 
these Indians—the power to concentrate hundreds, ney, thousands 
of men in a few hours upon any desired point? How much harm 
could they do before the fighting train would be upon them at 
13 
 
the rate of fifty miles an hour? Judah’s plan not only proposed 
the approach to build the Pacific Railroad, but identified 
threats, or what we would today call risks, to achieving the 
plan and mitigation actions required to overcome the threats.  
These early examples provide insight into the minds of 
early planners and engineers and how they considered potential 
negative outcomes and implemented action plans to increase the 
likelihood of program success.  
However, risk management today is a large field of study. 
It includes research in mathematical notations of probability, 
finding and quantifying cause and effect relationships between 
human behavior or environmental influences and their health 
impact, financial and economic applications, optimizing 
insurance levels and cost, human safety analysis, supply chain 
risk, as well as many other applications14, 15, 16.  
Risk management, as a formal program management and 
engineering process as applied to the engineering of complex 
systems, emerged after World War II17. Mehr and Hedges18 codified 
the basic concepts of risk management in 1963, after seven years 
of research and writing, and included details about analyzing 
and handling risks to a business enterprise. 
Today, risk management as a program management and 
engineering practice is commonplace19. The Project Management 
Institute’s Project Management Body of Knowledge includes 
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project risk management as one of its ten knowledge areas, 
highlighting its importance as equal to areas such as scope, 
cost, schedule, and quality management20.  
The Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) includes 
risk management as a process area, and organizations are 
required to demonstrate competence in program-level risk 
management in order to achieve a maturity level 3 rating21. The 
Guide to the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge includes risk 
management as a topic within the systems engineering management 
knowledge area and discusses the overlap between systems 
engineering and program management within the program’s overall 
risk management process3.  
The Department of Defense requires all program managers to 
manage risk22 and has developed a detailed guidebook to assist 
program managers in the activities required to manage program 
risk23.  
Even with the evolution of risk management as a standard 
engineering and management process, not all high-risk and 
critical programs have effective risk management processes in 
place. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
recently reported that over half of the programs that it 
examined in a deep-dive assessment had significant weaknesses in 
their risk assessment processes24. 
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Simply having a risk management process in place is not 
sufficient. Programs need to have a continual focus on the most 
critical risks to program success. These most critical risks go 
beyond meeting cost and schedule constraints or overcoming 
technical challenges.  
Some of the most challenging risks facing a systems 
engineering team are associated with ensuring that the 
capabilities delivered actually satisfy the real operational 
need and that as the operational need evolves during the systems 
engineering lifecycle, the team is able to identify these 
changes and react to the shift in need. Ignoring these 
considerations increases operational risk for the end-user of 
the capability and decreases the likelihood that the end-user 









Operational risk management is widely practiced in the 
banking industry and in military operations. While some of the 
concepts and definitions are common, the purpose and approach 
are unique depending on the application.  
In the banking industry, operational risk management 
focuses on mitigating catastrophic financial loss at an 
institution and limiting the propagation of that loss to other 
banks and across international boundaries. In the military, 
operational risk has a heavy emphasis on safety hazards and 
their impact on mission outcomes. Both of these applications of 
operational risk management form a foundation for a more 
comprehensive treatment of operational risk.  
3.1 OPERATIONAL RISK IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY  
Operational risk management within the banking industry is 
focused on the goal of reducing the probability of loss due to 
events such as fraud, mismanagement, system failures, failed 
investments, or legal considerations25. Banks estimate their risk 
exposure, establish mitigation activities, and set aside 
financial reserves to cover such loss. The banking system is 
international in that loss and risk aren’t confined to a single 
bank or country but have broader impacts to the world economy. 
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In 1930, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was 
established in Basel, Switzerland. It is an international 
organization with shareholders consisting of central banks and 
other monetary authorities. The purpose of the BIS is to foster 
monetary and financial stability and international cooperation 
among central banks.  
Military tensions in the 1930s reduced cooperation between 
countries, and the BIS was instrumental in moving more than one 
hundred and forty tons of gold out of the European central banks 
for safe keeping as part of the goal to ensure international 
financial stability. After World War II, the BIS became the 
international forum for the central establishment and control of 
banking standards26.  
The Group of Ten (G-10) consists of eleven industrialized 
nations that meet on an annual basis to discuss and cooperate 
regarding international financial matters27. After several high 
visibility bank failures in 1974, including the collapse of 
Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany and the Franklin National Bank in 
the United States, the G-10 asked the BIS to establish the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. The Basel committee 
established standards for international banking focused on risks 
incurred by international banks to limit the spread of financial 
failure in times of crisis28.  
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These standards evolved over years of collaboration and 
were known as the Basel Accord (1988), Basel II (2004), and 
Basel III (2010). The term operational risk emerged during this 
time and became the leading approach for managing banking 
institution risk in the 1990s29.  
The Basel committee established a framework for managing 
financial risk using operational risk management as the central 
expectation for banks to implement. It defined operational risk 
as the risk of loss resulting from the inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people, and systems or from external events. 
This definition included legal risk and published a set of 
principles and a framework for managing operational risk30.  
The Basel definition of operational risk is general enough 
to apply to other industries and applications of operational 
risk management, however, the principles are focused on the 
banking industry. They require banks who comply with the 
framework to establish a robust operational risk management 
approach with expectations placed on the board of directors and 
senior management as well as process expectations for continuous 
operational risk identification, mitigation, and reporting.  
The Basel operational risk management principles are shown 
in Table 1. The Basel operational risk management principles 
emerged to address banking risk and were established in times of 
crisis to avert future global financial loss. As such, they are  
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Table 1. Basel Operational Risk Principles 
 
Principle 






Principle 1: The board of directors should take 
the lead in establishing a strong risk 
management culture. The board of directors and 
senior management should establish a corporate 
culture that is guided by strong risk management 
and that supports and provides appropriate 
standards and incentives for professional and 
responsible behavior. In this regard, it is the 
responsibility of the board of directors to 
ensure that a strong operational risk management 
culture exists throughout the whole 
organization. 
Principle 2: Banks should develop, implement, 
and maintain a Framework that is fully 
integrated into the bank’s overall risk 
management processes. The Framework for 
operational risk management chosen by an 
individual bank will depend on a range of 
factors, including its nature, size, complexity, 




Principle 3: The board of directors should 
establish, approve, and periodically review the 
Framework. The board of directors should oversee 
senior management to ensure that the policies, 
processes, and systems are implemented 
effectively at all decision levels. 
Principle 4: The board of directors should 
approve and review a risk appetite and tolerance 
statement for operational risk that articulates 
the nature, types, and levels of operational 




Principle 5: Senior management should develop 
for approval by the board of directors a clear, 
effective, and robust governance structure with 
well defined, transparent, and consistent lines 
of responsibility. Senior management is 
responsible for consistently implementing and 
maintaining throughout the organization 
policies, processes, and systems for managing 
operational risk in all of the bank’s material 
products, activities, processes, and systems 








Principle 6: Senior management should ensure the 
identification and assessment of the operational 
risk inherent in all material products, 
activities, processes, and systems to make sure 
that the inherent risks and incentives are well 
understood. 
Principle 7: Senior management should ensure 
that there is an approval process for all new 
products, activities, processes, and systems 






Principle 8: Senior management should implement 
a process to regularly monitor operational risk 
profiles and material exposures to losses. 
Appropriate reporting mechanisms should be in 
place at the board, senior management, and 
business line levels that support proactive 






Principle 9: Banks should have a strong control 
environment that utilizes policies, processes, 
and systems; appropriate internal controls; and 





Principle 10: Banks should have business 
resiliency and continuity plans in place to 
ensure an ability to operate on an ongoing basis 




Principle 11: A bank’s public disclosures should 
allow stakeholders to assess its approach to 
operational risk management. 
 
unique to the banking industry. However, the concepts are sound 
and at a higher level of abstraction apply more broadly.  
As financial institutions become more complex through 
regulation changes or diversification of services offered, 
operational risk increases, and the need for a broader 
discussion of operational risk increases as well31. The Basel 




Table 2. Basel Principles Generalized 
 
Basel Principles Generalized 
Principle 1: Establish a strong operational risk 
management culture 
Principle 2: Integrate operational risk 
considerations into overall operations 
Principle 3: Ensure that operational risk 
management is implemented effectively 
Principle 4: Define the components of risk exposure 
based on operational needs 
Principle 5: Establish an operational risk 
management strategy 
Principle 6: Continuously identify and assess 
operational risk based on ongoing operational 
activities 
Principle 7: Identify and assess operational risk 
when adopting new systems or processes 
Principle 8: Monitor and report operational risk 
exposure to operational leadership 
Principle 9: Establish and implement mitigation 
strategies for the most critical operational risks 
Principle 10: Implement resiliency and continuity 
plans to ensure ongoing operations in the event of 
severe operational disruption 
Principle 11: Ensure that key stakeholders 
participate in operational risk activities 
 
Power suggests that operational risk management is still a 
relatively new field of study within the banking industry and 
states, Definitions of key concepts are an intimate and central 
part of the logic of any practice; without a system of concepts 
and taxonomies, any practice of intervention is blind, 
disorganised and of questionable legitimacy29.  
Moving toward a more general application of these concepts 
may assist any operational organization in establishing and 
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maintaining a comprehensive operational risk management process 
that focuses on mitigating mission and business risks.  
3.2 OPERATIONAL RISK IN THE MILITARY  
Military operations involve weighing the risk of taking 
action against the risk of inaction. Colonel John Boyd, United 
States Air Force, wanted to understand why U.S. fighter pilots 
were more successful in combat while flying the F-86 fighter 
aircraft as opposed to pilots flying the Mig-15, a more 
technologically advanced aircraft, during the Korean conflict.  
His research concluded that U.S. fighters were able to 
cycle through a four-step decision process more quickly than 
their adversaries. This cycle of observe, orient, decide, and 
act became known as the OODA-loop and was adapted beyond Air 
Force fighter pilots into ground and naval operations32. Inherent 
in the OODA-loop cycle is identification and mitigation of 
operational risk.  
While the fighter pilot’s OODA-loop is executed in mere 
seconds, the process of making decisions using the OODA-loop in 
a military context applies equally for mission-planning 
activities and long-term strategic planning and involves 
identifying and mitigating operational risk. Accommodating 
uncertainty and allowing flexibility in execution is more 
conducive to improving mission outcomes and decreasing safety-
related risks33.  
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The U.S. Marine Corps defines operational risk management 
as The process of identifying and controlling hazards to 
conserve combat power and resources34. The U.S. Navy defines 
operational risk management in OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3500.39B as The 
process of dealing with risk associated within military 
operations, which includes risk assessment, risk decision making 
and implementation of effective risk controls35.  
The U.S. Air Force removed the word operational from its 
guidance document and prefers the more generic term risk 
management. Its definition of risk management is a decision-
making process to systematically evaluate possible courses of 
action, identify risks and benefits, and determine the best 
course of action for any given situation36. While the definition 
includes for any given situation, the emphasis within the 
guidance document on risk management is on addressing personnel 
health, safety, and environmental factors.  
The U.S. Army includes guidance for the management of risk 
in operational contexts within ATP 5-19 and defines risk 
management as The process of identifying, assessing, and 
controlling risks arising from operational factors and making 
decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits37.  
The focus of operational risk in the Marine Corps, the 
Navy, the Air Force, and the Army is on identification and 
elimination of hazards. The Navy defines a hazard in 3500.39B as 
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Any real or potential threat that can cause personal injury or 
death, property damage or mission degradation, or damage to 
environment. The Navy identifies its operational risk management 
process in four steps: Identify Hazards, Assess Hazards, Make 
Risk Decisions, and Implement Controls.  
The Army includes the same four steps, adding Supervise and 
Evaluate as a fifth step. The increase of asymmetric threats in 
combat, that is an unpredictable enemy using unconventional 
means to attack a more conventional force, increases the 
emphasis on safety and hazard mitigation on the battlefield38. 
Similar to the approaches found in the military services, 
NASA uses a Risk-Informed Safety Case approach to support the 
claim that NASA operations are conducted in a safe manner, free 
from operational safety-related hazards97.    
This emphasis on hazards rather than on a more general 
definition of operational risk narrows the handling of potential 
operational risk to the identification of safety-related risks 
and ignores other operational attributes that contribute to 
mission or business degradation.  
3.3 OPERATIONAL RISK EXPANDED  
The concepts and application of operational risk management 
in banking and military operations provides a foundation for a 
more comprehensive treatment of operational risk. The structure 
and discipline established in a continuous process of 
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identifying risks or hazards and establishing proactive 
mitigation plans to address these risks is fundamental to 
addressing operational risk.  
However, the narrow focus within both the banking industry 
on financial risk and within the military on safety hazards 
decreases the potential effectiveness of operational risk 
activities. The more inclusive definition of operational risk 
and operational risk management is shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Operational Risk Definitions 
 




An operational practice with processes, 
methods, and tools for managing risks to 
successful mission and business 
outcomes.  
 
It provides a disciplined environment 
for proactive decision making to:   
- continually assess what could go wrong 
(operational risks) 
- determine which operational risks are 
most important to deal with, and 
- implement strategies to address 
operational risk 
 
With this more general yet comprehensive definition, 
operational organizations may explore operational risks39 beyond 
those related to financial risk as practiced in the banking 
industry and safety hazards as explored in military contexts. 
Any risk to the successful accomplishment of mission or business 
outcomes may be identified and addressed.  
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A detailed operational risk taxonomy is presented in 
Appendix A, with the goal of assisting operational organizations 
in exploring potential sources of risk to both mission execution 

























Requirements development and management is one of the 
earliest and most critical activities in the systems engineering 
lifecycle. It represents the bridge between the operational need 
and the potential solution space. Even when the rest of the 
systems engineering activities are performed with effectiveness, 
solving the wrong problem will increase the likelihood of 
rejection of the system by the end-user and late lifecycle cost 
increases.  
In 2008, Carnegie Mellon University and the National 
Defense Industrial Association developed a study to determine 
whether systems engineering practices had an impact on program 
performance (cost, schedule, scope) of defense systems40. It was 
not an easy question to answer, as there were few studies 
specifically aimed at correlating systems engineering practices 
and program outcomes.  
The authors found that across the defense industry, among 
contractors who participated in the survey, there wasn’t a 
common definition of the activities included in their respective 
systems engineering approaches. Some companies included 
engineering management activities such as risk management and 
planning in their definition while others had a narrower 
definition of systems engineering and even excluded later 
28 
 
lifecycle activities such as integration and testing in how they 
defined systems engineering.  
In constructing their approach to gathering data, the team 
decided to focus on the major activities of systems engineering 
rather than the topic as a whole. They devised a survey 
instrument that asked systems engineers and program managers 
about the effectiveness of eleven systems engineering practices 
within their program and also on program outcomes such as 
schedule and cost variance. They found sixty-four programs 
across defense industry companies willing to participate in the 
survey. 
The research continued through 2012 as the team looked to 
obtain quantitative evidence of the benefit of systems 
engineering best practices on program performance2. It also 
explored team experience, program challenges, and their 
relationship to program success. Figure 2 presents the summary 
of the team’s findings with the systems engineering activity on 
the y-axis and the correlation, represented by Gamma score, on 
the x-axis. 
Gamma values of zero indicate a non-existence or weak 
relationship. Gamma values near 1 represent a strong positive 
relationship, while Gamma values near -1 represent a strong 
negative relationship. If a systems engineering practice has a 




Figure 2. Program Performance versus SE Capabilities and Drivers. 
 
 
of that practice move in the same direction. While this 
relationship does not indicate causation, it does support the 
researcher’s conclusion that projects that properly apply 
systems engineering best practices perform better than projects 
that do not.  
Requirements activities represents one of the highest Gamma 
values, second only to project planning. This supports the 
argument that requirements development and management is one of 
the most critical systems engineering activities impacting 
program outcomes.  
As shown in Figure 3, the Gamma value of 0.44 indicates a 
strong supporting relationship between requirements engineering  








delivering higher performance increased from 21 percent to 58 
percent as the effectiveness of their requirements engineering 
practices increased from lower to higher.  
While this study highlights the importance of applying 
systems engineering activities to increase the likelihood of 
program success, it does not explore the relationship between an 
operational risk focus and program outcomes. Examining studies 
of program failures highlights this relationship.  
One study by the Rand Corporation explored the relationship 
between the cost of complex system development and the 
uncertainty of requirements41. The authors of the study argue 
that operational risks may drive uncertainty and that urgent 
operational needs might cause a program to be accelerated or 
more end units produced than planned.  
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This type of churn in requirements and in funding causes 
costs to increase and requires re-work in lifecycle engineering 
activities and artifacts. The Rand study also points out that a 
lack of participation by operationally focused stakeholders 
creates disconnects when the system is tested against 
operational needs.  
In several system development programs, the authors 
recognized that ...requirements and capabilities were set by 
planners and promised by the acquisition community, but there 
was great difficulty in testing them during operational test and 
evaluation. These difficulties are driven by long acquisition 
timelines during which operational risks and mission threats 
influence the operational need.  
The real operational need when the system enters 
operational test and evaluation has evolved, but the operational 
need statement, which may have been baselined years earlier, 
remains stagnant. The tension between long-standing engineering 
methods expecting well-defined and stable requirements and the 
rapid evolution of operational need requires newer methods for 
including an ongoing review of operational risk and mission 
threats and mechanisms for inserting this new understanding into 
the system baseline to allow systems to remain relevant.  
 The Nunn-McCurdy Act was a provision in the 1983 defense 
authorization bill42 in which the intent was to force a 
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notification of Congress and to initiate a review of major 
weapon system acquisition programs if they exceeded their 
Acquisition Program Baseline by certain thresholds. This is 
commonly referred to as a Nunn-McCurdy breach.  
The review is intended to evaluate whether the program is 
worth continuing or if the program should be canceled. While a 
Nunn-McCurdy breach is a good mechanism for reviewing the 
efficacy of a program, the review is late-to-need. As former 
Senator John Tower, then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, pointed out during the initial debate of the 
provision, this is like closing the gate after the horse has 
galloped off into the boondocks43.  
 Finding the root cause(s) of a Nunn-McCurdy breach may be 
challenging. As an old proverb states, success has many fathers, 
while failure is an orphan44.  
Commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a 
Rand study explored the issues that led to such breaches45. The 
study examined the Army’s Excalibur program, a munitions system 
that provides for precision fires in artillery munitions, and 
the Navy’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) program, which was 
designed to serve as the technical backbone for the maintenance, 
financial, and supply functions of the Navy.  
The root causes for breaches identified in the Excalibur 
program were changes in procurement quantities driven by 
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operational requirements changes and affordability 
considerations, inaccurate estimates, concept and technological 
changes, and minor technical issues. The concept and 
technological changes occurred between the initial solicitation 
and contract award.  
Urgent operational needs to support Operation Enduring 
Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom caused production to be 
accelerated and more Increment 1A rounds to be produced than 
initially planned. This is an example of how operational risk 
and mission threats may drive the need to evolve requirements 
after programs have baselined requirements.  
 The Navy’s ERP system was initiated in 2003 and fully 
started in 2004. The program was re-baselined in 2006 at an 
increase of $400 million. The increase was necessitated by a re-
design of the system, a change in business practices, and an 
improvement in estimates.  
Major shifts in the way that the Navy was organized moved 
intermediate maintenance activities to regional maintenance 
activities and caused major re-design issues. Identifying 
operational risk and evolving mission needs during early 
requirements activities could have highlighted the need to 
include growth and exploratory scenarios into the requirements 
engineering process and might have led to a more flexible design 
that could have withstood this operational change. 
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 After examining the Excalibur and the Navy ERP root causes 
of failure, the author recommended a framework for thinking 
about critical program features. An initial conceptual framework 
would allow a decision maker to quickly determine what is most 
critical, complex, or least understood of the list of program 
features. He recommends an approach that characterizes technical 
complexity of functional requirements.  
However, he does not look at quality attributes such as 
evolvability, flexibility, and adaptability to operational risk 
and mission changes. The author recognizes that operational risk 
and mission threats influence operational need and even states, 
...as the needs of the battlefield evolve, so will the demand 
for integrated, better, and faster technologies. But the focus 
is primarily on technical risk of components already selected or 
designed, not on assessing evolving operational risk and its 
impact on system or sub-system requirements or the selection or 
design of components. Addressing operational risk factors this 
late in the development lifecycle leads to re-work and cost 
impacts.  
 The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) is a key part of 
the future missile alert system for the United States46. When 
fully operational, it will provide monitoring of ballistic 
missile launches anywhere in the world at any time. It is also 
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one of the most challenging programs undertaken with cost growth 
estimated at over 400 percent47.  
The cost overruns have been attributed to immature 
technologies, complex requirements, and unrealistic cost 
estimates48. The program began in 1996 with a contract awarded to 
Lockheed Martin for $2.3 billion. By 2012, the cost of the 
program grew to nearly $14 billion, as shown in Figure 4, as 
reported in Program Office Status Reports, and by 2014 costs 
were estimated at $17 billion47. 
 
Figure 4. SBIRS Cost Growth as Reported in Program Office Status Reports 
 
 
 The SBIRS program’s first Nunn-McCurdy breach was declared 
in 2000 when the program failed to meet the initial operational 
capability date for Increment 1 Ground in late 1999. Brent 
Collins, then Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space, 
assembled a team to review the program.  
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I was asked to lead the technical review team investigating 
the contractor’s development activities and progress at its 
primary software development location in Boulder, Colorado, and 
the operational site at Buckley Air Force Base in Aurora,  
Colorado.   
The team included members from the Software Engineering 
Institute, Aerospace Corporation, MITRE, Air Force Audit Agency, 
Defense Contract Management Center, and Lockheed Martin. During 
a planning meeting before the investigation, I asked Mr. Collins 
to articulate what success would look like for the program. He 
stated that achievement would be successful certification of 
Increment 1 on the mutually-agreed-upon re-structure date with a 
subordinate goal of successful entry into Initial Operational 
Test and Evaluation49. The team decided to conduct a risk 
assessment following the Software Risk Evaluation (SRE) method 
developed by the Software Engineering Institute50.  
 The SRE method uses a detailed software development risk 
taxonomy that provides a structure for identifying and 
classifying risks51. While the taxonomy was developed to address 
risks related to software development programs, the topics and 
structure are written generically enough to apply more broadly. 
Figure 5 shows the overall structure of the taxonomy with 
three major classes: Product Engineering, Development 
Environment, and Program Constraints. These three categories 
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equate to what the program is building (Product Engineering), 
how the team chooses to operate (Development Environment), and 
external forces (Program Constraints).  
 
 
Figure 5. SEI’s Software Development Taxonomy. 
 
 
The next level contains elements such as Requirements, 
Design, and Resources. The lower level of the taxonomy structure 
contains attributes, which are the risk concerns associated with 
each element.  
For example, the attributes to explore for risk 
identification or classification under the element of 
Requirements would be Stability, Completeness, Clarity, 
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Validity, Feasibility, Precedent, and Scale. Discussing the 
elements of the taxonomy with program team members is a good way 
to explore possible program risks and may help expand potential 
sources of risk beyond a team’s collective experience. In 
addition, a taxonomy may help de-personalize risk identification 
and allow team members to focus on objective definitions of the 
attributes rather than trying to place blame or argue over word 
definitions.  
During the SBIRS Increment 1 technical review, the taxonomy 
was useful in exploring areas of program risk with the 
engineering team in a non-threatening approach. In a five-day 
period we interviewed thirty-one team members, identified one 
hundred sixty-nine individual risk statements, and affinity-
grouped them into fifteen risk areas49. One of the major risk 
areas was described as Requirements Uncertainty.  
The program was experiencing disconnects between the 
expectations of the engineering team and the operational team. 
Disconnects such as these arise when the operational need or 
mission threat is either not well understood or has evolved 
during development activities, and the changes were not 
incorporated into development activities and are not reflected 
in the deployed system.  
 The second interview site was the SBIRS operational 
facility. The facility was located at Buckley Air Force Base, 
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and the end-users were mostly officers and enlisted members of 
the United States Air Force. The operators were highly-trained 
and educated men and women, yet most of them were not engineers 
and didn’t understand the systems engineering activities 
required to develop a complex system.  
One example of this disconnect has to do with defect 
discovery and removal. The SBIRS development team wanted more 
test time at the operational site to find and remove defects. 
Finding and removing defects as the system moves from a 
development environment through various integration and test 
environments and finally into the operational environment is a 
standard systems engineering approach. It allows the development 
team to grow system reliability and to gain confidence in system 
performance supporting deployment decisions52.  
SBIRS operators, on the other hand, spent their time 
operating systems that have to work every time. As one operator 
stated, The system has to work, or people will die. I don’t 
understand why they are finding defects. 
 Given this difference in perception, the assessment team 
decided that using the software development taxonomy wasn’t the 
right tool for eliciting risks. Having recently taught risk 
management courses at several overseas operational locations, I 
sketched the beginnings of what was eventually published as the 
Taxonomy of Operational Risks53. The team tested the operational 
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risk taxonomy during interviews at Buckley Air Force Base, as 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. SEI's Taxonomy of Operational Risks. 
 
 
Similar to the development taxonomy, the operational risk 
taxonomy contains classes, elements, and attributes. The classes 
are organized into areas related to the mission or missions 
performed by the operational organization (Mission), the way 
that the operational organization chooses to perform the mission 
or missions (Work Processes), and external forces (Constraints).  
41 
 
The taxonomy proved to be a good mechanism to elicit risks 
from operational users, and over a two-day period the team was 
able to elicit seventy risk statements, which were grouped into 
eight risk areas54. One of the major risk areas identified  
by the operational users was Requirements. The end-users were 
concerned that the requirements management process failed to 
adequately capture system capabilities and expectations.  
They were also concerned that some requirements were more 
stringent than operationally required and that the development 
contractor would have difficulty achieving these requirements. 
The practical use of the operational risk taxonomy helped evolve 
the work to its current state and publication.  
 These case studies have shown the importance of a continued 
focus on operational risk and mission threats during the systems 
engineering lifecycle to ensure that the end product meets the 
evolving needs of operational users. However, there are few 
methodologies or approaches that explicitly include operational 
risk considerations during the systems engineering lifecycle. 
Chapter 5 offers one such approach with the goal of using a 
continual focus on operational risk as a means to improve the 










 This chapter introduces a repeatable method designed to 
influence systems engineering activities through exploration and 
management of operational risk throughout the systems 
engineering lifecycle. The approach outlined is called 
Operational Risk-Driven Engineering Requirements/Engineering 
Development (ORDERED).  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Operational Risk-Driven Engineering 
Requirements/Engineering Development is a repeatable method 
designed to influence systems engineering activities throughout 
the systems engineering lifecycle with the purpose of improving 
program outcomes and system operability and usability. New or 
enhanced capabilities are driven by mission and business needs 
of diverse stakeholders55.  
Mission and business needs increase operational risk when 
gaps in current capabilities fail to address these needs. As new 
capabilities are developed, mission and business needs evolve, 
increasing the operational risk that the new capability will 
fail to address these changes. The ORDERED method ensures that 
program requirements and development activities are enacted with 
a thorough consideration of operational risk concerns.  
43 
 
ORDERED is not intended to replace a program’s current set 
of engineering methods, but rather to augment the current 
approach with operational risk considerations. Figure 7 presents 
a high-level overview of the ORDERED method.  
 
Figure 7. ORDERED Method. 
 
 
 Mission and business threats and needs are derived from 
current operations and maintenance activities. The gap between 
needs and threats and current systems and operational processes 
generates operational risk. Operational risk is captured in the 
form of individual risk statements and may be grouped into 
operational risk areas.  
These risks or risk areas define the negative impact of 
what could go wrong, essentially the mission or business loss 
that may be realized. Operational risk attributes are derived 
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from the risks. These attributes are characteristics of the 
system or capability.  
Operation risk scenarios are developed to further describe 
the risk in terms of the environment, behavior, and outcomes 
that would negatively impact mission or business objectives. The 
scenarios are then used during the systems engineering process 
to inform activities such as requirements development, 
architecture and design development, implementation decisions, 
test and acceptance case development, and deployment strategies 
and approaches.  
As mission and business needs and threats evolve, 
operational risks are continuously identified, their attributes 
identified or refined, and scenarios are developed or updated. 
Mechanisms to incorporate this evolved understanding of mission 
and business needs into the program baseline should be included 
into the agreement between the customer and the developer. The 
shorter time between discovery of new operational risk-driven 
changes and incorporation of those changes into the program 
baseline, the more likely systems engineers will be able to 
influence engineering activities before committing to 




5.2 BASIC CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONAL RISK 
 For the purpose of ORDERED, operational risk is defined 
simply as the possibility of suffering mission or business loss. 
An operational organization is any group of individuals teamed 
together with a common purpose to carry out a mission. A mission 
is comprised of a specific task or set of tasks carried out by 
operational personnel56. Tasks may be described as either 
mission-essential or mission-support57.  
Mission-essential tasks directly contribute to mission 
execution. For example, if the operational organization was a 
community fire department, mission-essential tasks could include 
emergency response, firefighting, and rescue tasks. Mission-
support tasks could include equipment maintenance, training, and 
fire prevention awareness.  
Mission risks may be driven by any number of conditions, 
such as events, activities, processes, and systems that could 
impact the operational organization’s ability to perform its 
mission or could negatively impact the full accomplishment of 
the mission. The impact is tactical in that the mission is 
impacted directly.  
Business risks are also driven by similar conditions, but 
the impact is more strategic. A flat-tire on a fire truck is a 
risk to performing the mission task of fighting fires, and 
therefore, may be described as a mission risk. A lower tax-base 
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in a community may impact the fire department’s ability to 
perform preventive maintenance or hire and train future 
firefighters, and therefore, could be described as a business 
risk. This distinction is valuable when identifying operational 
risk.  
When the focus is solely on immediate mission risks, 
longer-term considerations such as affordability or long-term 
viability of the organization are ignored. When the focus is 
solely on business risks, mitigation actions or system solutions 
may not be operationally effective in the short-term. The 
balance between mission and business considerations helps ensure 
that solutions and mitigation actions are both operationally 
relevant and support the strategic needs of the organization.  
5.3 ORDERED APPROACH 
 The process steps of the ORDERED approach are shown in 
Figure 8.
 





ORDERED is a continuous process whereby operational risks 
are identified and analyzed. The risks or risk areas are 
characterized by identifying operational risk attributes and 
scenarios to further describe the concern in a manner that helps 
bridge the gap between operational activities and engineering 
activities. These scenarios are then evaluated against current 
and future engineering activities to ensure that requirements 
and development activities mitigate operational risk.  
5.3.1 IDENTIFY OPERATIONAL RISKS 
 The activities associated with the Identify Operational 
Risks process step are shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Identify Operational Risks 
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Risks are identified by having a clear understanding of the 
mission and business context of the operational organization to 
include mission-critical and mission-support tasks, objectives, 
and success criteria and then exploring areas of concern based 
on potentially failing to achieve, or fully achieve, operational 
mission success.  
5.3.1.1 ESTABLISH MISSION AND BUSINESS CONTEXT 
INPUTS: Understanding of mission and business needs. 
OUTPUTS: Mission and business objectives and additional context 
as needed.  
Clear articulation of mission and business context helps 
focus risk identification on areas relevant to mission success. 
According to Lewis Carrol, If you don't know where you are 
going, any road will get you there58. For the purpose of risk 
identification, knowing what constitutes mission and business 
success allows operational staff to explore obstacles to 
achieving success.  
For example, a government agency may operate a 
Cybersecurity Operations Center (CSOC). The purpose of the CSOC 
is to ensure that cybersecurity incidents do not impact agency 
operations. The mission and business objectives of the CSOC 
could be described as shown in Table 4.  
Depending on the complexity of the mission, further 
definition may be required to fully understand the mission and  
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Table 4. CSOC Mission and Business Objectives. 
 
Mission Objectives Business Objectives 
1. Detect, contain, and 
remediate cybersecurity 
threats. 
2. Analyze trends, determine 
root causes, and improve system 
resilience.  
3. Educate system operators and 
maintainers about cybersecurity 
threats. 
1. Reduce cybersecurity-related 
incidents. 
2. Reduce cost of cybersecurity 
activities. 
3. Position for agency 
organizational consolidation. 
 
business context. Additional details defining specific mission-
critical and mission-support tasks, detailed processes, and 
procedures necessary to perform the mission, as well as  
quantitative criteria to evaluate mission success, may be 
provided.  
5.3.1.2 RISK IDENTIFICATION 
INPUTS: Mission and business objectives and additional context 
as needed. 
OUTPUTS: List of operational risks.  
There are many methods for identification of risk to 
include continuous risk identification by all members of the 
organization, structure risk identification sessions, and 
milestone or event-based risk identification3. Structured risk 
identification sessions are facilitated activities with 
stakeholders and subject matter experts available to help 
brainstorm operational risks.  
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Individual risk statements are captured in a structured 
manner to allow for analysis. Risks may be identified using the 
if-then construct: if (an event occurs), then (an outcome 
occurs) or using the condition; consequence construct: condition 
(something that exists) leads to an undesirable consequence 
(outcome). The simplified condition; consequence structure will 
be used here.  
Regardless of identification method or methods used, 
sources of risk are explored by operational personnel. ORDERED 
uses a taxonomy to help with risk identification. A taxonomy is 
useful both when exploring sources of risk as well as when 
classifying risks after they are identified to help with the 
Analyze Operational Risks process. The ORDERED Taxonomy is shown 
in Figure 10. The taxonomy was developed and simplified by 
considering several source documents53, 59, 60, 20 and personal 
experience.  
The ORDERED taxonomy consists of two categories: Mission 
and Business. The next level of the taxonomy contains elements 
such as Mission Planning, Operational Systems, and Continuous 
Improvement. The final level of the taxonomy consists of 
attributes.  
Appendix A contains the complete taxonomy with taxonomic 




Figure 10. ORDERED Risk Taxonomy 
 
 
exploratory questions that may be used during a risk assessment 
to prompt discussion of operational risk. 
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Using the example of an agency CSOC, during a risk 
identification workshop, CSOC operators explored business and 
mission objectives and used the ORDERED taxonomy to examine  
areas of potential risk. The risk workshop used a structured 
brainstorm approach and allowed all concerns to be voiced and 
captured without filtering. The participants collected their 
concerns in the condition; consequence format to allow for 
analysis in subsequent steps. Shown in Table 5 are five of the 
more than sixty risks identified during the session.  
Table 5. CSOC Risk Statements 
 
Risk ID Risk Statement 
CSOC001 
Incident occurrence is unpredictable; 
may not have adequate resources to 
respond during crisis 
CSOC002 
Heavy compliance and oversight make 
processes rigid; may not be able to 
adjust quickly to new events 
CSOC003 
Current intrusion detection system is 
proprietary, and vendor is not 
responsive when changes are needed; 
system may not detect newer threats; 
cost of support is high 
CSOC004 
We hire new operators with little 
experience; lower mission effectiveness 
CSOC005 
80 percent of operator time is spent 
responding to incidents; may not see 
trends or understand root cause of 
incidents 
 
 Using the condition; consequence format keeps the risk 
statements focused on areas of concern that are relevant to the 
mission. Risk CSOC004 was identified when exploring Mission 
Execution, Mission Outcomes, and Operators elements of the 
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ORDERED taxonomy. The concern raised was that mission 
effectiveness and ability to meet operational objectives are 
impacted by inexperienced CSOC operators.  
CSOC003 raises concern about the use of a proprietary 
system and the inability to quickly update the system to meet 
operational needs. Since the CSOC is dependent on the 
proprietary system with no alternative source for the 
capability, CSOC leadership has little leverage with the vendor 
to reduce costs.  
5.3.2 ANALYZE OPERATIONAL RISKS 
The activities associated with the Analyze Operational 
Risks process step are shown in Figure 11. 
 





Once risks are identified, the next step is to analyze the 
risks to help understand the exposure that the mission is facing 
based on each risk, which risks are most critical to mitigate, 
and to group risks as appropriate when multiple risks address 
the same risk area.  
5.3.2.1 DETERMINE RISK EXPOSURE 
INPUTS: List of operational risks. 
OUTPUTS: List of operational risks and their risk exposure.  
Risk Exposure (RE) is the product of the probability (P) 
that the risk will occur and the impact (I) to the organization 
if the risk occurs: RE = P x I. The goal in determining risk 
exposure is to understand the relative criticality of a given 
risk in order to help decide which risks should be mitigated, in 
what order, and the number of resources that the organization is 
willing to expend on mitigation activities.  
Determining risk exposure is not an exact science and 
relies on the best judgment of individuals. For this reason the 
ORDERED approach keeps this step simple. The operational 
organization must decide how to assign a probability and impact 
score to each risk. ORDERED uses a simple 1 to 5 rating for 
probability as shown in Table 6, with 1 being the lowest 
probability of occurrence and 5 being the highest probability of 









p > 60% 
4 Likely 
40% < p < 60% 
3 Moderate 
20% < p < 40% 
2 Unlikely 
5% < p < 20% 
1 Rare 
p < 5% 
 
 
While probability of occurrence becomes a simple 
determination of likelihood of the risk occurring based on best 
judgment, the impact of occurrence must be taken into 
consideration with the impact of the risk to the mission or 
business needs of the organization. Each operational 
organization will adjust the impact definitions to meet its 
needs. A generic impact of occurrence table is shown in Table 7. 
With a list of risks and their risk exposure, an 
operational organization may begin to understand the relative 
importance of applying mitigation resources. A simple risk 
exposure matrix as shown in Table 8 may help to graphically show  
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Table 7. Impact of Risk Occurrence 
 
Impact Risk 
5 Extreme Unacceptable operational 
failure 
4 Major Loss of operational 
capability 
3 Moderate Remedial action required 
2 Minor Limited operational impact 
1 Insignificant Minimal operational impact 
 
Table 8. Risk Exposure Matrix 
 
  
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Extreme 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
Almost 
Certain 
5 Yellow Yellow Red Red Red 
Likely 4 Green Yellow Yellow Red Red 
Moderate 3 Green Yellow Yellow Yellow Red 
Unlikely 2 Green Green Yellow Yellow Red 
Rare 1 Green Green Green Yellow Yellow 
 
the risk exposure of each individual risk and its relative 
exposure as compared to other risks.  
Table 9 shows the CSOC risks with their probability of 
occurrence, impact of occurrence, and risk exposure.  
Using the risk exposure matrix and placing the CSOC risks 




Table 9. CSOC Risks with Risk Exposure 
 
Risk ID Risk Statement Prob Imp 
CSOC001 
Incident occurrence is unpredictable; 
may not have adequate resources to 
respond during crisis 
4 2 
CSOC002 
Heavy compliance and oversight make 
processes rigid; may not be able to 
adjust quickly to new events 
2 3 
CSOC003 
Current intrusion detection system is 
proprietary, and vendor is not 
responsive when changes are needed; 
system may not detect newer threats; 
cost of support is high 
4 4 
CSOC004 
We hire new operators with little 
experience; lower mission effectiveness 
4 4 
CSOC005 
80 percent of operator time is spent 
responding to incidents; may not see 





Table 10. CSOC Risk Exposure Matrix 
 
  
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Extreme 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
Almost 
Certain 
5      







Moderate 3      
Unlikely 2   CSOC002   
Rare 1      
  
The risk exposure matrix provides a quick and graphical 
representation of risk exposure and allows decision-makers to 
allocate resources to mitigate risks. Risks CSOC003 and CSOC004 
present the highest risk exposure to mission and business 
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objectives and should be considered first for mitigation 
activities.  
5.3.2.2 PRIORITIZE RISKS 
INPUTS: List of operational risks and their risk exposure. 
OUTPUTS: Prioritized list of operational risks.  
Prioritizing risks provides decision-makers with the 
ability to allocate scarce resources to mitigate the most 
important risks to mission success. Simply sorting the risk list 
by risk exposure, highest to lowest, provides a first look at 
potential prioritization.  
However, since risk probability and risk impact are 
assigned using best judgment, once the entire list of risks 
sorted by risk exposure is examined, it may be less practical or 
urgent to mitigate some risks that sort higher in the list than 
risks that are further down the risk list. Use the list of risks 
sorted by risk exposure highest to lowest and examine the top 
five to ten risks to make sure that the order of the risks makes 
sense.  
Allow for the possibility to move risks up or down based on 
operational need, urgency, and other operational concerns. 
Adjust the probability and impact or occurrence as more insight 
is gained.  
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In the CSOC example, a simple sort by risk exposure 
produces the list as shown in Table 11. This provides an initial 
list of the Top N risks.  
Table 11. CSOC Initial Prioritized Risk List 
  
After examining the prioritized list of risks, CSOC 
leadership decided that risk CSOC004 was more urgent to mitigate 
than CSOC0003, and likewise CSOC005 was more important to 
mitigate than CSOC001. Given these decisions, the list was re- 
sorted in accordance with the top five risks presented in Table 
12.  
 




Current intrusion detection 
system is proprietary, and vendor 
is not responsive when changes 
are needed; system may not detect 
newer threats; cost of support is 
high 
4 4 16 
CSOC004 
We hire new operators with little 
experience; lower mission 
effectiveness 
4 4 16 
CSOC001 
Incident occurrence is 
unpredictable; may not have 
adequate resources to respond 
during crisis 
4 2 8 
CSOC005 
80 percent of operator time is 
spent responding to incidents; 
may not see trends or understand 
root cause of incidents 
4 2 8 
CSOC002 
Heavy compliance and oversight 
make processes rigid; may not be 
able to adjust quickly to new 
events 
2 3 6 
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Table 12. CSOC Final List of Prioritized Risks 
 
5.3.2.3 GROUP INTO RISK AREAS (OPTIONAL) 
INPUTS: Prioritized list of operational risks. 
OUTPUTS: Prioritized list of operational risk areas.  
An individual risk may be viewed as a single flashlight 
illuminating some potential impact in the future. When an 
organization has a long list of risks, either due to an 
exhaustive risk identification process or as a result of 
multiple structured risk identification workshops, it may make 
sense to group the flashlights that appear to point in the same 
Top 




We hire new operators with 
little experience; lower 
mission effectiveness 
4 4 16 
2 CSOC003 
Current intrusion detection 
system is proprietary, and 
vendor is not responsive 
when changes are needed; 
system may not detect newer 
threats; cost of support is 
high 
4 4 16 
3 CSOC005 
80 percent of operator time 
is spent responding to 
incidents; may not see 
trends or understand root 
cause of incidents 
4 2 8 
4 CSOC001 
Incident occurrence is 
unpredictable; may not have 
adequate resources to 
respond during crisis 
4 2 8 
5 CSOC002 
Heavy compliance and 
oversight make processes 
rigid; may not be able to 
adjust quickly to new 
events 
2 3 6 
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direction together to get a better understanding of the common 
area of risk that they address.  
Risks may be grouped into a pre-defined structure such as 
the ORDERED taxonomy, a work breakdown structure, by mission 
tasks, or other structure that helps reason out how the risks 
relate. Another option is to group the risks by allowing a 
structure to emerge based on the risks themselves61.  
Once the individual risks are grouped into risk areas, the 
risk areas are then prioritized by examining the relationship 
between the risk areas. An inter-relationship digraph is a 
powerful and simple tool that may be used to examine these 
relationships62. Figure 12 shows an example inter-relationship 
digraph illustrating the relationship of six risk areas.  
Each risk area is comprised of many individual risk 
statements. The digraph is constructed by examining each risk 
area relative to every other risk area to determine if the risk 
statements associated with the risk area drive or cause the risk 
statements in the other risk area or vice versa. If there is a 
relationship, an arrow is drawn to show the primary direction of 
the relationship. Two-way arrows are not allowed.  
Once the digraph is constructed, add the number of arrows 
coming in to the risk area and the number going out. Risk areas 
with many arrows coming in indicate that other risk areas are 




Figure 12. Inter-relationship Digraph 
 
 
with many arrows going out indicate that risk statements in this 
risk area are driving risk in the other risk areas.  
In this example, the risk area New Mission Threats contains 
risk statements that drive risk in all other risk areas. 
Ideally, this is the risk area on which to focus mitigation 
activities, but realistically, evolving mission threats may be 
externally driven and may not be within the control of the 
organization to mitigate.  
The risk area System Flexibility may need to be addressed 
to ensure that systems may respond to new or evolved mission 
threats. Likewise, the risk area Operator Skill may need to be 
63 
 
addressed to ensure that operational personnel are adequately 
skilled to adjust to changes in mission needs. 
Prioritizing mitigation actions on the risk areas with more 
arrows going out than coming in provides focus and allows the 
organization to allocate mitigation resources effectively.  
5.3.3 IDENTIFY OPERATIONAL RISK ATTRIBUTES 
The activities associated with the Identify Operational 
Risk Attributes process step are shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Identify Operational Risk Attributes 
 
 
Once risks have been analyzed and their risk exposure 
determined, and the risks or risk areas are prioritized, the 
next step is to further explore the risks by identifying the 
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risk attributes that describe the risk’s characteristics and the 
concerns associated with those characteristics.  
5.3.3.1 MAP ATTRIBUTES TO RISKS OR RISK AREAS 
INPUTS: Prioritized list of operational risks or risk areas. 
OUTPUTS: List of operational risks and risk attributes.  
An operational risk attribute is a characteristic of the 
operational mission or business that will be judged negatively 
by stakeholders unless the operational risk is mitigated. The 
purpose of mapping operational risk attributes to risk 
statements is to further clarify operational concerns and to 
help when identifying mitigation actions.  
A starting point in mapping operational risk attributes is 
the ORDERED risk taxonomy. The lowest level of the taxonomy 
contains attributes describing the aspect of risk associated 
with the elements and categories of the taxonomy. Additional 
attributes to explore include quality attributes as described in 
Attribute Driven Design63 engineering approaches and the Method 
Framework for Engineering System Architectures64.  
In the CSOC example, the top five risks are shown in Table 
13 with the addition of the risk attributes from the ORDERED 
taxonomy.  
For risk CSOC004, the attributes mapped to the risk 
statement are Training and Skill Level from the Operator element  
and Effectiveness from the Mission Execution element. Training  
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Table 13. CSOC Top Risks with Risk Attributes 
Top 












4 4 16 
















system may not 
detect newer 
threats; cost 
of support is 
high 
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incidents 

























rigid; may not 
be able to 










and skill level of operators will be judged negatively by 
stakeholders if this risk isn’t mitigated. The effectiveness of 
the mission will also be judged negatively as the operators who 
are less skilled and lack training impact mission outcomes.  
5.3.3.2 IDENTIFY ATTRIBUTE CONCERN 
INPUTS: List of operational risks and risk attributes. 
OUTPUTS: List of operational risks, risk attributes, and areas 
of concern.  
In addition to understanding the attributes associated with 
the operational risk, additional insight into the actual concern 
is useful when determining mitigation actions. While it helps to 
understand that a given risk is associated with an ORDERED 
taxonomic element and attribute, the additional understanding 
from eliciting the area of concern from the individual or group 
who identified the risk provides more definitive focus.  
For example, an operator may have identified the following 
risk: Current systems were designed using nominal data loads; 
system may not scale. The risk could be mapped to the 
Operational Systems element and Throughput attribute of the 
taxonomy.  
adjust quickly 
to new events 
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Simply knowing that Throughput is an attribute may not 
provide enough detail. The attribute concern in this example 
could be described as mission stress. The operator is 
specifically concerned about how the system will operate when 
the mission becomes much more intense and the system needs to 
operate effectively when additional data is processed.  
In the CSOC example, Table 14 shows the top two risks 
mapped to taxonomic elements along with the operator’s concern. 





ID Risk Statement Prob Imp 
Risk 



































































The CSOC operator’s concern with the Skill Level and Mission 
Execution attributes is the inability to perform the mission 
when assimilating new staff, especially because of planned 
mission growth, which will require additional staff to be added 
at a rate higher than previously experienced.  
The addition of the attribute concern of Assimilation of 
new staff and planned growth in mission sheds more light on the 
risk. The addition of the attribute concern enables the 
construction of more complete risk scenarios.  
5.3.4 DEVELOP OPERATIONAL RISK SCENARIOS 
The activities associated with the Develop Operational Risk 
Scenarios process step are shown in Figure 14. 
 





5.3.4.1 DEVELOP SCENARIOS 
INPUTS: List of operational risks, risk attributes, and areas of 
concern. 
OUTPUTS: List of operational risks with risk scenarios.  
Scenarios are simply expressions of real-world 
interactions. They may be formal, structured and verbose, or 
freer form and expressed simply65. The purpose of scenarios as 
used to influence engineering activities is to describe expected 
results of a system during development in terms of real-world 
behavior66. Scenarios describe how the system should behave under 
certain conditions when presented with certain stimuli67. 
Operational risk scenarios describe the unwanted behavior 
of the system that would cause mission or business impact to the 
operational organization. Similar to the concept of anti-
patterns in systems and software engineering68, operational risk 
scenarios describe undesirable outcomes that need to be 
mitigated because they increase operational risk.  
The ORDERED method uses a simplified format to describe the 
risk scenario based on the Architecture Tradeoff Analysis 
Method69. The operational risk scenario should describe a source 
that provides a stimulus to a system or operational task, the 
environment or artifact affected by the stimulus, and the 
unwanted response or outcome. Example operational risk scenarios 
are listed below: 
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An operator requests fire suppression during a high 
intensity operation with degraded communications; and 
the request fails to transmit within five minutes. 
 
A resource manager attempts to re-assign a military 
member while the member is relocating to a new 
assignment; and the system fails to locate the member. 
  
The key difference between engineering scenarios and 
operational risk scenarios is that operational risk scenarios 
describe negative or unwanted behavior or outcomes while 
traditional engineering scenarios describe expected behavior or 
outcomes.  
 Using the CSOC example, the top two risks are shown in 
Table 15, complete with risk statement, risk attributes and 
areas of concern, and operational risk scenarios. The scenarios 
for risk CSOC004 describe the unwanted outcome of new operators 
failing certification within two weeks and how a change in 
mission objectives requires a 200 percent ramp-up in operational 
staff, creating new teams that fail to become mission capable 
within one month.  
CSOC003 scenarios describe both a growth in mission 
requirements and failure of the existing system to adapt to the 
change, as well as a new sophisticated attack coupled with the 
system’s lack of flexibility in evolving easily to address the 
potential scenario. In all cases, operational risk scenarios 
describe unwanted behavior or outcomes.   
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Operational risk scenarios describe the unwanted behavior 
of a system or outcome of a mission-critical or mission-support 
task. Some scenarios are more critical to address than others,  
Table 15. CSOC Operational Risk Scenarios 
 
Top 





















Operational Risk Scenarios 
1. New operator joins organization and fails to be 
completely certified and capable within two weeks.  
2. OPs staff grows by 200 percent, increasing the number of 
teams performing the mission. New teams not fully capable 





and vendor is not 
responsive when 
changes are 
needed; system may 
not detect newer 
threats; cost of 












Operational Risk Scenarios 
1. New mission tasking requires additional intrusion 
detection across new agency locations. Current system fails 
to scale, and vendor is unresponsive in making required 
system changes.  
2. A new hacker group uses alternative means to access 
closed system and uses technology not detected by current 
system. Complete re-design of detection system required to 
implement new detection algorithms.  
 
and some scenarios may already be addressed by operational 
processes or by existing or planned system capabilities. The 
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next step is to prioritize the scenarios based on mission 
criticality and level of existing plan accommodation.  
5.3.4.2 PRIORITIZE SCENARIOS 
INPUTS: List of operational risks with risk scenarios. 
OUTPUTS: Prioritized operational risk scenarios.  
With a list of operational risk scenarios, the next step is 
to prioritize the scenarios to determine which risk scenarios 
are the most critical to avoid based on mission and business 
needs. Some of the risk scenarios might already have mitigation 
activities in place due to current or planned operational 
processes or planned activities within the systems engineering 
lifecycle, such as requirements, design trade-offs, 
implementation decisions, testing approaches, or deployment 
strategies that address the scenario to some degree.  
Table 16 provides a matrix to score risk scenarios based on 
criticality and accommodation gap. Scenarios that have a serious 
mission or business impact are assigned a criticality score of 
HIGH, scenarios with moderate impact are assigned a score of 
MEDIUM, and scenarios that have a low mission impact are scored 
LOW. 
The other important aspect in prioritizing scenarios is 
understanding if current operations or engineering plans 
accommodate avoidance of the scenario. Scenarios that are not 
accommodated in current operations or engineering plans are 
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assigned a gap score of HIGH, scenarios that have some 
accommodation in current operations or engineering plans are  
Table 16. Scenario Criticality and Gap Scoring Matrix 
 
Mission or Business Criticality 
HIGH Serious mission or business impact  
MEDIUM Moderate mission or business impact 
LOW Low mission or business impact 
Plan Gap 
HIGH 
No accommodation based on current operations or 
engineering plan (requirements, design, 
implementation, testing, deployment) 
MEDIUM 
Some accommodation based on current operations 
or engineering plan (requirements, design, 
implementation, testing, deployment) 
LOW 
Accommodated in current operations or 
engineering plan (requirements, design, 
implementation, testing, deployment) 
 
assigned a gap scope of MEDIUM, and scenarios that are avoided 
by current operations or engineering plans are assigned a gap 
score of LOW.  
The criticality and gap score of a scenarios helps those 
involved to decide which scenarios receive the most attention in 
the Influence Systems Engineering Activities step of the ORDERED 
method. Scenarios with HIGH criticality and HIGH gap scores are 




Best judgment is used to prioritize scenarios with scores 
other than HIGH/HIGH and LOW/LOW. Criticality may be deemed more 
important than gap given certain mission or business 
considerations, or gap may be deemed more important.  
In the CSOC example, Table 17 represents the scenarios 
scored by criticality and gap. Scenario CSOC003-1 has a HIGH  
Table 17. CSOC Prioritized Operational Risk Scenarios 
 
Scenario 
Number Operational Risk Scenario Criticality Gap 
CSOC003-1 
New mission tasking requires 
additional intrusion detection 
across new agency locations. 
Current system fails to scale, 
and vendor is unresponsive in 
making required system changes  
HIGH HIGH 
CSOC004-2 
OPs staff grows by 200 percent, 
increasing number of teams 
performing the mission. New 
teams not fully capable of 




A new hacker group uses 
alternative means to access 
closed system and uses 
technology not detected by 
current system. Complete re-
design of detection system 
required to implement new 
detection algorithms.  
MEDIUM HIGH 
CSOC004-1 
New operator joins organization 
and fails to be completely 
certified and capable within 
two weeks.  
MEDIUM MEDIUM 
 
mission criticality score and also has no accommodation in 
current operations or engineering plans to avoid the scenario. 
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CSOC004-1 and CSOC004-2 both address concerns with training and 
certification of staff, but CSOC004-1 is less critical as it 
only addresses the performance of individuals while CSOC004-2 is 
concerned about performance of teams.  
The team felt that CSOC003-2 had a criticality of MEDIUM 
because the scenario was contained to a single class of 
intrusion. However, given the lack of accommodation to avoid the 
scenario, the team may decide to prioritize it above CSOC004-2. 
With a list of prioritized operational risk scenarios, 
systems engineering lifecycle activities are next explored to 
determine if these scenarios may help improve operational 
acceptability of systems as they are developed.  
5.3.5 INFLUENCE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES 
Operational risk may be used to inform and influence 
systems engineering lifecycle activities with the intended 
outcome of improving the operational acceptability of delivered 
solutions and services. The activities associated with the 
Influence Systems Engineering Activities process step is shown 
in Figure 15. 
5.3.5.1 INFORM REQUIREMENT ENGINEERING 
INPUTS: Requirements and prioritized operational risk scenarios. 
OUTPUTS: Validated requirements, change requests, and updated 
risk register.  
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Informing requirements with operational risk scenarios is 
part of a larger requirements validation activity. The process 
of transforming operational mission and business threats, risks,  
 
Figure 15. Influence Systems Engineering Activities 
 
 
and needs into a set of requirements that may drive the creation 
of a system, product, or capability to meet those needs may be a 
multi-phased process implemented sequentially, iteratively, 





This step is not intended to replace the requirements 
engineering process on a program, but rather to inform the 
process with operational risk considerations so that the 
requirements for the system, product, or capability specifies 
functional and non-functional behavior that avoids high priority 
operational risk scenarios.  
Boehm recommends a requirements approach that includes 
emphasizing value-driven, shared-vision-driven, change-driven, 
and risk-driven activities71. Central to these approaches is 
exploration of operational scenarios describing intended 
behavior.  
Risk-driven activities allow engineering leadership to 
apply resources to mitigate highest risks or to avoid performing 
activities that increase risk. The addition of operational risk 
scenarios to expected behavior scenarios allows engineers and 
operational users to explore behavior that they want the 
resulting system, product, or capability to help mitigate or 
avoid.  
This step is simply using operational risk scenarios to 
help define requirements, validate that existing requirements 
are sufficient, or identify required changes in requirements to 
address the operational risk scenario. This isn’t a one-time 
activity or only performed during the requirements phase of a 
program, but rather should be performed continuously as new 
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operational risks are identified and operational risk scenarios 
are defined.  
As requirements are informed by operational risk scenarios, 
the risk scenario scoring is adjusted as appropriate, which may 
also require a change in the risk exposure of the original 
operational risk statement. The operational risk register is 
updated to reflect new understanding of risk exposure and 
scenario scoring.  
In the CSOC example, after discussing risk scenario 
CSOC003-1, the engineering team and operational users agreed 
that the functional requirements were sound but that they had 
collectively overlooked non-functional requirements of 
scalability, flexibility, and evolvability. The team decided to 
issue a program change request authorizing additional 
architectural trade studies to be performed with the goal of 
maximizing the non-functional requirements to specifically avoid 
the operational risk scenario.  
Risk scenario CSOC004-2 highlighted the lack of a separate 
training environment with minimal operational capability to 
allow multiple teams to train without impacting ongoing 
operations. The result was a change request to add the 
requirement for an operationally relevant training environment.  
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5.3.5.2 INFORM ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN 
INPUTS: Validated requirements, architecture and design, and 
prioritized operational risk scenarios. 
OUTPUTS: Validated architecture and design, change requests, and 
updated risk register.  
Informing architecture and design with operational risk 
scenarios is part of a larger architecture and design validation 
activity. Architecture is simply the highest level of design, 
the first artifact that structures a system, component, or 
capability into its constituent physical or logical sub-parts. 
It also represents the first opportunity to ensure that the 
resulting design and implementation enables desired attributes 
and avoids undesirable attributes.  
The addition of operational risk scenarios during 
architectural development and validation allows architects and 
engineers to select or create architectural mechanisms and 
constructs to avoid operational risk. While all architecture is 
a design activity, not all design is an architecture activity. 
Architecture informs, constrains, and influences lower-level 
design, whereas the lowest level of design describes and 
influences implementation-level choices72.  
For the purposes of ORDERED, these two activities are 
treated the same. This step is not intended to replace the 
architecture and design processes on a program, but rather to 
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inform the processes with operational risk considerations so 
that architectural and design decisions for the system, product, 
or capability avoid high priority operational risk scenarios. 
As with requirements, this step is simply using operational 
risk scenarios to help inform architecture and design decisions, 
to validate that previous architecture and design decisions are 
sufficient, or to identify required changes in architecture or 
design artifacts to address operational risk scenarios. This 
activity should be performed continuously as new operational 
risks are identified and operational risk scenarios are defined. 
As architecture and design activities and artifacts are 
informed by operational risk scenarios, the risk scenario 
scoring is adjusted as appropriate, which may also require a 
change in the risk exposure of the original operational risk 
statement. The operational risk register is updated to reflect 
new understanding of risk exposure and scenario scoring.  
In the CSOC example, the operational users participated in 
an architecture evaluation, which included a discussion of the 
operational risk scenarios and the architectural mechanisms and 
patterns selected and how they would either avoid the scenario 
or were deficient in mitigating the risk. When evaluating 
operational risk scenario CSOC003-1, the engineering team and 
operational users concluded that the architecture team had 
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failed to consider structural and behavioral patterns that would 
help avoid the risk scenario.  
Since the architecture was still in development, the 
architecture team revised its approach and selected additional 
architectural patterns to increase the scalability, flexibility, 
and evolvability of the solution.  
5.3.5.3 INFORM IMPLEMENTATION 
INPUTS: Validated requirements, validated architecture and 
design, implementation details, and prioritized operational risk 
scenarios. 
OUTPUTS: Validated implementation details, change requests, and 
updated risk register.  
Informing implementation with operational risk scenarios is 
part of a larger systems engineering implementation activity. 
Implementation is the process of realizing a system that 
satisfies the validated architecture and design and meets 
stakeholder requirements. Implementation decisions are made to 
include make, buy, or re-use tradeoffs as well as resolving 
detailed implementation choices below the design level. 
Operational risk considerations are key in performing 
engineering trade studies and should be weighted appropriately 
when selecting implementation-level solutions. This step is not 
intended to replace the implementation processes on a program, 
but rather to inform the processes with operational risk 
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considerations so that implementation decisions for the system, 
product, or capability avoid high priority operational risk 
scenarios.  
This step uses operational risk scenarios to help inform 
implementation decisions, to validate that previous 
implementation decisions are sufficient, or to identify required 
changes in implementation approaches to address operational risk 
scenarios. This activity should be performed continuously as new 
operational risks are identified and operational risk scenarios 
are defined.  
As implementation artifacts and activities are informed by 
operational risk scenarios, the risk scenario scoring is 
adjusted as appropriate, which may also require a change in the 
risk exposure of the original operational risk statement. The 
operational risk register is updated to reflect new 
understanding of risk exposure and scenario scoring.  
In the CSOC example, after discussing risk scenario 
CSOC003-1, the implementation team decided to de-couple 
configuration information identifying locations and sites from 
the intrusion detection system’s compiled software components. 
This decision allowed end-users to add sites and locations by 
changing configuration files without needing to go back to the 
developer to change the software. While this change allowed more 
operational flexibility, the team also identified an operational 
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security risk and provided guidance regarding additional changes 
to training and operational procedures to control unauthorized 
or inadvertent changes to site and location configurations. 
5.3.5.4 INFORM TESTING 
INPUTS: Validated requirements, validated architecture and 
design, validated implementation details, testing strategy, and 
prioritized operational risk scenarios. 
OUTPUTS: Validated testing strategy, change requests, and 
updated risk register.  
Informing testing with operational risk scenarios is part 
of a set of test activities on a program. A program typically 
has a series of test activities described in a test strategy or 
test management plan. Verification testing is performed to 
ensure that the component, sub-system, or system meets all 
specified requirements. Validation testing is performed to 
ensure that the delivered capability satisfies an operational 
need.  
The gap between what is specified and what is needed 
increases operational risk and in turn the likelihood that the 
end-user rejects the new capability as operationally 
ineffective. The longer the development lifecycle, the more 
likely mission and business needs and threats will change. A 
program may successfully pass all verification testing and still 
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fail validation testing if the delivered capability fails to 
satisfy the operational need.  
Using operational risk scenarios in requirements, 
architecture, design, and implementation activities helps ensure 
that the system’s specifications, design, and implementation 
reflect the evolving operational need, thereby decreasing the 
gap between how the system is specified and realized and the 
operational need at time of deployment. Test scenarios are use-
oriented descriptions of desired function, data, and behavior of 
a given system73. They describe the detailed step-by-step 
instructions to exercise the system to prove that it behaves as 
expected.  
Testing should also be used to ensure that the system 
doesn’t exhibit unwanted behavior. One of the pitfalls of 
testing is inadequate user involvement during the planning and 
execution of test activities74. Operational risk scenarios 
captured from end-users throughout the development process may 
help test engineers develop comprehensive test scenarios that 
not only verify and validate expected behavior but also explore 
the system’s ability to prevent unwanted behavior.  
This step is not intended to replace the testing processes 
on a program, but rather to inform the processes with 
operational risk considerations so that test strategies and 
scenarios are more comprehensive and include the exploration of 
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the system’s ability to mitigate the user’s most critical 
operational risks. 
In the CSOC example, operational risk scenario CSOC003-2 
describes a hacker gaining alternative access to a closed system 
to avoid detection. Based on this operational risk, the test 
team developed a set of test scenarios to examine the system’s 
ability to detect unauthorized access through alternative means. 
The results of the testing will either validate that the 
system as implemented mitigates this operational risk or that 
additional risk mitigation actions should be considered. These 
additional actions could include a change request to add 
detection functionality or they could entail changes in 
operational processes to mitigate the risk. 
5.3.5.5 INFORM DEPLOYMENT 
INPUTS: Validated requirements, validated architecture and 
design, validated implementation details, validated testing 
strategy, deployment approach, and prioritized operational risk 
scenarios. 
OUTPUTS: Validated deployment approach, change requests, and 
updated risk register.  
Informing deployment with operational risk scenarios is 
part of a larger deployment strategy defined for the program. A 
program’s deployment approach needs to account not only for 
technical aspects of deploying new capabilities but also must 
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account for organizational change issues associated with the 
operational organization adopting the new capability. These 
issues may include activities such as training for operations 
and maintenance staff and changes to operational processes and 
procedures.  
The Capability Maturity Model Integrated Acquisition Model 
(CMMI-AM) provides guidance on transitioning new capabilities 
into operations and maintenance75. The goals and practices of the 
CMMI-AM process area Transition to Operations and Support are 
shown in Table 18.  
Table 18. CMMI-AM Transition to Operations and Support Goals and Practices 
 
Capability Maturity Model Integrated Acquisition Model – 
Transition to Operations and Support 
Goals Practices 






1.1 Establish and maintain a strategy for 
transition to operations and support. 
1.2 Establish and maintain plans for 
transitioning acquired products into 
operational use and support. 
1.3 Establish and maintain training 
requirements for operational and support 
personnel. 
1.4 Establish and maintain initial and 
lifecycle resource requirements for 
performing operations and support. 
1.5 Identify and assign organizational 
responsibility for support. 
1.6 Establish and maintain criteria for 
assigning responsibility for enhancements. 
1.7 Establish and maintain transition 











2.1 Evaluate the readiness of the acquired 
products to undergo transition to 
operations and support. 
2.2 Evaluate the readiness of the 
operational and support personnel to 
assume responsibility for the acquired 
products. 
2.3 Analyze the results of all transition 
activities and identify appropriate 
action. 
 
The practices from CMMI-AM may form the basis of a 
program’s deployment plan. Operational risk scenarios defined 
throughout the systems engineering process should be used to 
define the implementation of these activities with the goal of 
reducing operational risk. This step is not intended to replace 
the deployment processes on a program, but rather to inform the 
processes with operational risk considerations so that 
deployment strategies, approaches, and activities are more 
robust and include the reduction of operational risk through 
deployment activities. 
In the CSOC example, operational risk scenario CSOC004-2 
describes an operational risk associated with standing up new 
teams to perform operations as mission scope increases. The 
engineering and operations team decided to deploy new 
capabilities incrementally, team-by-team, treating each 
deployment to a team as a new team stand-up. This allowed a low-
risk deployment to smaller groups rather than the entire 
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operational staff at once so that deployment activities could be 
validated and adjusted as needed based on issues found in early 
deployments.  
In addition, treating each team as a new team stand-up 
allowed development and testing of processes and procedures for 
expanding mission scope to new teams with the benefit of 
reducing the risk described in risk scenario CSOC004-2.  
5.4 MITIGATING OPERATIONAL RISK THROUGH SYSTEMS ENGINEERING  
In addition to using operational risk to influence systems 
engineering activities, systems engineering processes may also 
be used to mitigate operational risk. The Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook describes systems engineering processes in two broad 
categories: Management Processes and Technical Processes76. Each 
of these categories contains eight processes that describe 
systems engineering activities as shown in Table 19.  
Table 19. Defense Acquisition Guidebook Systems Engineering Processes 
 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook Systems Engineering 
Management Processes Technical Processes 
Technical Planning 
Decision Analysis 




















The Management Processes provide a framework for managing 
the technical activities and identifying processes critical to 
the success of the program, while the Technical Processes ensure 
that the solution or service is designed to deliver the 
capability needed by the stakeholders. Each of these processes 
is performed to mitigate some amount of risk in which the 
product under development fails to meet the mission and business 
needs of the end-user or the end-user’s operational 
organization.  
Table 20 maps the Attributes within the Mission Category of 
the ORDERED Risk Taxonomy to the Systems Engineering Management 
Processes of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook.  




 = High 
Mitigation 
Activity 
 = Medium 
Mitigation 
Activity 






































a. Stability         
b. 
Completeness         
c. Clarity         
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d. Feasibility         
e. Precedents         










a. Efficiency         
b. 
Effectiveness         
c. 
Repeatability         
d. Agility         
e. 
Affordability         
f. Security         











        
b. Accuracy         
c. Usability         
d. Timely         








a. Throughput         
b. Usability         
c. Flexibility         
d. Reliability         
e. 
Evolvability         
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f. Security         
g. 
Supportability         










a. Suitability         
b. 
Repeatability         
c. 
Predictability         
d. Agility         






a. Skill Level         
b. Training         
c. Turnover         
d. 
Affordability 
        
 
The relationship is characterized as HIGH if the systems 
engineering process may be substantially used to mitigate risks 
within an attribute, MEDIUM if there are aspects of the systems 
engineering process that may be used to mitigate risks within an 
attribute, or LOW if there is little direct ability of the 
systems engineering process to mitigate risks within an 
attribute. 
For example, if there are high operational risks mapped to 
the Affordability attribute of the Mission Execution element, 
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the Systems Engineering Management processes of Decision 
Analysis, Technical Assessment, Requirements Management, and 
Risk Management should be considered as risk mitigation 
activities. The Technical Data Management and Interface 
Management processes may also help mitigate the risks. Technical 
Planning and Configuration Management may be of less value when 
mitigating risks mapped to the Affordability attribute of the 
Mission Execution Element.  
This is intended to be a starting point when considering 
which systems engineering activities may help mitigate 
operational risk. These relationships are generalized and would 
need to be adjusted when considering a specific program. 
Table 21 maps the Attributes within the Mission Category of 
the ORDERED Risk Taxonomy to the Systems Engineering Technical 
Processes of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook. 
Table 21. ORDERED Taxonomy: Mission Category Mapped to SE Technical Processes 
 
Legend 
 = High 
Mitigation 
Activity 
 = Medium 
Mitigation 
Activity 












































Completeness         
c. Clarity         
d. Feasibility         
e. Precedents         


















a. Efficiency         
b. 
Effectiveness         
c. 
Repeatability 
        
d. Agility         
e. 
Affordability         
f. Security         

















Predictability         
b. Accuracy         
c. Usability         
d. Timely         














a. Throughput         
b. Usability         
c. Flexibility         




Evolvability         
f. Security         
g. 
Supportability         


















a. Suitability         
b. 
Repeatability         
c. 
Predictability         
d. Agility         










a. Skill Level         
b. Training         
c. Turnover         
d. 
Affordability 
        
 
Similarly, if there are high operational risks mapped to 
the Affordability attribute of the Mission Execution element, 
the Systems Engineering Technical processes of Requirements 
Analysis, Architecture Design, Implementation, Validation, and 
Transition should be considered as risk mitigation activities. 
The Stakeholder Requirements Definition, Integration, and 
Verification processes may also help mitigate the risks.  
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Table 22 maps the Attributes within the Business Category 
of the ORDERED Risk Taxonomy to the Systems Engineering 
Management Processes of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook. 
For example, if the operational organization has difficulty 
engaging relevant stakeholders, there may be high operational 
risks mapped to the Engagement attribute of the Stakeholder 
Involvement element. The Systems Engineering Technical process 
of Risk Management should be employed to mitigate these risks.  




 = High 
Mitigation 
Activity 
 = Medium 
Mitigation 
Activity 




















































a. Workforce          
b. Budget         
c. Facilities         
d. Equipment 
and Systems 






a. Policies         




















        
d. Contracts         
e. Analytics         
f. Compliance         
g. Risk 
Management 
















a. Vision and 
Mission 
        
b. Values         
c. Goals         
d. Objectives         






























        
c. Engagement         













        
b. Opportunity 
Identification 
        
c. Root Cause 
Analysis 
        
d. Improvement 
Planning 
















        
 
The Technical Planning, Decision Analysis, Requirements 
Management, and Interface Management processes may also help 
mitigate the risks. Technical Assessment, Configuration  
Management, and Technical Data Management may be of less value 
when mitigating risks mapped to the Affordability attribute of 
the Mission Execution Element.  
Table 23 maps the Attributes within the Business Category 
of the ORDERED Risk Taxonomy to the Technical Processes of the 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook. 




 = High 
Mitigation 
Activity 
 = Medium 
Mitigation 
Activity 
























a. Workforce          










c. Facilities         
d. Equipment 
and Systems 











a. Policies         




        
d. Contracts         
e. Analytics         
f. Compliance         
g. Risk 
Management 









a. Vision and 
Mission 
        
b. Values         
c. Goals         
d. Objectives         



















        
c. Engagement         














        
b. Opportunity 
Identification 
        
c. Root Cause 
Analysis 
        
d. Improvement 
Planning 
        
e. 
Implementation 
        
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Similarly, if there are high operational risks mapped to 
the Engagement attribute of the Stakeholder Involvement element, 
the Systems Engineering Technical processes of Stakeholder 
Requirements Definition, Validation, and Transition should be 
considered as risk mitigation activities. The Requirements 
Analysis and Architecture Design processes may also help 
mitigate the risks. Implementation, Integration, and 
Verification processes may be of less value when mitigating 
risks mapped to the Engagement attribute of the Stakeholder 
Involvement Element. 
5.5 ORDERED SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced ORDERED, a repeatable method 
designed to influence systems engineering activities throughout 
the systems engineering lifecycle with the purpose of improving 
program outcomes and system operability and usability. Key to 
the process is a thorough operational risk identification and 
analysis process that results in operational risk scenarios. The 
operational risk scenarios are continually identified and 
evolved throughout the systems engineering lifecycle and used to 
influence systems engineering decisions from requirements 
through deployment.  
In addition, systems engineering processes themselves may 
be used to mitigate operational risk, and the ORDERED taxonomy 
was mapped to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook systems 
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engineering processes to highlight this relationship. The 
ORDERED process is not intended to replace the systems 
engineering processes and methods used on a program, but rather 









To understand the relationship between operational risk 
considerations and program outcomes, a survey instrument was 
developed (see Appendix B). The survey approach followed a 
recent survey on systems engineering effectiveness conducted by 
the National Defense Industrial Association Systems Engineering 
Division, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Aerospace and Electronic Systems Society, and the International 
Council on Systems Engineering77.  
Using a Likert scale consisting of Not At All, A Little, 
Moderately, Considerably, To A Great Extent, and Unknown, 
participants were asked to indicate how strongly they supported 
the statements shown in Table 24. Operational risk 
considerations were defined as actively eliciting operational 
risk from end-user during the early solution development stages 
of a program as well as actively and continuously involving end-
user perspectives during development to identify and mitigate 
evolving operational risk throughout the program lifecycle 
(Questions 6 and 8).  
Program performance was defined as meeting cost and 
schedule expectations, delivering a system that satisfies the 









1 My program team has a documented risk management 
process. 
2 My program team has an active risk register that 
reflects the team’s most critical current risks. 
3 My program team has a robust, continuous risk 
identification process. 
4 My program team actively mitigates the program’s top 
risks. 
5 The leadership above my program actively elicits risks 
and helps mitigate risks to my program. 
6 My program team actively elicited operational risks and 
mission threats from customers and end-users during the 
capture phase. 
7 My program team actively elicited quality attributes 
(responsiveness, adaptability, evolvability, agility, 
scalability, etc.) during the capture phase.  
8 The customer actively participates with the program 
team during execution to identify and mitigate 
operational risk. 
9 The customer actively participates with the program 
team during execution to prioritize quality attributes 
(responsiveness, adaptability, evolvability, agility, 
scalability, etc.) and evaluate the ability of the 
solution or service to satisfy critical quality 
attributes during development. 
10 The customer interaction with the program team is 
positive. 
11 My customer would say that the solution or service we 
deliver mitigates operational risk or mission threats. 
12 My customer would say that the solution or service we 
deliver meets all critical quality attributes 
(affordability, agility, scalability, etc.). 
13 The program team consistently meets all customer cost 
and schedule objectives. 
 
 
delivering a system or service that mitigates operational risk 
(Questions 11, 12, and 13).  
In addition, the survey instrument was designed to enable 
the exploration of the relationship between the existence of an 
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effective risk management process on the program and program 
outcomes (Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4). Additional questions in the 
list were asked for purposes other than stated above.  
The survey was administered to 104 program managers on 
October 14, 2015. The programs were classified as solution 
development, service delivery, and professional services as 
shown in Figure 16.  
 
Figure 16. Program Type 
 
 
A solution development program was defined as a program 
where the team is responsible for developing and delivering a 
solution (typically a tangible product such as a 
software/hardware system) to a customer. A service delivery 
program was defined as a program where the team is responsible 
for developing and delivering a service to the customer and is 
expected to meet customer outcomes, such as service level 
agreements. A professional services program was defined as a 
program where the program team is responsible for delivering 
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qualified staff that provides expertise and works at the 
direction of the customer to support the customer's mission. 
The programs ranged in size from small (under $5 million in 
annual revenue) to large (over $50 million in annual revenue) as 
shown in Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17. Program Revenue 
 
 
The results were analyzed by first examining the variation 
in the responses to the thirteen questions to determine if 
enough variation existed to allow further analysis. The analysis 
of the distribution of results shown in Figure 18 indicates 
enough variation within and between questions to allow further 
analysis78.  
The two areas explored here are first the relationship 
between the existence of an effective risk management process 
and program performance and second the relationship between an 
operational risk focus and program performance. Questions 1, 2, 




Figure 18. Likert Analysis 
 
 
process effectiveness. They measure the existence of a 
documented risk process, the use of a risk register, an active 
and continuous risk identification and mitigation process, and 
the program mitigating its most critical risks.  
Questions 6 and 8 were combined to provide an aggregate 
score of operational risk effectiveness. They measure active 
elicitation of the customer’s operational risks during the 
program’s capture phase (where early lifecycle solution 
activities occur) and elicitation and mitigation of operational 
risk during program execution.  
Questions 11, 12, and 13 were combined to provide an 
aggregate score of program performance. They measure the 
customer’s perspective of the program meeting cost and schedule 
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objectives, mitigating their most critical operational risks, 
and delivering a service or solution that meets all expected 
quality attributes.  
Each program’s aggregate measure for the three areas, risk 
process effectiveness, operational risk effectiveness, and 
program performance, were then divided into three categories 
indicating the lower third of effectiveness or performance, the 
middle third of effectiveness or performance, and the top third 
of effectiveness or performance. Figure 19 shows the result of 
risk process capability compared to program performance. 
 
Figure 19. Risk Process Capability and Program Performance 
 
 
Simply looking at the chart, one might conclude that 
programs with a more effective or capable risk process perform 
better than programs with an ineffective risk process. Fifty 
percent of the programs with lower risk process capability 
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exhibited lower program performance. That number decreased to 31 
percent for programs with medium risk process capability and to 
27 percent for programs with higher risk process capability.  
The number of programs exhibiting higher program 
performance across the low, medium, and high risk process 
capability stayed roughly the same, while the programs 
exhibiting medium program performance increased from 36 percent 
to 49 percent to 55 percent across the three groups. Performing 
ordinal logistic regression analysis of the data reveals a Gamma 
score of .23 and p-value of .088. Gamma is a measure of 
association that expresses the strength of relationship between 
two ordinal variables79 as represented by the equation below.  
= � − ��� + �� 
Ns is the number of pairs of cases ranked in the same order 
on both variables, and Nd is the number of pairs of cases ranked 
in reverse order on both variables. Where there is a tie, the 
relationship is dropped from the equation. Gamma values of less 
than 0.2 may be considered as weak, values around 0.3 may be 
thought of as moderately strong, values near 0.5 are considered 
strong, and values over 0.6 are very strong.  
P-values measure the probability that the observed 
relationship in the sampled data occurs by chance alone. Values 
of p < 0.05 are used as a basis for rejecting the null 
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hypothesis, that is having confidence that the relationship is 
not specious40.  
The Gamma score of .23 indicates a weak relationship 
between the two variables, and a high p-value of .088 decreases 
our confidence that the relationship observed is valid. In other 
words, it would be difficult to conclude with certainty using 
this data that programs with an effective risk process 
outperform programs with a less effective risk process.  
Figure 20 shows the results of comparing the operational 
risk process capability and program outcomes.  
 
Figure 20. Operational Risk Process Capability and Program Performance 
 
 
Once again, simply looking at the chart, one might conclude 
that programs that focus on identifying and mitigating 
operational risk throughout their lifecycle perform better than 
programs that don’t focus on operational risk. The number of 
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programs exhibiting lower program performance decreased from 50 
percent for programs with low operational risk process 
capability to 36 percent for programs with medium operational 
risk process capability and to 21 percent for programs with 
higher operational risk process capability.  
Programs exhibiting medium program performance increased 
from 39 percent for programs with low operational process 
performance to 49 percent for programs with medium operational 
process performance and to 52 percent for programs with higher 
operational risk process performance. Programs exhibiting high 
program performance increased from 11 percent for programs with 
lower operational risk process performance to 15 percent for 
programs with medium operational risk process capability to 27 
percent for programs with higher operational risk process 
capability.  
The Gamma score shows a moderately strong to strong 
positive relationship between the two variables, and the p-value 
of .006 provides confidence that the relationship is valid.  
The above analysis includes all three program types:  
Solution Development, Service Delivery, and Professional 
Services. Because systems engineering activities are performed 
more heavily on Solution Development programs, the analysis was 
performed excluding the Service Delivery and Professional 
Services programs.  
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Figure 21 shows risk process capability compared to program 
performance. Interestingly, the relationship when looking only 
at Solution Development programs results in a weak Gamma score 
and a high p-value. The conclusion is that there is not a valid 
relationship between risk process effectiveness and program 
performance for Solution Development programs within the sample. 
 




Figure 19 included all programs and indicated a 
questionable relationship. However, when evaluating risk process 
effectiveness and program performance for just Solution 
Development programs, one could conclude that increasing risk 
process performance alone would have little or no effect on 
program outcomes.  
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Figure 22 shows the results of comparing the operational 
risk process capability and program outcomes for Solution 
Development programs only. This comparison results in the 
strongest relationship of the data analyzed. The number of 
Solution Development programs exhibiting lower program 
performance decreased from 46 percent for programs with low 
operational risk process capability to 36 percent for programs 
with medium operational risk process capability and to 17 
percent for programs with higher operational risk process 
capability.  
 




Solution Development programs exhibiting medium program 
performance remained steady at 36 percent for programs with low 
and medium operational process performance and decreased to 25 
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percent for programs with higher operational risk process 
performance. Solution Development programs exhibiting high 
program performance increased from 18 percent for programs with 
lower operational risk process performance to 28 percent for 
programs with medium operational risk process capability and 
jumped to 58 percent for programs with higher operational risk 
process capability.  
The Gamma score shows a strong positive relationship 
between the two variables, and the p-value of .038 provides 
confidence that the relationship is valid. 
The caution here is that the ordinal logistic regression 
analysis performed provides only confidence that there is a 
correlation between an operational risk focus and program 
performance and an indication of the strength of that 
relationship. It does not provide a causal relationship. In 
other words, from the data alone, one cannot conclude that an 
operational risk focus causes improved program performance or 
that higher program performance causes higher operational risk 
process capability. One may only conclude that there is a 
positive correlation between the variables: they move in the 
same direction.  
Given the strength of the relationship and the low p-value, 
one may confidently conclude that programs within the sample 
that focus on operational risk during the program lifecycle also 
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have better program performance than programs that focus less on 
operational risk during the program lifecycle. This relationship 
holds and is even stronger when only Solution Development 
programs are examined.  
Further analysis may provide additional insights. Revenue 
or team size may influence the outcomes of the analysis. Larger 
programs may have a more formal risk process in place or may 
have lower program performance due to the inherently higher risk 
of larger programs.  
Service Delivery programs may require stronger risk 
practices than Professional Services programs, and the influence 
of operational risk considerations may weigh heavier in program 
outcomes. This is a first step in the analysis of the 
relationships between risk, operational risk, and program 
outcomes, and the results are promising and indicate that more 
exploration with additional survey instruments may provide even 
more valuable insights.  









Many factors impact the outcomes of an engineering program, 
including the complexity of the problem space, the precedents of 
solutions to address the problem, and the skill and ability of 
the team solving the problem, among others. Several other 
measures of success include total cost, user acceptance, and 
operational effectiveness.  
Total cost is a convenient surrogate for the success of a 
program. If the capability delivered is not acceptable to the 
user or is deemed operationally ineffective, total cost 
increases as additional development and re-work is performed to 
address the user or operability issues.  
Operational risk increases when end-user or operability 
issues exist in a product or capability. If the operational risk 
is not addressed in a given release, re-work is deferred to 
subsequent releases. If it is not addressed in subsequent 
releases, it is deferred into operations and maintenance. 
Deferring re-work increases the technical debt of a 
program80. Technical debt is defined by McConnell as A design or 
construction approach that’s expedient in the short term, but 
that creates a technical context in which the same work will 
cost more to do later than it would cost to do now81. 
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In the simplest terms, the total cost of a program is a sum 
of the total cost of each development release, plus the cost to 
resolve any residual technical debt not addressed during 
development, plus the nominal operations and maintenance cost 
for the life of the capability. 
   �� = ∑ �� +  � � + � � 
  
 The total cost for any given release is the cost for 
developing features allocated to the release, plus the cost of 
any operational risk mitigation activities (additional features) 
performed during the release, plus the cost of the technical 
debt addressed during the release.  
  �� = � + � + � � 
 
Cr is the cost for developing each feature of a release. 
 � = ∑ � �      �  
 
Cor is the cost for any operational risk mitigation actions 




� = ∑ � �      �  
Ctd is the cost of technical debt mitigated in this release. 
 � � = ∑ � � �      �  
 
The dilemma facing most engineering program teams is the 
trade-off between needing to deliver capability early versus 
addressing longer-term issues such as supportability and 
evolvability of the delivered products. Most programs have 
stakeholders who want to see progress and ensure that the payoff 
from the program is worth the investment. This creates pressure 
to keep the program sold by demonstrating and delivering value 
early.  
There may also be a pressing operational need that places 
pressure on the engineering team to deliver capabilities sooner 
rather than spend time considering longer-term operational 
attributes such as maintainability. Engineering a solution that 
is more operationally flexible and adaptable impacts early 
systems engineering lifecycle activities such as requirements, 
architecture, and design.  
Delaying the engineering activities that allow a more 
complete infrastructure results in re-working these engineering 
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artifacts later when it is more costly to make changes. These 
delayed decisions increase technical debt and operational risk. 
To simplify and explore the relationship between addressing 
operational risk by reducing technical debt and the impact on 
cost and schedule, the simplified model shown in Figure 23 below 
was developed using the Vensim system dynamics modeling tool 
developed by Ventana Systems Inc.  
 
Figure 23. Simplified Operational Risk Model 
 
 
This model simplifies the interaction during the 
development phase of a program and simulates a single release. 
In this model, the initial set of features (Initial Features) 
represent the development work to be done during the release and 
becomes the starting point for the work to do (Features to be 


























































same cost to implement (Cost Per Feature) and the same amount of 
effort required to complete them.  
Capabilities may be comprised of one or more features. A 
more complex capability would have more features and more cost. 
For the purpose of this model, the collection of features into 
capabilities is assumed and not modeled. The program team has a 
set amount of capacity in terms of features that they may 
complete in a month (Total Capacity). Some percentage of that 
capacity may be assigned to develop the planned features (Dev 
Capacity), and some percentage may be assigned to discover and 
mitigate operational risk discovered during development 
(Discovery Capacity).  
Depending on the development capacity, a certain amount of 
work may be performed per month (Work Accomplished), and 
developed features are moved to the completed state (Features 
Completed). Technical debt (Technical Debt) grows during 
development. This debt may grow from deferred decisions, poor 
quality, and a variety of other causes.  
For this model, technical debt increases based on the level 
of operational risk (Op Risk Level). The level of operational 
risk represents a disconnect between mission and business needs 
and the current set of features under development. If mission 
and business needs have shifted, a certain amount of re-work is 
required to the features under development.  
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For example, an operational shift impacting 20 percent of 
the features would require additional work performed on 20 
percent of the features. This re-work is captured as technical 
debt. Technical debt is discovered based on the program’s 
ability to recognize operational risk (Op Risk Effectiveness) as 
well as the amount of resources allocated to discover risk 
(Discovery Capacity).  
As technical debt is discovered, additional work is added 
to the work to do (Features to be Developed) variable. Some 
programs elect to ignore technical debt while others allocate 
some number of resources to discover and address technical debt. 
Features added because of technical debt that are addressed in a 
release cost the same to address as other features in the 
release, however, schedule is impacted, and the cost of the 
release increases (Release Cost).  
Technical debt that is not addressed during the release is 
much more costly to address. For software systems, addressing 
technical debt post-deployment may be more than one hundred 
times more costly than if addressed during development71.  
A NASA study determined that for software systems, the cost 
to fix problems after deployment ranged from one hundred to one 
thousand times more than if fixed during development. For 
systems (integrated hardware and software systems), the cost was 
twenty-nine to about sixteen hundred times more82.  
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For the purposes of this model, the lower value of twenty-
nine times more costly is used for technical debt not addressed 
during the release. The total cost for the program then is the 
cost of the release plus the cost to address technical debt in 
operations.  
The model was run with all variables fixed with the 
exception of the number of resources allocated to mitigate 
operational risk (Percentage for Mitigation). Table 25 indicates 
the initial values of all other variables.  
Table 25. Initial Model Variables 
 
Initial Model Variables 
Variable Value 
Initial Features 648 
Completed Features 0 







Cost Per Feature $1,000  
Technical Debt 0 
Release Cost 0 
Residual Cost 0 
Total Cost 0 
 
The initial features to be developed was set at six hundred 
forty-eight features. The capacity of the program team was set 
at thirty features per month. The operational risk level 
represents the gap in the system under development and the 
evolving business and mission needs of the end-user. This was 
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set at 20 percent, reflecting a need to re-work 20 percent of 
the features to address the operational risk.  
Operational risk effectiveness represents the ability of 
the development team to recognize and translate the growing 
technical debt into work to be done. This was set at 50 percent, 
indicating that the development team had a fairly healthy 
ability to recognize operational risk. The cost of a feature was 
set at $1,000, and the cost of addressing technical debt during 
operations was assigned a multiplier of twenty-nine.  
The program was simulated with zero, 10 percent, 20 
percent, 25 percent, and 30 percent of the program capacity 
allocated to mitigate operational risk and address technical 
debt during the release. A value of zero indicated that the 
program team decided to ignore evolving needs of the end-user as 
represented by operational risk and deferred all technical debt 
reduction post-deployment. Table 26 shows the output of the 
simulations.  
Table 26. Model Outputs 
 


















(features) Residual Cost Total Cost 
0% 648 22 0 $648,000  129.6 $3,758,400  $4,406,400  
10% 684 26 36 $684,000  99.3 $2,879,700  $3,563,700  
20% 735 31 87 $735,000  57 $1,653,000  $2,388,000  
25% 765 34 117 $765,000  29.25 $848,250  $1,613,250  




Ignoring operational risk in order to deliver the initial 
features allows the program to complete at twenty-two months 
with a development cost of $648,000. This decision defers the 
resolution of technical debt into the operations phase where it 
is much more costly to address. The total cost for this option 
is $4,406,400.   
At the other extreme, allocating 30 percent of development 
capacity to identify and mitigate operational risk and thereby 
reducing technical debt stretches the schedule to thirty-eight 
months. The residual technical debt is the lowest, and the total 
cost is $919,800, dramatically lower than delivering early. This 
tradeoff between cost and schedule is shown in Figure 24 as a 
Pareto Front allowing decision-makers the ability to explicitly 
select how much operational risk and technical debt they are 
willing to mitigate during development at the expense of 
schedule, versus delivering early and ignoring operational risk 
at the expense of total lifecycle cost.   
 
Figure 24. Pareto Front Showing Cost and Schedule Tradeoff 
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Urgent operational needs may drive decision-makers to 
ignore operational risk and defer technical debt. They may also 
not be aware of the impact of ignoring operational risk during 
development on total cost and opt for the shorter schedule to 
reduce development costs. Either way, a model such as the one 
described here could help decision-makers understand the 
dynamics involved in addressing operational risk and technical 











The ORDERED approach presented in Chapter 5 describes how 
the systems engineering activities on a program could be 
adjusted to ensure that operational risk considerations are 
addressed throughout a program’s lifecycle. Because ORDERED is a 
proposed approach, no programs are actively using it, and 
therefore, evaluating its effectiveness or viability on a 
program is not possible.  
As an alternative, codifying the outcomes as expected 
characteristics from implementing a comprehensive operational 
risk management approach such as ORDERED is presented in this 
chapter, and case studies of completed programs are used to 
determine if those characteristics were observed in the case 
study.  
Standards have emerged by community consensus and are one 
way to describe expected characteristics of materials, products, 
processes, or services. There are several standards 
organizations and constructs to disseminate characteristics of 
best practice.  
One such set of standards is the Capability Maturity Model 
Integration initially developed by a joint Government, Industry, 
and Academia working group with Carnegie Mellon University as 
the original steward of the models, which are currently 
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maintained by the CMMI Institute21. The CMMI model uses a 
construct that includes both normative material and informative 
material.  
Normative parts of a standard are required or expected in 
order to be compliant with the standard. Informative material is 
explanatory material and is used to further define the intent of 
the standard and provide implementation guidance.  
The architecture of the CMMI model includes process areas 
consisting of goals, practices, and guidance. The goals are 
required, the practices are expected, and the guidance is 
informative.  
A process area defining the normative and informative 
characteristics of an Operational Risk Management (ORM) process 
would need to address areas such as the generalized Basel 
principles described in Chapter 3 and provided in Table 2. An 
ORM process area could then be implemented by a variety of 
users, including banking and military organizations, to 
establish and evaluate the effectiveness of a general ORM 
process.  
However, ORDERED is a narrow application of operational 
risk considerations as applied to the systems engineering 
process of an engineering program. Rather than a general ORM 
process area, Table 27 provides a look at goals and practices 
using the CMMI process area construct defining the  
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Manage Operational Risks 
Operational risks, driven by requirements 
prioritization decisions, are explicitly 
captured as risk statements and mitigation 




Engineering plans mitigate operational risk 
Engineering plans (methodologies, lifecycles, 
etc.) are developed to mitigate both 




Engineering plans are influenced by evolving 
operational risk 
Engineering plans are evolved when mission or 




Transition to operations and support plans 
mitigate operational risk 
Operational risk considerations influence 
transition to operations and support plans that 









End-users participate in systems engineering 
activities by identifying operational risk 
End-users participate continuously during the 
systems engineering process by identifying and 
prioritizing operational risk, taking into 





Operational risk considerations validate system 
requirements 
System requirements are developed and validated 
based on an analysis of mission and business 
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System requirements balance mission and 
business needs 
Validated system requirements balance short-





Operational risk considerations influence 
systems engineering artifacts 
Derived and sub-system requirements, 
architecture, designs, and technical decisions 





Technical solutions are influenced by evolving 
operational risk 
Technical solutions are evolved when mission or 




Operational risk considerations influence 
technical decisions 
Technical decisions to defer or accelerate 
capabilities during development are made based 
on a thorough consideration of operational 
risk.  
 
characteristics that should be present if a program is actively 
addressing operational risk concerns as part of its systems 
engineering process.  
The goals presented represent the required outcomes of 
actively considering operational risk during development. 
Engineering plans, such as a Systems Engineering Management 
Plan, a Software Development Plan, and a Test and Evaluation 
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Master Plan; the program’s selected methodology such as single-
step, incremental, or evolutionary; and the program Work 
Breakdown Structure, Integrated Master Plan, transition to 
operations and support plans, and other planning documents are 
all developed by considering how planning decisions may mitigate 
operational risk.  
To achieve this goal, a program would need to continuously 
identify operational risk and develop mitigation plans to 
address the risk. Planning activities and program plans would be 
developed to mitigate operational risk and evolve when 
operational risk evolves.  
In addition to engineering plans, operational risk should 
influence systems engineering artifacts and decisions. This 
would require active participation by operational end-users 
during engineering activities, analysis of operational risk to 
develop and validate requirements, and the need to balance near-
term mission needs with longer-term business needs when defining 
and prioritizing requirements.  
Technical artifacts such as derived requirements, 
architecture, design, and engineering trade studies are 
influenced by operational risk. When mission and business needs 
evolve, operational risk changes, and engineering artifacts are 
evaluated for impact and changes incorporated as appropriate to 
mitigate the evolving operational risk. Decisions to defer or 
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accelerate capabilities are made to either mitigate operational 
risk or are evaluated to determine if these decisions increase 
operational risk and whether additional mitigation actions are 
required.  
Publicly available case studies provide a rich set of 
descriptions of completed programs and the successes or 
challenges that the programs experienced. Case studies provide 
an opportunity to evaluate actions, decisions, and outcomes 
against the practices described in Table 27 to determine if the 
practice was considered during the program.  
The programs evaluated against the practices defined in 
Table 27 include those that are successful as well as programs 
that are challenged. This is a subjective evaluation because a 
program may be described as successful or challenged differently 
based on the stakeholder.  
A program that delivers on time and on schedule but lacks 
certain quality attributes deemed important to the operational 
user may be viewed as successful by the program office 
responsible for managing the program, yet the end-user may view 
the program as challenged because it fails to meet the 
operational need. Another program may cost more than planned or 




However, the added cost or schedule may have been required 
to address changes in operational risk or mission threats. 
Additionally, the way that the program overcame technical 
challenges may have allowed operational flexibility and better 
addressed operational needs. This program could be viewed as 
challenged by the program office yet successful by the end-user. 
For the case studies presented here, the rationale for whether 
the program was successful or challenged is presented.  
Practices are evaluated as to the level of implementation 
present in the case study description and assigned a value of 
High, Medium, or Low based on the criteria defined in the 
Standard CMMI Appraisal Method for Process Improvement (SCAMPI) 
Class C83 as shown in Table 28.  




The intent of the model practice is judged 
absent or inadequately addressed in the 
approach. Goal achievement is judged unlikely 
because of this absence or inadequacy. 
MEDIUM 
The intent of the model practice is judged to 
be partially addressed in the approach, and 
only limited support for goal achievement is 
evident. 
HIGH 
The intent of the model practice is judged to 
be adequately addressed in the set of 
practices (planned or deployed) in a manner 
that supports achievement of the goal in the 




The first set of programs evaluated are described as 
successful programs and are presented in Table 29. 
Table 29. Case Studies of Successful Programs 
 








Transforming the business through the following 
activities:  
 mission analysis and capabilities 
decomposition 
 business architecting  
 planning of the program 
 implementation of the new business model 
 
Successful program because the organization 
recognized a shift in threats to the long-term 
viability of the organization and implemented a 
business transformation program to position 
itself to take advantage of the shift.  
SP 
1.1 
H Shifts in external risks threatened 
the current operational model. The 
company recognized these threats and 
developed plans to mitigate them. 
SP 
1.2 
H Decisions to select engineering 
methods (Agile) were based on 
unknowns associated with a shift in 
operational needs.  
SP 
1.3 
H Early in development, expenditures 
exceeded resources, delivery of 
capability took longer than expected, 
and higher than planned re-work was 
experienced. A set of principles was 
established to address these issues 
based on Agile practices, resulting 




M Use of a multi-level integrated 
program team addressed roll-out 
risks. 
SP H Use of a multi-level integrated 
program team identified changes in 
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2.1 operational needs, found a new 
solution, generated changes, and 
updated the plan. 
SP 
2.2 
H Entire transformation was undertaken 
to address perceived shifts in 
business threats and requirements 
derived to address these shifts. 
SP 
2.3 
L System developed to address long-term 
business needs, little evidence that 




H Used capability-based development and 
selected a system of systems 




M Some changes were made based on lack 
of progress, but there was little 
evidence that technical solutions 
were re-evaluated or evolved.  
SP 
2.6 
L The need for corporate knowledge 
capture was identified as a risk but 
not addressed until after the system 
was deployed.  
Case 2: The 
Hubble Space 
Telescope84 
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was launched 
into low Earth orbit in 1990 and remains in 
operation. With a 2.4-meter mirror, Hubble's 
four main instruments observe in the near 
ultraviolet, visible, and near infrared 
spectra. 
Successful program because the telescope is 
well known as a marvel of science fulfilling 
critical operational needs and because of 
engineering design decisions that accommodated 
operational risk during the life of the 
program, allowing evolution post-deployment 
after a critical design flaw was detected.  
SP 
1.1 
H Extensive operational mission 
analysis was conducted with outcomes 
influencing plans based on technical 
and operational risk, including 
133 
 
decisions to allow on-orbit 
modification of components. 
SP 
1.2 
H Plans were developed to include 
program phases designed to 
accommodate discovery and mitigation 
of risk through the program 
lifecycle. Trade-studies, independent 
review teams, simulations, laboratory 
experiments, and ground testing 
activities were designed to reduce 
engineering and operational risk.  
SP 
1.3 
M While many plans were clearly 
adjusted based on evolving 
operational risk, verification plans 
were not adjusted when testing of the 
mirror indicated. Additional analysis 
was required.  
SP 
1.4 
M Operations and support plans were 
developed and adjusted based on 
operational risk scenarios. 
Specifically, the original plan to 
retrieve and re-launch the HST every 
five years was abandoned for on-orbit 
maintenance. These plans, however, 
assumed the continuation of the Space 
Shuttle program, and on-orbit 
maintenance is on hold until a 
robotic alternative is developed.  
SP 
2.1 
H NASA created an Institute to ensure 
that the astronomer-scientist 
customer had a direct say in what the 
HST would actually be able to do. The 
Institute had direct influence over 
initial requirements, design, 




H Extensive operational mission 
analysis activities were performed 
and influenced system requirements.  
SP 
2.3 
M Cost considerations appeared to 
influence requirements over technical 
or operational considerations. 
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However, most decisions impacting 
requirements went through exhaustive 
trade studies and analysis.  
SP 
2.4 
H Due to the known operational risk 
associated with potential problems 
detected post-launch, engineers had 
designed the system specifically for 
on-orbit servicing to upgrade 
instruments and change out degradable 
components. Instruments were designed 
for ease of removal and replacement. 
SP 
2.5 
H Once the error in the mirror was 
detected, engineers developed a 




L Due to schedule and cost pressures, 
NASA ignored indicators that there 
were problems from at least two tests 
used to align the test apparatus and 
check the correct radius of the 
primary mirror. At the conclusion of 
the testing activities, management 
abandoned the review of all data for 
the final report and re-assigned the 
team as a cost-cutting measure.  






The Mission Integration and Development (MIND) 
program is a complete lifecycle contract to 
develop, integrate, operate, and maintain the 
National Reconnaissance Office’s (NRO’s) Future 
Imagery Architecture system, integrating core 
ground common services and numerous space and 
ground-based systems and providing a state-of-
the-art intelligence infrastructure. The MIND 
contract was awarded in April 1999 to a multi-
company team under the leadership of the 
Raytheon Company. 
Successful program because the MIND program 
accomplished all major milestones on schedule 
and continually exceeded the operational 
availability specification of 98 percent 
(averaging over 99.5 percent) since the first 
transition to operations in December 2003. This 
initial delivery into operations was performed 
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on cost and on schedule (to the day) as 
established four and a half years earlier in 
the original proposal.  
SP 
1.1 
H The initial development was completed 
in seven increments. The initial 
increments established the 
infrastructure and tested high-risk 
designs and operational concepts. 
This strategy later enabled MIND to 
accept major changes driven by 
operational risk evolution without 
baseline delivery schedule changes. 
SP 
1.2 
H The program used incremental 
development, event-based reviews, and 
Integrated Product Teams with 
customer representation to ensure 
operational risks were accommodated. 
They also used proven process 
technology as recognized by Malcolm 
Baldridge awards, CMMI, and 
International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) 
9001:2000/AS9100:2001 compliance.  
SP 
1.3 
H Incremental development and delivery 
of system in blocks provided 
opportunities for customer feedback, 
incorporation of new requirements, 
and changes to existing requirements 
based on operational considerations. 
SP 
1.4 
H Implementation of incremental 
deployment of the system in blocks 
performed to mitigate operational 
risk. The transition occurred so 
smoothly that it received special 
recognition from the NRO.  
SP 
2.1 
H MIND developed a series of Early 
Interface Tests as a risk reduction 
technique. The contractor employed a 
full-time staff at the Government 
operational sites to perform 
operational integration activities, 
facilitate end-user feedback, and 
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address problems or issues 
immediately. The customer was an 
active member of the MIND team, 
participating in a wide range of 
planning, review, and decision 
activities to include risk 
identification and mitigation.  
SP 
2.2 
H The initial increments established 
the infrastructure and tested high-




M A series of Engineering Review Boards 
and the Program Control Board, which 
is the controlling authority for risk 
and management reserves, approved all 
technical baseline changes after 




M The program used a structured 
architecture-based development 
approach, which allowed the customer 
to participate in the engineering 
process and ensured that the 
requirements derived for the program 
supported the design and that the 




H The engineering approach 
(incremental) and architectural 
approach (separation of concerns) 
allowed the MIND program to accept 
major changes without baseline 
delivery schedule changes. 
SP 
2.6 
M Additional block updates occurred 
after deployment, but it is unclear 
if technical capability was deferred 






Implementation of an Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) system at a manufacturing 
subsidiary of a multinational pharmaceutical 
firm deploying a single instance of specific 







Successful program because the system went live 
as expected, on time and within budget, and the 
program team was able to achieve a rapid ramp-
up to full production earlier than planned 
(seven weeks instead of the predicted nine 
weeks after going live). 
SP 
1.1 
H Planning decisions were driven by the 
business threat of failing a Food and 
Drug Administration audit, which 
would have long-term impacts on the 
financial viability of the company. 
This operational risk was clearly 
articulated and communicated as the 
driving need for the program.  
SP 
1.2 
H The implementation team selected a 
negotiated engineering process rather 
than a standard plan-driven process. 
This allowed a dialogue between end-
users, ERP integrators, and ERP 
product vendors as they negotiated 
needs, extension capabilities, and 
ERP configurability as they converged 
within the solution space.  
SP 
1.3 
H Legacy data integrity issues were 
discovered after initial planning, 
and in response, the program team 
created a dedicated data maintenance 
team of seventeen full-time 
equivalents and ensured that data 
going into the new system was clean, 
valid, and in the right format. 
SP 
1.4 
M Local end-users participated in the 
program work streams, and integration 
specialists were charged with 
mitigating the anticipated impact to 




M End-users were encouraged to voice 
uncertainty during development and 
raised concerns about the ERP 
transition impacting customer 
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satisfaction and their ability to 
distinguish their work from 
competitors. Because this was a 
global implementation, some end-users 
at remote sites weren’t as engaged in 
identifying mission and business 
impacts of the new system.  
SP 
2.2 
H The exploration/negotiation process 
used by the company allowed for 
influence of the requirements based 
on operational risk.  
SP 
2.3 
M Requirements were sub-optimized to 
mitigate longer-term business needs 
and tended to ignore more urgent 
mission needs of end-users. However, 
this decision was explicit and well-




H This implementation of the ERP system 
was in the highly-regulated 
pharmaceutical sector, which requires 
operational risk considerations to 
influence detailed implementation 
decisions, such as quality, safety, 




M The company used a dual cycle of 
exploration/negotiation, allowing the 
resulting implementation to produce a 
stable corporate template acceptable 
to most site requirements. This 
enabled product evolution based on 
changing user needs.  
 
While most of the interaction between 
development team and end-user was 
positive, there was some evidence 
that when end-users requested changes 
that were required based on 
operational need, their requests were 
ignored, and they were told to use 
the system as is and to absorb the 





L Schedule pressure influenced the team 
to defer planned tasks rather than 
evaluate the impact of the deferral 
decision on operational risk.  
 
The second set of programs evaluated are described as 
challenged programs and are presented in Table 30.  
Table 30. Case Studies of Challenged Programs 
 
Case 1: Titan 
Survey portion 




The Titan survey portion of the Cassini-
Huygens mission involved the Huygens lander 
separating from the Cassini orbiter and 
commencing a one-way, two and a half-hour 
descent into Titan’s atmosphere. Its modest 
transmitter sent data back to the orbiter, 
which relayed the information to Earth. 
Challenged program because the program team 
ignored operational risks associated with the 
design of the communication link between the 
orbiter and the lander not accounting for 
Doppler shift. These issues were identified 
during development and ignored due to cost and 
schedule pressures, forcing the team to 
address the issues after launch at greater 
expense and the risk of mission failure. 
SP 
1.1 
M Operational risk of communication 
issues between the lander and the 
orbiter were identified but not 




L A traditional development approach 
was selected. The decision to divide 
the work between the European Space 
Agency (ESA) and NASA was made based 
on political motivation, not on 
desire to mitigate operational risk 
associated with interface 
complexity. 
SP L Plans were not adjusted when risks 
of inter-operability issues were 
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1.3 raised. Testing did not reflect 
operational environment, and 
requests for high-fidelity radio 
testing between the orbiter and the 




L The launch date was held even though 
scientists raised concerns about 
potential Doppler shift phenomenon. 
SP 
2.1 
H Scientists participated during 
development and identified the risk 
of ignoring the Doppler shift 
between the orbiter and the lander. 
SP 
2.2 
L No evidence requirements were 
adjusted based on operational risk 
of inter-operability between the 
orbiter and the lander.  
SP 
2.3 
L The program team appeared to 
prioritize development cost and 
schedule and ignored both mission 
and lifecycle cost considerations. 
SP 
2.4 
L Architectural and design decisions 
did not account for interface issues 
between the orbiter and the lander. 
SP 
2.5 
L The component selected by the ESA 
vendor did not address operational 
risk of Doppler shift.  
SP 
2.6 
L The program team ignored operational 
risk during development and deferred 
further analysis until after launch. 
Although the travel time would be 
approximately seven years from Earth 
to Saturn, less costly changes to 
components or designs were 
impossible after launch. Heroic 
engineering activities saved the 
mission at higher cost using sub-
optimal solutions. 
Case 2:  Denver 
International 
Implementation of an airport-wide, information 






Denver International Airport (DIA) intended to 
dramatically improve the efficiency of luggage 
delivery. The system composed of fifty-five 
networked computers, five thousand electric 
eyes, four hundred radio frequency receivers, 
and fifty-six barcode scanners was to 
orchestrate the safe and timely arrival of 
every suitcase and ski bag at DIA.  
Challenged program because by the time the 
airport opened in late February 1995, it was 
sixteen months behind schedule and close to $2 
billion over budget, causing DIA to abandon 
its previous commitment to build an airport-
wide automated baggage handling system to 
support the airport when initially opened. 
SP 
1.1 
L Only three firms bid on the 
contract, and Denver’s consulting 
firm recommended against all three 
submitted designs on the grounds 
that the configurations would not 
meet the airport's operational 
needs. The contract was awarded to 
BAE, who originally declined to bid 
on the program because of the 
complexity and the lack of time to 
complete the program.  
SP 
1.2 
L Based on schedule constraints, the 
system was initially deployed 




L When the system failed its first 
operational test, the program wasn’t 
re-planned, rather more pressure was 
placed on the program team to 
deliver as planned to support the 
opening of the airport.  
SP 
1.4 
M The opening of the airport was 
delayed based on the results of 
operational testing and lack of 
progress developing a baggage 





L DIA management relied on BAE to 
understand the operational 




L The BAE system was described as 
highly advanced and theoretically 
capable of living up to its promised 
capabilities, but lack of validation 
of the requirements and designs in 
an operational environment caused 
the system to not be able to achieve 
stable and reliable operations. 
SP 
2.3 
L Schedule considerations drove the 
lack of engineering trade studies 
and modeling that could have 
improved system design. 
SP 
2.4 
L BAE did not perform validation of 
the designs and technical solutions 
selected based on operational need.  
SP 
2.5 
M The fully automated system was too 
complex and unable to meet the 
operational need, causing DIA to 




M Operational risk drove DIA to 
abandon the airport-wide 
computerized baggage handling system 
and instead opted to support two 
concourses with a manual baggage 
system and one concourse with a 
scaled-down semi-automated system. 





The Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) 
program was intended to transform how the Air 
Force manages its global logistics and supply 
chain network in support of its operations 
worldwide. Part of the effort was to overhaul 
or retire hundreds of legacy computer systems. 
 
Challenged program because the result after 
eight years of development was an abandoned 
system, a waste of $1.1 billion in taxpayer 
money, and the need to maintain multiple, 
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inadequate logistics systems far inferior to 
the promise of ECSS. 
SP 
1.1 
M The Air Force identified cultural 
resistance to change and lack of 
leadership as potential problems in 
2004, yet it failed to mitigate 
these operational risks. 
SP 
1.2 
L The program failed to follow the 
required Business Process Re-
engineering (BPR) approach required 
of major information technology 
programs. This lack of adherence to 
the BPR process meant a failure to 
examine operational processes and 




L The program failed to follow 
appropriate change management 
processes during program execution. 
SP 
1.4 
L High levels of resistance to change 
within the end-user community was 
allowed to fester without addressing 
transition into operations plans.  
SP 
2.1 
L The Air Force failed to clearly 
communicate with ECSS end-users or 
allow them to adequately participate 
in program development activities. 
This lack of participation decreased 




L The Air Force failed to follow 
acquisition best practices and did 
not establish a set of validated and 
stable requirements for the program. 
SP 
2.3 
L The Air Force failed to highlight 
the expected improvements to long-
term operations of the new system. 
Cost avoidance was prioritized over 





L Lack of end-user participation, 
program delays, and cost pressure 
caused the design team to forego 




L Early in the program, requirements 
changes due to operational need 
changes was identified as a high 
risk that would increase costs and 
cause scheduling delays. However, 
this risk was never addressed and 
served as a contributing cause of 
the program’s failure. 
SP 
2.6 
L Decisions to add, decrease, or 
remove capabilities were made 
without regard to impact on cost, 
schedule, and usability. 
Contributing to this lack of 
consideration was the fact that the 
program had six different program 
managers during the program’s eight 
years, who weren’t always privy to 
decision rationale.  




Vehicle90, 91, 92, 
93 
The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) was 
planned to be an armored amphibious vehicle 
that was initiated in 1988 to replace the 
1970s-era Amphibious Assault Vehicle. The EFV 
was an armored, fully-tracked infantry combat 
vehicle operated by a three-person crew 
designed to carry seventeen combat-equipped 
Marines. It was designed to roll off a Navy 
amphibious assault ship, move under its own 
power to the beach, and cross the beach and 
operate inland. 
   
Challenged program because of cost growth and 
changing requirements driven by mission 
threats that evolved since the program was 
originally conceived. Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) were not prevalent in 1988, and 
the design had the EFV too close to the ground 
and vulnerable to an IED taking out the 
vehicle and its occupants. Also, advances in 
longer-ranged, shore-based, anti-ship cruise 
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missiles put the Navy’s amphibious ships 
disembarking EFVs at their twenty-five-mile 
operating limit vulnerable to attack requiring 
a change in operational concepts and designs. 
Program delays, rising costs, and a decrease 
in the number of vehicles ordered drove the 
cost of each vehicle to over $24 million each. 
As a result, the EFV program requested an 
additional $11.163 billion in 2011 and was 
subsequently cancelled with only five 
prototype vehicles delivered after twenty-
three years of sunk development cost.  
SP 
1.1 
L The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 
was designed to mitigate the risks 
of a World War II enemy requiring 
U.S. Marines to conduct assaults on 
the shores of an enemy. While it was 
recognized that the threat evolved, 




M Plans included traditional long 
development lifecycles with system 
delivery at the end. No evolution 
was built into the engineering 
plans, but plans did include 
operational readiness testing where 
many issues were uncovered.  
SP 
1.3 
L When mission threats changed, the 
program was slow to react and 
required major, costly re-designs 
and eventually was canceled because 




M Transition plans included 
operational readiness testing with 
prototypes, which allowed the end-
user to express concerns about the 




L The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 
was a model acquisition program that 
won numerous awards early in its 
lifecycle. As an acquisition reform 
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program, the prime contractor was 
given more leeway and less 
government oversight. End-user 
involvement began in earnest during 
operational readiness testing in 
2006, at which time the prototype 
was viewed as operationally 
ineffective with concerns that the 
vehicle would wear out under normal 
operating conditions.  
SP 
2.2 
L Requirements were developed based on 
the last war, and little validation 
of requirements was conducted.  
SP 
2.3 
L System requirements were not 
balanced. The desire to specify a 
vehicle for both amphibious landing 
as well as over-land operations 
resulted in requirements that were 
sub-optimized for both needs.  
SP 
2.4 
M The program was forced to repeat the 
System Design and Development phase 
to address operational risks such as 
better protection against sea water, 
a strengthened gun turret, and trim 
tabs to make the vehicle more stable 
in the water. This added $143 
million in development costs and a 
schedule slip of four years.  
SP 
2.5 
L The program was slow to react to 
changes in mission threats, and 
changes in technical solutions 
became too costly to allow the 
program to continue.  
SP 
2.6 
L Decisions to relax requirements and 
subsequent decisions to decrease the 
number of vehicles acquired were 
based on cost rather than 
operational risk.  
CASE 5:  New 
York Subway 
Communications 
In 1999, officials in New York City hired 
contractors to develop a new communications 
system to allow law enforcement personnel to 
communicate both underground and above ground 
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System94, 95 during emergency situations. The goal of the 
program was to develop a network that would 
make it possible for law enforcement personnel 
to talk across department and organizational 
lines. Program completion would be in 2004 at 
a cost of $115 million. 
   
Challenged because government and contractor 
program managers ignored technical issues 
associated with operability of the system that 
could cause interference when they were raised 
in 2001. Schedule and political pressure 
caused the team to continue with a failed 
design rather than re-design the transmission 
components of the system. 
  
Police users said in 2004 that they would not 
use the system unless the interference issues 
were fixed. The decision was made in 2005 to 
fix the problems after delivery. The program 
was completed three years late in October of 
2007 after spending $140 million, a 22 percent 
cost overrun.  
 
However, because of interference issues, the 
implementation was halted due to lack of 
operational effectiveness. At the time, fixing 
the problem was expected to increase the cost 




L Program managers ignored operational 
risk of frequency interference even 




L The program team did not plan for 
operational risk mitigation actions 
such as prototype development or 
early operational testing.  
SP 
1.3 
L Plans were not adjusted when 
operability issues were raised. 
SP 
1.4 
L Operational risk was ignored, and 
deployment plans were held even 






M The police department raised the 
issue of interference and lack of 
operability, but the program team 
actively ignored its input. 
SP 
2.2 
L Operational risk concerns were 
ignored and requirements held even 








L Operational risks were ignored, and 




L The technical solution selected 
failed to meet the operational need. 
SP 
2.6 
L The program team decided to delay 
addressing known operational risks 
based on cost and schedule. The 
resulting system was unusable.  
 
Table 31 provides a summary of the successful and 
challenged programs along with the evaluation of those programs 
against the systems engineering operational risk characteristics 
described in Table 27. In addition, each program was scored 
numerically by simply assigning a value of 1 for each Low, 3 for 
each Medium, and 5 for each High characterization. This provides 
the ability to quickly compare scores across programs.  
Programs identified as successful had a higher score than 
programs identified as challenged. The results would imply that 
the successful programs addressed operational risk  
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Case 1 H H H M H H L H M L 38 
Case 2 H H M M H H M H H L 37 
Case 3 H H H H H H M M H M 44 
























Case 1 M L L L H L L L L L 16 
Case 2 L L L M L L L L M M 16 
Case 3 M L L L L L L L L L 12 
Case 4 L M L M L L L M L L 16 
Case 5 L L L L M L L L L L 11 
Average 14.2 
 
considerations, either explicitly or inadvertently, more than 
challenged programs. However, given the subjective nature of 
this evaluation technique, additional research may be required 
to convince a program team to implement an approach that allows 
operational risk considerations to influence systems engineering 




Several practices defined in Table 27 did not score well in 
either successful of challenged programs. Neither set of 
programs as a group did well in managing the balance between 
short-term mission needs and longer-term business needs (SP 
2.3). Cost and schedule drivers tended to drive decisions over 
mission and business needs.  
Similarly, when capabilities were deferred or accelerated, 
cost and schedule played a key role in these decisions over the 
consideration of the operational risk impacts of the decision 
(SP 2.6). Of the practices related to planning, few programs 
considered operational risk when developing transition and 
deployment plans (SP 1.4). While these practices seem important 
to program success based on experience and judgment, their lack 
of presence in successful programs indicates that further 
exploration is required before including them in a standards-








The purpose of this research was first to define the 
activities that could be used by systems engineers to ensure 
that engineering activities are influenced by operational risk 
considerations. Secondly, to determine if a focus on operational 
risk during the systems engineering lifecycle has a positive 
impact on program outcomes.  
A structured approach to addressing operational risk during 
the systems engineering process, Operational Risk-Driven 
Engineering Requirements/Engineering Development (ORDERED), was 
introduced, and an exhaustive operational risk taxonomy was 
developed to allow systems engineers to incorporate the end-
user’s evolving operational risk considerations into systems 
engineering activities.  
To examine the relationship between operational risk 
considerations during the systems engineering process and 
program outcomes, a survey instrument was developed and 
administered, a system dynamics model developed, and case 
studies of successful and challenged programs were evaluated 
against characteristics of successfully implementing an 
operational risk focus. These activities led to the conclusion 
that a focus on operational risk during the systems engineering 
lifecycle has a positive impact on program outcomes.  
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This research focused primarily on program-level 
activities, those activities within the systems engineering 
lifecycle from user needs analysis through deployment and 
support of a given system, component, or capability. The results 
of identifying and applying operational risk considerations 
within the program systems engineering activities as shown in 
this research were promising. Additional work is required to 
institutionalize operational risk thinking within existing 
systems engineering lifecycle activities based on the ORDERED 
approach described here or other similar approaches.  
Another area of further research would be applying these 
concepts at an enterprise level. Programs within a portfolio are 
typically linked by a common mission set and are funded through 
the same or similar sources.  
As operational risk evolves, priorities change. An 
enterprise may need to re-direct attention and resources to 
expedite some programs, slow others down, or cancel some 
programs altogether. They may find that they need to initiate 
new programs to address the evolving risk if existing programs 
are unable to accommodate change.  
In a study by the National Academy of cost growth of NASA 
missions, the authors note that ...cost growth in one mission 
may induce organizational re-planning that delays other missions 
in earlier stages of implementation, further amplifying overall 
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cost growth. Effective implementation of a comprehensive, 
integrated cost containment strategy, as recommended herein, is 
the best way to address this problem96. An integrated strategy 
would benefit from operational risk considerations to balance 
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The mission category consists of potential sources of risk 
to the operational mission. The sources of risk in this category 
focus on the mission timeline from mission tasking and planning 
through evaluation of mission outcomes. In addition, the 
operational systems, processes, and people used to perform the 
mission are potential sources of risk to mission performance and 
are included in this category. 
1. Mission Planning 
The mission planning element includes sources of risk 
associated with planning the mission. It includes how the 
mission is tasked, planned, and re-planned during execution 
of the mission.  
a. Stability 
The stability attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with mission tasking and planning. Areas of 
risk include the frequency and magnitude of changes to 
mission tasking and the impact on operational planning 
and re-planning activities as well as stability of 
operational plans themselves. 
Exploratory Questions 
● How often does mission tasking change? 
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● Do operational plans need adjustment during 
  execution?  
b. Completeness 
The completeness attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the thoroughness and maturity of 
mission tasking and operational plans. Areas of risk 
include tasking with missing details required to plan 
the mission and operational plans lacking detail 
required to perform the mission.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Is mission tasking detailed enough to plan the 
  mission? 
● Are operational plans detailed enough to allow 
  operators to perform their assigned tasks?  
c. Clarity 
The clarity attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the certainty of the mission tasking 
as well as the operational plans. Areas of risk 
include level of confusion or misinterpretation that 
may arise from mission tasking or operational plans 
that lack clear and unambiguous definition.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Is mission tasking ambiguous? 
● Are operational plans of sufficient detail to avoid 
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  confusion or ambiguity in execution? 
d. Feasibility 
The feasibility attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with how likely mission outcomes are 
to be achieved given current people, processes, and 
systems. Areas of risk include probability of mission 
success and ability of current operational resources 
to perform the mission task or execute the operational 
plans. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Can the operational organization achieve the mission 
  tasking? 
● Are operational plans sufficient to achieve mission 
  outcomes given available resources? 
e. Precedents 
The precedents attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with whether the mission tasking or the 
approach defined in the operational plans have been 
successfully performed in the past. Areas of risk 
include mission tasking specifying outcomes never 
achieved previously or implementation choices within 
operational plans that are unproven. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Have the mission outcomes defined in the tasking ever 
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  been achieved before? If so, has this organization 
  achieved these outcomes previously? 
● Do operational plans define methodologies, 
  approaches, or tactics new to the organization? 
f. Agility 
The agility attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with how quickly the tasking and plans may 
be adjusted to meet evolving operational needs. Areas 
of risk include rigid change control processes for 
mission tasking and plans or the inability to adjust 
quickly when mission threats evolve. 
Exploratory Questions 
● How often does the mission change from the original 
  tasking? 
● How quickly can the operational organization adjust 
  to mission changes? 
● How much authority do operational leaders have in 
  deviating from tasking or plans? 
 2. Mission Execution 
The mission execution element includes sources of risk 
associated with performing the mission. It includes the 
effectiveness and efficiency of execution, the ability to 
repeatedly perform the mission, to adjust as needed, and to 
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execute while meeting cost constraints in a safe and secure 
manner. 
a. Efficiency 
The efficiency attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the ability of the operational 
organization to execute mission requirements with the 
least amount of resources needed. Areas of risk 
include resource waste during execution, performing 
unnecessary tasks that don’t contribute to mission 
success, or under-utilization of resources.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Are there mission execution steps performed that 
  don’t contribute to mission outcomes? 
● Are execution steps as streamlined as they could be 
  while still meeting mission outcomes? 
● Are all mission resources (people, processes, 
  systems) used without waste? 
b. Effectiveness 
The effectiveness attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the efficacy of the operational 
mission to achieve desired outcomes. Areas of risk 
include ability to achieve mission outcomes during 
performance of the mission and the effectiveness of 
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people, processes, and systems working together to 
meet mission objectives. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Do operational personnel, process, and systems meet 
  mission objectives during execution? 
● Does the operation achieve desired outcomes? 
c. Repeatability 
The repeatability attribute includes sources of 
risk associated the operational organization’s ability 
to execute the mission multiple times in a similar, if 
not the same, fashion. Areas of risk include ability 
to predict resources, effort, and outcomes based on 
past performance.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Are the mission steps performed similarly each time? 
● How much variation is observed in mission execution? 
  Does that cause concern? 
●  Can operational leaders and personnel rely on past 
  mission execution to predict resources and effort 
  required to achieve mission outcomes? 
d. Agility  
The agility attribute includes sources of risk 
associated the ability of the mission during execution 
to adjust quickly to respond to changes in operational 
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risk or mission needs/threats. Areas of risk include 
ability to adjust quickly and allow flexibility in 
mission execution while still performing the mission 
with discipline to meet mission outcomes.  
Exploratory Questions 
● During execution, are new threats and mission risks 
  quickly identified? 
● Can operational personnel, processes, and systems 
  quickly adjust during execution to meet mission 
  challenges, threats, or risks? 
● As mission execution adjusts to meet unexpected 
  execution needs, does mission discipline 
  deteriorate? 
e. Affordability 
The affordability attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the cost effective performance of 
the mission. Areas of risk include ability to meet all 
mission objectives while meeting cost constraints, 
including keeping cost growth at a minimum and the 
ability to recognize cost savings over time. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Are mission objectives met within all cost 
  constraints? 
● Do mission execution costs decline over time? 
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● Are there aspects of the mission driving cost 
  increases over time?  
● Is the operational organization able to continue to 
  execute within budget? 
● Are labor, raw material, or supplier costs rising 
  unacceptably?  
f. Security 
The security attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the ability to execute the mission 
while maintaining all security requirements. Areas of 
risk include ability to maintain operational, 
information, system, and personnel security. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Are there operational security concerns associated 
  with mission execution? 
● Does the operational organization maintain 
  information and data security during mission 
  execution?  
● Does mission execution endanger personnel security?  
g. Safety 
The safety attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the ability of the operational 
organization to guarantee safe operations during 
mission execution. Areas of risk include ability to 
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maintain operational, information, system, and 
personnel security.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Are safety hazards identified and mitigated during 
  mission execution? 
● Does the operational organization continually assess 
  the adequacy of controls in place to ensure that  
  acceptable levels of safety risk are not exceeded? 
● Do safety incidents impact mission execution or 
  degrade mission outcomes?  
● Are contingency plans in place to address potential 
  safety incidents? 
 3. Mission Outcomes 
The mission outcomes element includes sources of risk 
associated with the product or services that result from 
the execution of the mission. It includes being able to 
provide mission outcomes that predictably meet expectations 
in terms of the accuracy, timeliness, efficiency, and 
usability of the product or service provided as a result of 
executing the mission. 
a. Predictability 
The predictability attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the ability to provide results 
that predictably meet all expectations. Areas of risk 
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include how well mission outcomes observed align with 
planned outcomes and the uniformity of results from 
multiple execution of the same or similar mission 
tasks.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Do mission results routinely match planned results? 
● Is there variation in the product or service provided 
  as a result of executing mission tasks? 
● Can mission planners rely on mission task outcomes to 
  produce the results expected? 
b. Accuracy 
The accuracy attribute includes sources of risk 
associated the accuracy of mission outcomes. Areas of 
risk include the correctness, exactness, and 
authenticity of the outcomes, products, or services 
provided through mission execution.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Is it important that the mission produces accurate 
  results? 
● Can mission results be verified as accurate? 
● How is the authenticity of mission outcomes, 
  products, or services ensured through mission 




The usability attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the operational usability of mission 
outcomes. Areas of risk include a mismatch between 
operational need and results provided, the 
appropriateness of the results, and ease of use of 
mission outcomes.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Do the outcomes, products, and services resulting 
  from executing the mission meet the operational 
  need? 
● Are operators able to quickly and easily understand 
  the outcomes, products, and services resulting from 
  mission execution? 
● Are the mission execution outcomes appropriate to 
  fulfill mission and business needs?   
d. Timely 
The timely attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the suitability of the timeliness of 
mission outcomes. Areas of risk include mission 
outcomes, products, or services that are late-to-need 
or are produced too soon so that they become less 
effective once needed. 
Exploratory Questions 
● How important is it that mission outcomes are 
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  produced in a timely fashion? 
● Are mission outcomes routinely late-to-need? 
● Are mission outcomes, products, or services produced 
  too soon, and therefore, are less relevant or 
  effective due to staleness of the outcome?  
e. Efficient 
The efficient attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the ability of the mission to produce 
efficient outcomes. Areas of risk include waste in 
execution, lack of ability to execute economically, 
and tasks that exhibit excessive administrative 
overhead.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Are mission-critical and support tasks executed as 
  streamlined as needed? 
● Is there waste in execution that drives mission cost 
  higher than necessary? 
● Is the mission executed with minimal administrative 
  overhead? 
4. Operational Systems 
The operational systems element includes sources of 
risk associated with the systems used by operational 
personnel to execute the mission. It includes the ability 
of the systems to enable the performance of mission-
175 
 
critical and mission-support tasks effectively and 
efficiently. Systems are able to respond appropriately when 
necessary and to evolve when shifts in mission need occur.  
a. Throughput 
The throughput attribute includes sources of risk 
associated the ability of operational systems to 
process the amount of material or data required to 
perform the mission and to respond when shifts in 
mission need occur. Areas of risk include the 
inability of operational systems to process raw 
materials or information at a rate that supports 
current or future operational needs. 
Exploratory Questions 
● How critical is it that operational systems keep up 
  with mission demands for the processing of raw 
  materials or information? 
● Do current systems meet operational throughput needs?  
● Are there planned or expected changes in mission 
  execution requiring higher levels of throughput that 
  may be met with current operational systems? 
● Are the systems used by mission partners able to keep 




The usability attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the ease of use of operational 
systems. Areas of risk include operational systems 
that are not intuitive to use, that confuse operators, 
or that induce a high rate of operator errors. 
Exploratory Questions 
● How quickly can new operators master operational 
  systems? 
● Are operational systems easy to use? 
● Is how to get desired results from operational  
 systems intuitive for operators? 
● Is there a high rate of operational incidents traced 
  to operator error? 
● When operations scale in volume or intensity, do 
  operational systems decrease or increase uncertainty 
  and confusion? 
c. Flexibility 
The flexibility attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the ability of operational 
systems to meet changes in mission demands. Areas of 
risk include operational systems that have rigid 
operational concepts embedded in their design, systems 
that fail to recognize deviation in mission needs, and 
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systems that require extensive or awkward operational 
workarounds to perform the mission.  
  Exploratory Questions 
● Are operational systems designed to easily meet 
  changes in mission expectations? 
● When mission needs deviate from expectations, do 
  systems support these changes during execution? 
● Do operators employ extensive or awkward workarounds 
  for system inadequacies in order to meet mission 
  objectives? 
d. Reliability 
The reliability attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the ability of operational 
systems to perform their required functions under 
known and planned conditions for a specified period of 
time. Areas of risk include operational systems that 
fail to produce results consistently as expected under 
normal and planned stress conditions and systems or 
system components that break or fail earlier or more 
frequently than expected or modeled. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Are there high-reliability requirements for 
  operational systems? 
● Are there detailed reliability models predicting 
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  failure modes or that analyze reliability growth or 
  deterioration over time? 
● Do the operational systems perform as expected under 
  normal and planned stress conditions? 
● Do operational systems or their components fail too 
 often or earlier than expected?  
e. Evolvability 
The evolvability attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the ability of operational 
systems to evolve with relative ease to meet changes 
in mission threats or needs. Areas of risk include 
operational systems that require extensive or 
expensive re-design to support evolving mission 
changes or that require original manufacturer 
involvement in system evolution. 
Exploratory Questions 
● How often do mission threats and risks change and 
  cause the need for mission execution changes? 
● Are operational systems architected and designed to 
  allow quick evolution without extensive or expensive 
  re-design activities? 
● Do operational systems require the original  
  manufacturer to effect change?  
● Does the system design require a large contingent of 
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  engineers to deploy the systems in order to 
  configure them for operations or changes in 
  operational tactics?  
f. Security 
The security attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the ability of operational systems to 
enable secure operations. Areas of risk include 
operational systems that fail to ensure data, system, 
network, inter-system, or personnel security.  
Exploratory Questions 
● How critical or sensitive is the data processed by 
  operational systems or the system itself to 
  operational outcomes? 
● Are adequate controls in place to ensure that data is 
  free from intentional or unintentional unauthorized 
  manipulation or degradation? 
● Are adequate controls in place to ensure that only 
  authorized users have access to operational systems? 
● Are operational networks monitored for unauthorized  
 access or activity? 
● Are there adequate controls in place to ensure that 
  inter-system interactions are authorized and 
  appropriate? 
● Do operational systems have controls to detect and 
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  thwart unauthorized insider threats? 
● Do operational systems protect sensitive personal 
  information of users and operators? 
g. Supportability 
The supportability attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the ability to support 
operational systems during use. Areas of risk include 
operational systems without adequate raw materials 
available to operate, limited access to routine or 
preventive maintenance, and lacking post-deployment 
support strategies. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Do operational systems deploy with all required raw 
  materials and spare parts to support normal and 
  expected operations? 
● Are operational systems subject to routine or 
  preventive maintenance actions? 
● Is there a well-defined and tested strategy in place 
  to obtain support from the original manufacturer or 
  other source when systems require more than routine 
  maintenance? 
h. Inventory 
The inventory attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with managing and using raw materials to 
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produce operational outcomes, products, or services 
during mission execution or to store intermediate or 
final mission outcomes before use. Areas of risk 
include having to store unplanned amounts of raw or 
processed materials or not having materials when 
needed. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Is there a well-defined strategy for the management 
  of inventory that includes raw materials, 
  intermediate products, and final mission outcomes 
  prior to use?  
● Are adequate raw materials or system inputs available 
  when needed? 
● Is there a plan for re-use or re-purposing of excess 
  raw materials or inventory?   
5. Operational Processes 
The operational processes element includes sources of 
risk associated with the processes used by operational 
personnel to perform the mission. It includes the 
suitability of operational processes to perform required 
mission-critical and support tasks and the ability of those 
processes to provide repeatable, predictable outcomes while 
being agile enough to support mission changes without 




The suitability attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the appropriateness of 
operational processes and their level of formality to 
support mission-critical and support tasks. Areas of 
risk include having operational processes that impede 
rather than enable the mission and not having 
processes that appropriately balance discipline and 
agility as required by unique mission needs. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Are operational activities guided by documented 
  processes?  
● Do operational processes enable successful mission 
  outcomes? 
● Are operational processes optimized to the right mix 
  of formality and agility as dictated by mission 
  needs? 
● Are operators empowered to adjust operational  
  processes to ensure that mission objectives are 
  achieved?  
b. Repeatability 
The repeatability attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the ability to ensure that 
process execution is repeatable and results in 
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expected outcomes. Areas of risk include lack of 
process documentation, ownership, training, and 
evaluation of effectiveness and compliance.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Is operational process documentation adequate to 
  ensure repeatable execution?  
● Is responsibility assigned for process execution and 
  evolution?  
● Is adequate and current training provided to 
  operational personnel?  
● Are operational processes objectively evaluated to 
  ensure that they meet the needs of the mission and 
  that they are executed as documented? 
c. Predictability 
The predictability attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the ability to predict mission 
outcomes based on a quantitative understating of 
process performance. Areas of risk include lack of 
understanding of process behavior typically 
characterized by a central tendency and dispersion as 
well as the inability to model and predict outcomes by 
analyzing process behavior.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Is operational process or critical sub-process 
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  behavior quantitatively understood? 
● Is the behavior of critical processes or sub- 
  processes understood in terms of central tendency  
  (mean) and dispersion (standard deviation)? 
● Does the operational organization use process 
  performance models to understand process 
  interaction, expected outcomes, and to test 
  assumptions and what-if scenarios prior to  
  execution? 
● Are quantitative mission objectives established based 
  on historic process performance?   
d. Agility 
The agility attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the ability to quickly plan, execute, 
re-plan, and adjust as needed during operations. Areas 
of risk include processes that are so rigid and 
onerous that they fail to meet operational needs and 
processes that are inflexible during execution so as 
to not support adjustments as needed. 
Exploratory Questions 
● How quickly can the operational organization plan a 
  new mission with confidence in outcomes? 
● Are multiple and redundant approvals required to 
  finalize operational plans? 
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● Are operational processes flexible enough to allow 
  re-planning during execution when operational risks 
  or threats change? 
● Does every operator understand how they personally, 
  and how their teams, contribute to the mission and  
  their pre-approved level of authority to deviate 
  from plan to achieve mission outcomes? 
e. Security 
The security attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with maintaining the integrity, 
availability, and confidentiality of operational 
processes, plans, and expected outcomes. Areas of risk 
include the inability of the operational organization 
to identify critical process assets that need 
protection, lack of analysis of process 
vulnerabilities, failure to identify operational 
security risks, and the lack of focus on applying 
mitigation approaches to address security threats. 
Exploratory Questions 
● How vulnerable are operational processes to security 
  breaches?  
●  Does the operational organization understand which 
  process assets have security vulnerability  
 implications and require protection? 
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● Are operational security risks and process 
  vulnerabilities continually assessed and analyzed? 
● Are the most critical process risks mitigated?   
6. Operational Staff 
The operational staff element includes sources of risk 
associated with the people who perform operational 
activities. It includes ensuring that operational staff 
maintain proper skill levels, are effectively trained, are 
replaced in a timely fashion to address attrition, and that 
the cost of staff remains affordable to perform the 
required mission.  
a. Skill Level 
The skill level attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with a mismatch between the skill 
levels required for mission execution using existing 
or planned systems and the current skill level of 
assigned staff. Areas of risk include the inability of 
the operational organization to staff positions 
adequately with skilled staff when needed and 
mismatches that arise when shifts in mission needs 
evolve or new systems deployed requiring different 
skills. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Does operational staff have the required skills and 
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  experience to perform current mission operations? 
● Does operational staff have the required skills to 
  support planned mission changes or to operate new or  
  planned systems? 
● Are individuals with required skills available in the 
  current market?  
b. Training 
The training attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the operational organization’s ability 
to provide adequate training and experiences to allow 
staff to perform the current and planned mission with 
the systems employed and envisioned in the future. 
Areas of risk include the inability of the operational 
organization to train staff quickly and realistically 
and to get them fully qualified to perform operations 
today and to support planned mission and system 
evolution.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Is current operational staff adequately trained to 
  support mission needs? 
● Is staff adequately prepared for planned mission and 
  operational system changes? 
● Is current training realistic and comprehensive  
  enough to allow qualification of operational staff 
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  prior to mission execution?  
c. Turnover 
The turnover attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the level of operational staff 
turnover. Areas of risk include the inability of the 
operational organization to fill positions quickly 
with adequately skilled and trained staff prior to the 
need date and the ease with which new staff are 
integrated into operational systems and processes 
without mission impact.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Is there a high turnover rate within operational 
  staff? 
● How easily can the operational organization find 
  skilled staff, provide training, and qualify them to 
  perform operational tasks? 
● Are operational systems and processes intuitive to 
  new operational staff? 
● How long does it take to fully qualify new 
  operational staff members? 
d. Affordability 
The affordability attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the cost of the operational staff 
required to perform mission-critical and support 
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tasks. Areas of risk include operational staff cost 
growth associated with changes in mission growth, 
operational system or process complexity, or the 
inability to find qualified operational staff at 
reasonable salaries.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Are operational staffing needs increasing or becoming 
  more difficult to fill? 
● Are the costs of hiring skilled operational staff 
  increasing at an unreasonable rate? 
● Does mission growth or tempo require a large increase 
  in operational staff?  
● Does the complexity of operational systems or 
  processes drive more-skilled or higher-cost staff? 
B. BUSINESS 
The business category consists of potential sources of risk 
to the longer-term viability of the organization’s proficiency 
in conducting business and executing its assigned mission. The 
sources of risk in this category focus on activities such as 
resource planning, governance, strategic planning, stakeholder 
management, culture, and continuous improvement.  
1. Resource Planning 
The resource planning element includes sources of risk 
associated with the resources that the operational 
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organization uses to plan and perform mission activities. 
It includes the available workforce, funding, facilities, 
and the tools and systems available to carry out mission 
tasking. 
a. Workforce 
The workforce attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the strategic management of the 
workforce required to perform mission activities. 
Areas of risk include availability of a qualified 
workforce to perform future mission activities, 
affordability of the workforce, and the organization’s 
ability to attract and retain a highly skilled 
workforce.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization plan for the 
  management of the workforce long-term? 
● Can the operational organization attract qualified 
  staff to meet workforce needs? 
● Can the operational organization retain the staff 
  required to fulfill mission needs?  
b. Budget 
The budget attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with funding constraints to perform mission 
activities. Areas of risk include lack of long-term 
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viability of the organization to perform mission 
activities, funding shortfalls requiring degraded 
operations, growth in mission costs over time, and the 
inability to acquire new systems to support mission 
needs or maintain existing systems. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Are there budget constraints that impact mission 
  performance? 
● Will future mission tasks suffer from budget 
  shortfalls? 
● Are costs growing to an extent that mission 
  performance is negatively impacted?  
● Can the operational organization afford to acquire 
  and field enhanced capabilities to keep up with 
  mission threats and needs? 
● Are current systems maintained to ensure mission 
  readiness? 
c. Facilities 
The facilities attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the permanent or temporary facilities 
used to conduct mission operations. Areas of risk 
include facilities that are inadequate, deteriorating, 




● Are current facilities adequate to perform mission 
  operations? 
● Do facilities support planned growth or mission 
  expansion? 
● Has facility maintenance kept up with operational 
  needs? 
d. Equipment and Systems 
The equipment and systems attribute includes 
sources of risk associated with having the appropriate 
tools and systems to perform mission operations. Areas 
of risk include equipment or systems that fail to 
support operational needs, fail to scale, are 
obsolete, or are unable to support shifts in mission 
needs.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Do operational equipment and systems meet current 
  operational needs?  
● Can operational equipment and systems scale to meet 
  future mission demands? 
● Are the designs or components that make up equipment 
  and systems obsolete and difficult to maintain? 
● Are operational equipment and systems flexible enough 
  to support shifts in operational risk or mission 




The governance element includes sources of risk 
associated with the mechanisms in place to govern mission 
and business activities. It includes the policy and process 
architecture to effectively guide activities, 
organizational structures, contracts with suppliers, and 
the ability to analyze data, how the operational 
organization ensures compliance, and how it identifies and 
mitigates operational risk. 
a. Policies 
The policies attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the operational organization’s 
policies that govern mission activities. Areas of risk 
include lack of written policies, policies that are 
inflexible, policies that haven’t evolved with changes 
in mission need, or policies that incentivize unwanted 
behavior.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization have a set of 
  written policies? 
● Are operational personnel aware of the content of 
  organizational policies? 
● Do policies drive unwanted behavior? 
● Do operational personnel need to employ workarounds 
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  to avoid inflexible policies? 
● Is there a clear process in place to change policies? 
● When mission and business threats evolve, are  
 policies changed appropriately? 
● Are mission activities evaluated for compliance with 
  policies? 
b. Procedures 
The procedures attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the operational organization’s 
procedures used to perform mission-critical and 
mission-support tasks. Areas of risk include lack of 
written procedures, procedures that are either too 
detailed or too abstract, procedures that are 
incomplete or inflexible, or the lack of guidance 
regarding when and how to deviate from procedures to 
support mission needs. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization have a set of 
  written procedures? 
● Are operational procedures defined for both mission- 
  critical and mission-support tasks? 
● Are procedures too detailed and inflexible? 
● Are procedures too abstract and allow too much 
  variation in mission execution? 
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● When mission needs necessitate deviation from 
  procedures, is clear guidance available to direct 
  staff about when and how to deviate? 
c. Organizational Structure 
The organizational structure attribute includes 
sources of risk associated with the structure that the 
operational organization has in place to execute 
mission tasks. Areas of risk include organizational 
structures that inhibit collaboration, increase 
command and control confusion, contain too many 
layers, or do not support how the mission is executed.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organizational structure inhibit 
  cross-unit collaboration? 
● Are there excessive layers of management between 
  those executing the mission and decision-makers? 
● Does the organizational structure cause mission 
  execution confusion? 
● Are command and control structures clear? 
● Does the static organizational structure mimic and 
  enable the mission execution structure? 
d. Contracts 
The contracts attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with contracts that the operational 
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organization enters into with external suppliers for 
products and services. Areas of risk include technical 
performance of acquired products and services, 
supplier cost and schedule performance, supply chain 
assurance, obsolescence of acquired products and 
services, availability of products and services from 
alternative sources, and flexibility of contracts and 
suppliers when mission needs change.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Do acquired products and services meet mission needs? 
● Do suppliers meet cost and schedule objectives? 
● Is the supply chain free of vulnerabilities that may 
  impact the mission? 
● Does the operational organization have the ability to 
  detect and remediate defective or counterfeit parts? 
● Are acquired products and services obsolete when 
  needed for mission tasks? 
● Does the operational organization have access to 
  alternative sources for mission-critical products 
  and services? 
● Are contracts and suppliers flexible when mission 




The analytics attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the ability of the operational 
organization to use data effectively to manage the 
work and make decisions. Areas of risk include having 
too much or too little data, not having an analytics 
capability, or having indicators that are late-to-
need, are misleading, are unused, or drive unwanted 
behavior.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization use historical and 
  fact-based data when making critical decisions? 
● Does the operational organization collect the 
  appropriate amount of data to support tactical and 
  strategic decision-making? 
● Does the operational organization have a robust data 
  analytics capability? 
● Are metrics and indicators provided when needed to 
  support timely decision-making? 
● Are metrics and indicators clearly understood 
  throughout the operational organization? 
● Are indicators aligned with operational mission and 




The compliance attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the ability of the operational 
organization to ensure that mission operations comply 
with all organizational policies as well as 
appropriate laws and regulations. Areas of risk 
include lack of objective oversight mechanisms in 
place to ensure compliance, lack of accountability, 
and inadequate reporting and record-keeping. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization objectively 
  evaluate compliance with policies and applicable 
  laws and regulations? 
● Are non-compliance incidents reported and tracked to 
  closure? 
● Are operational staff held accountable for compliance 
  with policies, laws, and regulations? 
● Does the organization keep records of compliance 
  checks and incidents of non-compliance? 
g. Risk Management 
The risk management attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the existence and effectiveness 
of a comprehensive operational risk management 
capability within the operational organization. Areas 
of risk include not having a defined operational risk 
199 
 
strategy, lack of robust operational risk 
identification approaches, the inability to analyze 
and prioritize operational risks, and the failure to 
mitigate operational risk. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization have a documented 
  and communicated operational risk management 
  strategy? 
● Does the operational organization have comprehensive 
  risk identification approaches to help continuously 
  identify mission and business risks? 
● Are mission and business risks analyzed and  
  prioritized? 
● Does the operational organization mitigate the most 
  critical risks to mission and business 
  effectiveness? 
3. Strategic Planning 
The strategic planning element includes sources of 
risk associated with the strategic planning capabilities 
and effectiveness of the operational organization. It 
includes establishing and articulating the operational 
organization’s vision and mission, values, goals, and 
objectives and monitoring their accomplishment. 
a. Vision and Mission 
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The vision and mission attribute includes sources 
of risk associated with the process of setting and 
communicating the vision and mission objectives of the 
operational organization. Areas of risk include not 
having well-defined vision and mission statements that 
reflect the reason for existence of the operational 
organization, not communicating the organization’s 
vision and mission, or mismatch between the stated 
vision and mission and actual operations. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization have explicit 
  vision and mission statements that reflect the 
  purpose of the operational unit? 
● Has the operational organization communicated its 
  vision and mission to all relevant stakeholders? 
● Do actual operations align with the operational 
  organization’s stated vision and mission? 
b. Values 
The values attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with guiding principles established to help 
operational staff understand acceptable behavior and 
action during mission execution. Areas of risk include 
not having an established set of core values to guide 
action and behavior, values that are in conflict with 
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actions of operational leadership, or values that 
don’t have an active influence on operations.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Has the operational organization established a set of 
  core values designed to influence acceptable actions 
  and behavior of operational staff? 
● Does staff in leadership positions exhibit behavior  
  in conflict with stated values? 
● Do the stated values influence the actions and 
  behavior of operational staff during mission 
  execution? 
c. Goals 
The goals attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with documented and communicated goals, 
tied to the organization’s values and mission, that 
explain what the operational organization intends to 
achieve. Areas of risk include not having documented 
goals, goals that aren’t aligned with the vision or 
mission statements of the organization, or goals that 
aren’t specific, measureable, achievable, and timely.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Are the operational organization’s goals documented 
  and communicated to relevant stakeholders? 
● Do stated goals align with the vision and mission 
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  statements of the operational organization? 
● Are the operational organization’s goals specific,  
 measureable, achievable, and timely? 
d. Objectives 
The objectives attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with the specific steps that the 
operational organization intends to take to achieve 
goals. Areas of risk include objectives that aren’t 
tied to stated goals, objectives that lack clarity, 
lack of assigned responsibility for accomplishment of 
objectives, or objectives without specific timelines 
and milestones.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Are strategic objectives of the operational 
  organization tied specifically to organizational 
  goals? 
● Are strategic objectives clear and concise, with 
  specific steps detailed to avoid execution 
  confusion? 
● Do stated objectives include timelines, 
  responsibilities, and milestones? 
e. Monitoring 
The monitoring attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with monitoring the implementation of the 
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operational organization’s strategic plan. Areas of 
risk include failure to understand when the 
organization deviates from strategic plan achievement; 
failure to adjust strategic plans, goals, or 
objectives when mission or business needs shift; or 
failure to communicate progress toward strategic plan 
achievement.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization monitor achievement 
  of strategic plans? 
● Are goals and objectives monitored and measured? 
● When mission or business needs change, does the 
  operational organization re-evaluate strategic 
  plans, goals, and objectives for relevance? 
● Is progress toward strategic plan achievement  
  communicated to relevant stakeholders? 
 4. Stakeholder Management 
The stakeholder management element includes sources of 
risk associated with how the operational organization 
manages relevant stakeholders. It includes identifying 
relevant stakeholders, planning for their involvement, 
engaging stakeholders appropriately, and controlling 





The identification attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with identifying relevant stakeholders 
who are affected by mission and business outcomes. 
Areas of risk include failure to understand the impact 
of mission and business outcomes on stakeholders, 
failure to explicitly list stakeholders and how they 
should be involved in mission activities, or failure 
to re-evaluate relevant stakeholders as mission and 
business changes occur.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Has the operational organization evaluated the impact 
  of mission and business outcomes on stakeholders? 
● Has the operational organization explicitly 
  identified both internal and external stakeholders  
  who are effected by mission and business outcomes? 
● As mission and business needs change, does the 
  operational organization re-evaluate which 
  stakeholders to involve during mission and business 
  activities? 
b. Stakeholder Management Plan 
The stakeholder management plan attribute 
includes sources of risk associated with the 
operational organization’s plan for involving relevant 
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stakeholders during mission and business activities. 
Areas of risk include failure to plan for the 
involvement of relevant stakeholders in mission and 
business planning and execution activities, failure to 
document the stakeholder management plan, or failure 
to maintain the plan as mission and business needs 
change. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Has the operational organization planned for the 
  involvement of relevant stakeholders during mission 
  and business planning and execution activities? 
● Is the stakeholder management plan documented? 
● Does the operational organization update the 
  stakeholder management plan when mission and 
  business needs change? 
c. Engagement 
The engagement attribute includes sources of risk 
associated with ensuring that relevant stakeholders 
are engaged as appropriate during mission and business 
activities. Areas of risk include failure to monitor 
stakeholder involvement, stakeholders who are unable 
or unwilling to participate as required, or 




● Does the operational organization monitor stakeholder 
  involvement in relation to the stakeholder 
  management plan? 
● Do all relevant stakeholders participate as planned? 
● Do stakeholders engage inappropriately (try to unduly 
  influence outcomes, disrupt mission planning or 
  execution)?  
d. Controlling 
The controlling attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with controlling stakeholder 
involvement. Areas of risk include failure to control 
stakeholder access to plans and mission outcomes or to 
take corrective action when stakeholders aren’t 
involved appropriately. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization control stakeholder 
  access to plans and mission outcomes? 
● When stakeholders aren’t engaging as required, does 
  the operational organization take corrective action? 
5. Continuous Improvement 
The continuous improvement element includes sources of 
risk associated with the continuous identification and 
implementation of operational improvements. It includes 
identification of problems impacting mission and business 
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outcomes, identifying opportunities for improvement, 
determining the root cause of problems, and planning 
improvement activities and implementing improvements. 
a. Problem Identification 
The problem identification attribute includes 
sources of risk associated with the ability of the 
operational organization to identify problems, issues, 
weaknesses, or constraints that negatively impact 
mission or business outcomes. Areas of risk include 
inability to determine negative outcomes, failure to 
document problems, and failure to encourage discovery 
of problems. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Can the operational organization detect when 
  problems, issues, weaknesses, or constraints  
  negatively impact mission or business outcomes? 
● Are problems documented to allow for further 
  analysis? 
● Does operational leadership encourage staff to 
  identify and communicate problems? 
b. Opportunity Identification 
The opportunity identification attribute includes 
sources of risk associated with the ability of the 
operational organization to identify potential 
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opportunities that could positively impact mission or 
business outcomes. Areas of risk include lack of 
analysis of current operations, failure to identify 
external best practices for possible adoption, and 
discouraging operational staff from suggesting 
improvements.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization analyze past and 
  current operations to identify potential improvement 
  opportunities? 
● Does the operational organization look for best 
  practices and improvement opportunities externally? 
● Does the operational organization encourage staff to 
  identify opportunities for improvement? 
c. Root Cause Analysis 
The root cause analysis attribute includes 
sources of risk associated with the ability of the 
operational organization to identify root causes of 
problems. Areas of risk include lack of analysis to 
determine root cause, fixing problems before 
determining the true cause, and inability to prevent 
recurrence of problems with certainty. 
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization analyze negative 
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  outcomes to determine their root cause? 
● Does the operational organization attempt to solve 
  problems without understanding the underlying cause 
  of the problem? 
● When proposing solutions to problems, can the 
  operational organization provide certainty that the 
  solutions will prevent recurrence of the problems?  
d. Improvement Planning 
The improvement planning attribute includes 
sources of risk associated with the ability of the 
operational organization to plan operational 
improvements. Areas of risk include failure to create 
a program plan for the improvement, failure to assign 
responsibility to plan the improvement activities, and 
failure to communicate the plan for improvement.  
Exploratory Questions 
● When planning improvement activities, does the 
  operational organization create a documented plan of 
  action and milestones? 
● Does the operational organization assign 
  responsibility for plan improvements? 
● Are operational improvement plans communicated to all 




The implementation attribute includes sources of 
risk associated with the ability of the operational 
organization to successfully implement operational 
improvements. Areas of risk include failure to fully 
resource the improvement plan, failure to address 
organizational change considerations such as 
resistance and training, and failure to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the improvement.  
Exploratory Questions 
● Does the operational organization provide adequate 
  resources to implement improvement plans? 
● When implementing operational improvements, does the 
  organization address resistance to change, training, 
  and other organizational change considerations? 
● After an operational improvement is implemented, does 
  the organization evaluate the effectiveness of the 



















Service and Solution Delivery Risk 
The purpose of Risk Management is to identify potential problems 
before they occur, so that risk-handling activities may be 
planned and invoked as needed to mitigate adverse impacts on 
achieving objectives. Identifying and mitigating risks is 
critical to ensuring delivery effectiveness. 
The purpose of this survey is to evaluate the effectiveness of 
Risk Management practices and to explore the relationship 
between a customer’s operational or mission risk and the ability 
to deliver solutions and services that mitigate these risks.  
Questionnaire (How strongly do you support the following 
statements?) 
 





Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 
2. My program team has an active risk register that reflects the 





Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 









Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 





Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 
5. The leadership above my program actively elicits risks and 





Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 
6. My program team actively elicited operational risks and 





Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 
7. My program team actively elicited quality attributes 
(responsiveness, adaptability, evolvability, agility, 





Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 
8. The customer actively participates with the program team 





Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 
9. The customer actively participates with the program team 
during execution to prioritize quality attributes 
213 
 
(responsiveness, adaptability, evolvability, agility, 
scalability, etc.) and evaluate the ability of the solution or 






Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 





Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 
11. My customer would say that the solution or service we 





Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 
12. My customer would say that the solution or service we 
deliver meets all critical quality attributes (affordability, 





Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 
      
 
13. The CACI program team consistently meets all customer cost 





Moderately Considerably To A Great 
Extent 
Unknown 




Type (select only one) 
Approximate Program Value (annual 
revenue): 
   Solution 
Development 








   Service Delivery     





  High          Medium        Low 
Program Visibility       High          Medium        Low 
Classification          
Approximate Team Size (FTEs):  ________ 
 
A.2 RAW SURVEY RESPONSES 
 Table 1 provides the raw results of the survey to include 
the respondents (Resp) and their answers to questions 1 through 
13 (Q1 through Q13) and program type (PT) of Solution 
Development (SD), Services (SVC), or Professional Services (PS).  
Table 1. Raw Survey Responses 
 
Resp Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 PT 
1 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 PS 
2 1 1 3 4 3 4 3 4 5 5 3 4 4 PS 
3 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 3 5 4 4 5 PS 
4 1 1 1 1 3 1 4 1 1 3 1 2 5 SVC 
5 3 2 2 4 4 1 1 3 5 5 5 5 5 SVC 
6 5 5 4 5 5 3 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 PS 
7 5 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 SVC 
8 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 4 SVC 
9 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 3 2 5 4 5 4 SVC 
10 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 SVC 
11 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 PS 
12 2 2 2 4 2 1 1 4 4 5 5 4 5 SVC 
13 1 1 2 3 4 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 4 PS 
14 2 1 2 5 4 2 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 PS 
15 3 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 PS 
16 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 PS 
17 3 2 3 4 1 2 2 4 3 3 2 2 2 SD 
18 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 4 1 5 5 PS 
19 4 4 3 3 1 2 2 5 5 4 3 4 5 SVC 
20 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 5 4 3 5 SD 
21 3 5 4 4 3 1 1 5 4 4 4 4 4 SVC 
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22 2 5 1 3 4 2 2 5 5 5 4 4 1 SVC 
23 2 1 1 5 1 5 5 4 3 5 4 5 5 PS 
24 3 4 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 5 4 3 5 SD 
25 2 1 2 4 3 2 2 3 3 5 4 3 3 SVC 
26 4 5 2 4 4 3 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 SD 
27 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 2 SD 
28 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 PS 
29 3 4 3 4 3 2 2 3 3 5 4 5 5 SD 
30 5 4 4 5 4 1 5 2 3 3 4 4 5 SD 
31 4 3 1 5 2 1 1 5 5 5 1 4 5 SD 
32 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 3 3 SD 
33 3 3 2 3 3 4 2 3 2 5 4 4 5 SVC 
34 2 2 1 2 5 1 1 3 1 3 4 5 5 PS 
35 2 3 4 4 4 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 4 PS 
36 1 1 1 4 5 1 1 2 5 5 5 5 5 SVC 
37 4 3 3 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 PS 
38 4 5 4 4 2 2 2 1 3 5 4 4 4 SVC 
39 4 1 3 5 3 2 4 1 4 5 4 5 5 PS 
40 3 1 3 3 1 4 4 3 3 5 4 4 5 SVC 
41 4 4 3 5 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 3 5 SD 
42 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 1 5 SD 
43 3 4 4 4 5 3 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 SD 
44 3 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 SD 
45 3 3 3 3 1 2 3 2 3 5 4 3 4 SD 
46 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 SD 
47 4 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 SVC 
48 3 3 2 4 5 2 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 PS 
49 4 2 2 2 4 3 3 1 2 3 3 3 4 SD 
50 2 4 5 5 4 5 5 3 1 4 4 3 4 SVC 
51 5 5 5 4 4 1 1 3 2 4 4 3 4 SD 
52 5 4 4 5 5 1 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 PS 
53 4 4 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 4 4 4 4 PS 
54 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 4 5 PS 
55 3 2 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 5 4 5 5 SD 
56 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 PS 
57 3 1 2 5 5 1 1 5 2 2 3 2 4 SVC 
58 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 3 5 4 4 3 5 SVC 
59 3 2 3 4 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 PS 
60 3 1 2 5 1 3 2 1 1 2 4 5 5 SVC 
61 3 3 2 4 2 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 SD 
62 4 4 3 4 5 2 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 SD 
63 5 5 5 4 5 1 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 SD 
64 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 SD 
65 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 PS 
66 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 5 PS 
67 5 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 3 3 4 3 2 SD 
68 3 3 2 3 2 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 SD 
69 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 PS 
70 4 4 3 4 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 SD 
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71 5 2 3 5 5 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 SVC 
72 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 3 4 SVC 
73 2 1 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 SVC 
74 1 1 1 3 1 4 4 4 3 5 5 5 5 PS 
75 2 3 3 4 3 1 1 1 2 5 4 4 5 PS 
76 4 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 3 5 4 3 4 SD 
77 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 SD 
78 4 4 4 5 5 1 1 2 3 4 5 4 4 SVC 
79 4 5 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 SVC 
80 3 1 2 4 3 1 1 4 4 5 4 4 5 PS 
81 5 3 5 3 4 3 3 2 2 5 4 4 4 PS 
82 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 PS 
83 3 4 3 4 1 1 1 5 5 5 4 4 5 SVC 
84 5 5 3 4 3 2 2 5 5 4 4 4 4 SD 
85 4 3 4 5 4 3 3 5 5 5 4 5 5 PS 
86 4 4 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 SVC 
87 4 5 4 4 1 1 1 4 2 5 4 1 4 SD 
88 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 5 5 4 3 SD 
89 3 3 1 5 5 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 5 SVC 
90 1 1 2 3 4 1 1 3 4 5 5 5 5 SVC 
91 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 4 3 4 SVC 
92 5 5 4 4 4 1 1 5 5 3 4 5 4 PS 
93 3 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 3 5 3 4 5 SD 
94 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 2 4 5 4 4 5 SD 
95 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 5 4 5 4 SD 
96 4 4 3 5 4 5 4 5 3 5 4 4 3 SD 
97 1 2 4 4 2 3 2 5 4 5 4 5 5 PS 
98 3 1 1 4 1 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 PS 
99 2 5 3 4 3 1 1 2 2 5 4 4 4 PS 
100 2 4 2 5 4 1 1 5 3 5 4 4 5 PS 
101 3 4 4 4 4 2 1 1 1 5 4 3 5 PS 
102 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 5 3 5 4 PS 
103 3 3 3 4 3 2 4 5 5 5 3 3 3 SVC 
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One measure of effectiveness of any given systems 
engineering practice is the ability of that practice to mitigate 
product or project risk. Product and project risk reduction is 
the focus of most risk management processes. When a project team 
has a robust risk management process, it continually identifies 
risks that may impact its ability to produce a product that 
meets customer requirements within cost and schedule 
constraints. 
One missing aspect of most systems engineering risk 
management approaches is a focus on operational risk. That is, 
the evolving risk to business or mission needs of the end-user. 
This lack of focus on operational risk during the engineering 
process encourages the creation of a chasm between evolving need 
and delivered product capabilities. The longer the development 
process, the wider that gap, and the end-user becomes less 
receptive to deeming the capability operationally effective. 
The purpose of this research is to introduce operational 
risk concepts into the systems engineering process, specifically 
through the use of operational risk scenarios, with the goal of 
improving program outcomes. This paper introduces ORDERED, a 
repeatable method used to influence systems engineering 
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practices by continually identifying operational risks before 
and throughout the engineering lifecycle.  
Keywords: Risk Management, Systems Engineering, Software 



























Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and 
means to enable the realization of successful systems1. The 
practices, approaches, methods, and tools of systems engineering 
have been codified over time and evolve as technology and system 
complexity increases. The purpose of having a set of proven 
practices for engineers to follow is to reduce system 
development risk and increase the probability of delivering a 
system that meets an operational need2.  
The tools applied to a given problem are selected based on 
an understanding of certain quality attributes of the product 
under development or the management aspects of the team producing 
the product within cost and schedule constraints. Therefore, a 
given practice is only viewed as effective if it reduces product 
or project risk or improves product or project outcomes at the 
same risk level.  
Product-focused or technical risk is concerned with the 
technical performance and quality attributes of the end product. 
For example, a product may have stringent reliability 
requirements. Another product may have near real-time processing 
requirements. The systems engineering methods and tools for 
mitigating reliability risks may include using design patterns 
such as redundant hardware and software or fault detection and 
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remediation mechanisms. Products with real-time requirements 
might use design patterns with the ability to ensure 
schedulability and analyze process behavior.  
Project-focused or management risk is concerned with the 
management aspects of the development lifecycle. For example, if 
a project has multiple customers who are prone to having 
conflicting requirements, rapid-prototyping and user juries may 
be used as approaches to mitigate these stakeholder involvement 
risks.  
If the product is dependent on other components or products 
that are developed simultaneously, the project may select 
architectural patterns that separate concerns and allow 
independent evolution of components by separate teams or 
collaboration tools such as employing an Interface Control 
Working Group to mitigate the risk of the inter-operating systems 
having deployment issues.  
One missing aspect of most systems engineering risk 
management processes, such as those described in the Guide to the 
Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge3 or the INCOSE Systems 
Engineering Handbook1, is a focus on evolving operational risk 
during system development.  
Wrubel and Gross describe this disconnect, stating, 
...requirements for any given system are highly likely to evolve 
between the development of a system concept and the time at which 
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the system is operationally deployed as new threats, 
vulnerabilities, technologies, and conditions emerge and users 
adapt their understanding of their needs as system development 
progresses4.  
Some project teams attempt to manage this risk by selecting 
an evolutionary approach, which allows for an incremental 
commitment to design decisions and incorporates off-ramps and on-
ramps for technology or addition of new requirements due to 
changes in mission need5.  
These threats, vulnerabilities, and technology changes could 
effect operational risk. When the operational risk is great, end-
users bypass the traditional engineering process and create more 
streamlined avenues to acquire capability.  
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States Army faced 
a new and evolving threat. Enemy forces were no match for a 
traditional military, so it relied on asymmetric tactics. 
Improvised Explosive Devices  became the weapon of choice because 
they were easy to build and deploy and were highly effective. The 
Army wasn’t prepared either in terms of detection and defeat 
systems or from a psychological perspective.  
Coupled with an acquisition process that was slow to react 
to the evolving operational threat and outcry from both service 
members and the general population, the Army created the Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) with the 
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sole purpose of defeating this new operational risk. JIEDDO, 
recently re-named the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, was 
able to bypass the Army’s acquisition process and get equipment 
and capabilities to the field quickly.  
From a tactical perspective, the focus on defeating a 
specific operational risk was successful. Capabilities were 
fielded, and lives were saved. From a strategic perspective, 
these quickly-fielded systems lack certain quality attributes 
such as robustness, evolvability, and maintainability that would 
have been considered in a traditional systems engineering 
approach. The resulting quickly-fielded capabilities increased 
total cost of ownership and logistical complexity6. 
When system requirements are created to solely reduce 
strategic risk such as affordability or other long-term 
efficiencies, the resulting systems could be less relevant from 
a tactical or operational perspective. The driving requirements 
are associated with cost reduction, reducing redundant systems, 
or integrating capabilities rather than mitigating near-term 
operational risk.  
The Air Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System had 
only a vague set of objectives when it began development in 
20047. According to a report by the United States Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, these objectives 
resulted in ...a new, fully-integrated logistics system that 
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would replace an unspecified number of older, unconnected 
logistics systems. This lack of clarity and disconnect between 
solving critical operational threats and risks resulted in $1.1 
billion in wasted funding and a system that was not deployable. 
According to Senator John McCain, (R-Arizona), The Air 
Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System, or E.C.S.S., is a 
prime example of how a system designed to save money can actually 
waste billions of taxpayer dollars without producing any usable 
capability8. 
To increase the effectiveness of systems engineering, its 
practices, methods, and tools need to have a greater emphasis on 
eliciting and understanding operational risk and the development 
of enhanced methods to continually track and react to evolving 
operational threat and risk during the development, deployment, 
and sustainment phases of the system lifecycle. To that end, this 
paper introduces an approach that may be used to influence 
systems engineering activities with the objective of improving 
operational effectiveness and acceptance of engineered solutions.  
This approach is referred to here as Operational Risk-Driven 
Engineering Requirements/Engineering Development (ORDERED) and is 










For the purpose of ORDERED, operational risk is defined 
simply as the possibility of suffering mission or business loss. 
Mission loss in terms of less effective mission accomplishment 
or complete failure to accomplish mission objectives. Business 
loss in terms of economic affordability or long-term viability 
of performing the mission.  
An operational organization is any group of individuals 
teamed together with a common purpose to carry out a mission. A 
mission is comprised of a specific task or set of tasks carried 
out by operational personnel9. Tasks may be described as either 
mission-essential or mission-support10.  
Mission-essential tasks directly contribute to mission 
execution. For example, if the operational organization was a 
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community fire department, mission-essential tasks could include 
emergency response, firefighting, and rescue tasks. Mission-
support tasks could include equipment maintenance, training, and 
fire prevention awareness.  
Mission risks would be driven by any number of conditions 
such as events, activities, processes, and systems that could 
impact the operational organization’s ability to perform its 
mission or could negatively impact the full accomplishment of 
the mission. The impact is tactical in that the mission is 
impacted directly.  
Business risks are also driven by similar conditions, but 
the impact is more strategic. A flat-tire on a fire truck is a 
risk to performing the mission task of fighting fires, and 
therefore, may be described as a mission risk. A lower tax-base 
in a community may impact the fire department’s ability to 
perform preventive maintenance or hire and train future 
firefighters, and therefore, could be described as a business 
risk. This distinction is valuable when identifying operational 
risk.  
When a focus is solely on immediate mission risks, longer-
term considerations such as affordability or long-term viability 
of the organization are ignored. When the focus is solely on 
business risks, mitigation actions or system solutions may not be 
operationally effective in the short-term. The balance between 
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mission and business considerations helps ensure that solutions 
and mitigation actions are both operationally relevant and 
support the strategic needs of the organization. 
 




The ORDERED process steps are shown in Figure 2. ORDERED is 
a continuous process where operational risks are identified and 
analyzed throughout the engineering process. The risks or risk 
areas are characterized by identifying operational risk 
attributes and scenarios to further describe the concern in a 
manner that helps bridge the gap between operational activities 
and engineering activities. These scenarios are then evaluated 
against current and future engineering activities to ensure that 
requirements and development activities mitigate operational 
risk. 
  
Figure 2. ORDERED Process Steps 
 
 
A. Identify Operational Risks 
 
Risks are identified by having a clear understanding of the 
mission and business context of the operational organization to 
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include mission-critical and mission-support tasks, objectives, 
and success criteria and then exploring areas of concern based on 
potentially failing to achieve, or fully achieve, operational 
mission success. 
There are many methods for identification of risk that 
include continuous risk identification by all members of the 
organization, structure risk identification sessions, and 
milestone or event-based risk identification3. Structured risk 
identification sessions are facilitated activities with 
stakeholders and subject matter experts available to help 
brainstorm operational risks. Individual risk statements are 
captured in a structured manner to allow for analysis. 
Regardless of identification method or methods used, 
sources of risk are explored by operational personnel and 
systems engineers. ORDERED uses a taxonomy to help with risk 
identification. A taxonomy is useful both when exploring sources 
of risk as well as when classifying risks after they are 
identified to help with the Analyze Operational Risks process. 
The ORDERED Taxonomy is shown in Figure 3. The taxonomy was 
developed and simplified by considering several source 
documents11, 12, 13, 14 as well as personal experience. 
The ORDERED taxonomy consists of two categories: Mission and 
Business. The next level of the taxonomy contains elements such 
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as Mission Planning, Operational Systems, and Culture. The final 
level of the taxonomy consists of attributes. 
Operational organizations use the taxonomy to help identify 
both mission-impacting concerns as well as business-impacting  
 
 





concerns. This allows a balance between short-term mission risks 
and longer-term business risks.  
B. Analyze Operational Risks 
 Risk Exposure (RE) is the product of the probability (P) 
that the risk will occur and the impact (I) to the organization 
if the risk occurs: RE = P x I. The goal in determining risk 
exposure is to understand the relative criticality of a given 
risk in order to help decide which risks should be mitigated, in 
what order, and the number of resources that the organization is 
willing to expend on mitigation activities.  
Determining risk exposure is not an exact science and relies 
on the best judgment of individuals. For this reason the ORDERED 
approach keeps this step simple.  
The operational organization must decide how to assign a 
probability and impact score to each risk. ORDERED uses a simple 
1 to 5 rating for probability as shown in Figure 4, with 1 being 
the lowest probability of occurrence and 5 being the highest 
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3
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Figure 4. Probability of Occurrence 
 
 
While probability of occurrence becomes a simple 
determination of likelihood of the risk occurring based on best 
judgment, impact of occurrence must take into consideration the 
impact of the risk to the mission or business needs of the 
organization. Each operational organization will adjust the 
impact definitions to meet its needs. A generic impact of 
occurrence table is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Impact of Occurance 
 
 
Prioritizing risks provides decision-makers with the 
ability to allocate scarce resources to mitigate the most 
important risks to mission success. A simple risk matrix as 
shown in Figure 6 allows for a quick visual for decision-makers 
when allocating resources to mitigate operational risk.  
 
Description
5 Extreme Unacceptable, operational failure 
4 Major Loss of operational capability
3 Moderate Remedial action required
2 Minor Limited operational impact





Figure 6. Risk Matrix 
 
 
In this example, both RISK003 and RISK004 have a major 
impact on operations and are both likely to occur. Priority 
would be given to ensure that these two risks are mitigated by 
systems engineering activities and project design decisions.  
C. Identify Operational Risk Attributes 
 
An operational risk attribute is a characteristic of the 
operational mission or business that will be judged negatively by 
stakeholders unless the operational risk is mitigated. The 
purpose of mapping operational risk attributes to risk statements 
is to further clarify the operational concern and to help when 
identifying mitigation actions.  
A starting point in mapping operational risk attributes is 
the ORDERED risk taxonomy. The lowest level of the taxonomy 
contains attributes describing the aspect of risk associated with 
the elements and categories of the taxonomy. Additional 
attributes to explore include quality attributes as described in 
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Extreme












Attribute Driven Design15 engineering approaches and the Method 
Framework for Engineering System Architectures16. 
In addition to understanding the attributes associated with 
the operational risk, additional insight into the actual concern 
is useful when determining mitigation actions. While it helps to 
understand that a given risk is associated with an ORDERED 
taxonomic element and attribute, the additional understanding 
from eliciting the area of concern from the individual or group 
who identified the risk provides more definitive focus.  
For example, an operator may have identified the following 
risk: Current systems were designed using nominal data loads; the 
system may not scale. The risk could be mapped to the Operational 
Systems element and Throughput attribute of the taxonomy.  
Simply knowing that Throughput is an attribute may not 
provide enough detail. The attribute concern in this example 
could be described as mission stress. The operator is 
specifically concerned about how the system will operate when the 
mission becomes much more intense and the system needs to operate 
effectively when additional source data are processed. 
D. Develop Scenarios 
Scenarios are simply expressions of real-world 
interactions. They may be formal, structured and verbose, or 
freer form and expressed simply17. The purpose of scenarios as 
used to influence engineering activities is to describe expected 
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results of a system during development in terms of real-world 
behavior18. Scenarios describe how the system should behave under 
certain conditions when presented with certain stimuli19. 
Operational risk scenarios describe the unwanted behavior 
of the system that would cause mission or business impact to the 
operational organization. Similar to the concept of anti-patterns 
in systems and software engineering20, operational risk scenarios 
describe undesirable outcomes that need to be mitigated as they 
increase operational risk.  
The ORDERED method uses a simplified format to describe the 
risk scenario based on the Architecture Tradeoff Analysis 
Method21. The operational risk scenario should describe a source 
that provides a stimulus to a system or operational task, the 
environment or artifact effected by the stimulus, and the 
unwanted response or outcome. Example operational risk scenarios 
are listed below: 
1. An operator requests fire suppression during a 
high intensity operation with degraded communications, 
and the request fails to transmit within five minutes. 
2. A resource manager attempts to re-assign a 
military member while the member is relocating to a new 
assignment, and the system fails to locate the member. 
The key difference between engineering scenarios and 
operational risk scenarios is that operational risk scenarios 
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describe negative or unwanted behavior or outcomes while 
engineering scenarios describe expected behavior or outcomes. 
E. Influence Systems Engineering  
Informing systems or software engineering activities with 
operational risk scenarios becomes part of the project’s overall 
engineering activities. This is a continuous process of refining 
requirements, design and architectural decisions, implementation 
choices, testing approaches, and deployment strategies to 
mitigate operational risk so that the resulting behavior of the 
system, product, or capability avoids high priority operational 
risk scenarios. 
Boehm recommends a requirements approach that includes 
emphasizing value-driven, shared-vision-driven, change-driven, 
and risk-driven activities22. Central to these approaches is 
exploration of operational scenarios describing intended 
behavior.  
Risk-driven activities allow engineering leadership to apply 
resources to mitigate highest risks or to avoid performing 
activities that increase risk. The addition of operational risk 
scenarios to expected behavior scenarios allows engineers and 
operational users to explore behavior that they want the 




Informing architecture and design with operational risk 
scenarios is part of a larger architecture and design validation 
activity. Architecture is simply the highest level of design. It 
represents the first artifact that structures a system, 
component, or capability into its constituent physical or logical 
sub-parts.  
It also represents the first opportunity to ensure that the 
resulting design and implementation enables desired attributes 
and avoids undesirable attributes. The addition of operational 
risk scenarios during architectural development and validation 
allows architects and engineers to select or create architectural 
mechanisms and constructs to avoid operational risk. 
Using operational risk scenarios to influence 
implementation decisions allows for more robust trade decisions 
whereby selected implementation details are chosen to mitigate 
operational risk. Testing approaches and deployment strategies 
influenced by the end-user’s most critical operational risk 
scenarios are likely to improve operational acceptability of new 
systems, components, or capabilities. 
 




Operational risk should drive systems engineering activities 
from concept development through deployment. The reason that a 
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new system or capability is developed is to mitigate some mission 
or business need or threat. These needs and threats evolve over 
time, yet most engineering approaches ignore operational risk, 
allowing the chasm between the evolving need and the system under 
development to grow.  
This paper introduced ORDERED, a repeatable approach 
designed to influence systems engineering activities through a 
continuous focus on operational risk. The next steps are to apply 
the approach and evaluate the outcomes. Adding operational 
opportunity scenarios to operational risk scenarios may enrich 
the approach further by eliciting opportunities to enhance 
mission effectiveness during the engineering lifecycle.  
Many factors influence the success or failure of a 
development project. A structured focus on the evolving mission 
and business needs and threats of end-users aimed at explicitly 
driving requirements and informing engineering activities should 
improve the operational acceptability of the system, component, 
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When a project team has a robust risk management process, 
it continually identifies risks that may impact its ability to 
produce a product that meets customer requirements within cost 
and schedule constraints. Typical risk management approaches 
emphasize the focus on programmatic risk and technical risk. 
One missing aspect of systems engineering risk management 
approaches is a focus on operational risk. That is, the evolving 
risk to business or mission needs of the end-user. This lack of 
focus on operational risk during the engineering process 
encourages the creation of a chasm between evolving need and 
delivered product capabilities.  
The longer the development process, the wider that gap, and 
the end-user becomes less receptive to deeming the capability 
operationally effective. This research explores the use of 
operational risk identification and mitigation techniques during 
the systems engineering process. An approach to identify 
operational risk and to use risk scenarios to influence systems 
engineering is discussed, and the results of a survey 
correlating operational risk management and project outcomes is 
presented.  
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    Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and 
means to enable the realization of successful systems1. The 
practices, approaches, methods, and tools of systems engineering 
have been codified over time and evolve as technology and system 
complexity increases. The purpose of having a set of proven 
practices for engineers to follow is to reduce system 
development risk and increase the probability of delivering a 
system that meets an operational need2.  
The tools applied to a given problem are selected based on 
an understanding of certain quality attributes of the product 
under development or the management aspects of the team 
producing the product within cost and schedule constraints. 
Therefore, a given practice is only viewed as effective if it 
reduces product or project risk or improves product or project 
outcomes at the same risk level.  
     Product-focused or technical risk is concerned with the 
technical performance and quality attributes of the end product. 
For example, a product may have stringent reliability 
requirements. Another product may have strict real-time 
processing requirements.  
The systems engineering methods and tools for mitigating 
reliability risks may include using design patterns such as 
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redundant hardware and software or fault detection and 
remediation mechanisms. Products with real-time requirements 
might use design patterns with the ability to ensure 
schedulability and analyze process behavior.  
    Project-focused or management risk is concerned with the 
management aspects of the development lifecycle. For example, if 
a project has multiple customers who are prone to having 
conflicting requirements, rapid-prototyping and user juries may 
be used as approaches to mitigate these stakeholder involvement 
risks.  
If the product is dependent on other components or products 
that are developed simultaneously, the project team may select 
architectural patterns that separate concerns and allow 
independent evolution of components by separate teams or 
collaboration tools such as employing cross-project Integrated 
Product Teams to mitigate the risk of the inter-operating 
systems having deployment issues.  
     One missing aspect of most systems engineering risk 
management processes such as those described in the Guide to the 
Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge3 or the INCOSE Systems 
Engineering Handbook1 is a focus on evolving operational risk 
during system development.  
Wrubel and Gross describe this disconnect, stating, 
...requirements for any given system are highly likely to evolve 
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between the development of a system concept and the time at 
which the system is operationally deployed as new threats, 
vulnerabilities, technologies, and conditions emerge, and users 
adapt their understanding of their needs as system development 
progresses4. 
Some project teams attempt to manage this risk by selecting 
an evolutionary approach that allows for an incremental 
commitment to design decisions and incorporates off-ramps and 
on-ramps for technology or addition of new requirements due to 
changes in mission need5.  
    These threats, vulnerabilities, and technology changes could 
effect operational risk. When the operational risk is great, 
end-users bypass the traditional engineering process and create 
more streamlined avenues to acquire capability.  
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States Army 
faced a new and evolving threat. Enemy forces were no match for 
a traditional military, so it relied on asymmetric tactics. 
Improvised Explosive Devices became the weapon of choice because 
they were easy to build and deploy and were highly effective. The 
Army wasn’t prepared either in terms of detection and defeat 
systems or from a psychological perspective.  
Coupled with an acquisition process that was slow to react 
to the evolving operational threat and outcry from both service 
members and the general population, the Army created the Joint 
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Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) with 
the sole purpose of defeating this new operational risk. JIEDDO, 
recently re-named the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, was 
able to bypass the Army’s acquisition process and get equipment 
and capabilities to the field quickly. 
From a tactical perspective, the focus on defeating a 
specific operational risk was successful. Capabilities were 
fielded, and lives were saved. From a strategic perspective, 
these quickly-fielded systems lack certain quality attributes 
such as robustness, evolvability, and maintainability that would 
have been considered in a traditional systems engineering 
approach. The resulting quickly-fielded capabilities increased 
total cost of ownership and logistical complexity6. 
     When system requirements are created to solely reduce 
strategic risk such as affordability or other long-term 
efficiencies, the resulting systems could be less relevant from 
a tactical or operational perspective. The driving requirements 
are associated with cost reduction, reducing redundant systems, 
or integrating capabilities rather than mitigating near-term 
operational risk. 
The Air Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System had 
only a vague set of objectives when it began development in 
20047. According to a report by the United States Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, these objectives 
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resulted in ...a new, fully-integrated logistics system that 
would replace an unspecified number of older, unconnected 
logistics systems.  
This lack of clarity and disconnect between solving 
critical operational threats and risks resulted in $1.1 billion 
in wasted funding and a system that was not deployable.  
According to Senator John McCain, (R-Arizona), The Air 
Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System, or E.C.S.S., is a 
prime example of how a system designed to save money can 
actually waste billions of taxpayer dollars without producing 
any usable capability8.  
     To increase the effectiveness of systems engineering, its 
practices, methods, and tools need to have a greater emphasis on 
eliciting and understanding operational risk and the development 
of enhanced methods to continually track and react to evolving 
operational threat and risk during the development, deployment, 
and sustainment phases of the system lifecycle.  
To that end, this paper describes an approach that may be 
used to influence systems engineering activities with the 
objective of improving operational effectiveness and acceptance 
of engineered solutions. This approach is referred to here as 
Operational Risk-Driven Engineering Requirements/Engineering 














For the purpose of ORDERED, operational risk is defined 
simply as the possibility of suffering mission or business loss. 
Mission loss in terms of less effective mission accomplishment 
or complete failure to accomplish mission objectives. Business 
loss in terms of economic affordability or long-term viability 
of performing the mission.  
An operational organization is any group of individuals 
teamed together with a common purpose to carry out a mission. A 
mission is comprised of a specific task or set of tasks carried 
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out by operational personnel9. Tasks may be described as either 
mission-essential or mission-support10.  
Mission-essential tasks directly contribute to mission 
execution. For example, if the operational organization was a 
community fire department, mission-essential tasks could include 
emergency response, firefighting, and rescue tasks. Mission-
support tasks could include equipment maintenance, training, and 
fire prevention awareness.  
Mission risks would be driven by any number of conditions 
such as events, activities, processes, and systems that could 
impact the operational organization’s ability to perform its 
mission or could negatively impact the full accomplishment of 
the mission. The impact is tactical in that the mission is 
impacted directly.  
Business risks are also driven by similar conditions, but 
the impact is more strategic. A flat-tire on a fire truck is a 
risk to performing the mission task of fighting fires, and 
therefore, may be described as a mission risk. A lower tax-base 
in a community may impact the fire department’s ability to 
perform preventive maintenance or hire and train future 
firefighters, and therefore, could be described as a business 




When a focus is solely on immediate mission risks, longer-
term considerations such as affordability or long-term viability 
of the organization are ignored. When the focus is solely on 
business risks, mitigation actions or system solutions may not 
be operationally effective in the short-term. The balance 
between mission and business considerations helps ensure that 
solutions and mitigation actions are both operationally relevant 
and support the strategic needs of the organization. 
2.1. The ORDERED Approach 
The ORDERED process steps are shown in Figure 2. ORDERED is 
a continuous process where operational risks are identified and 
analyzed throughout the engineering process. The risks or risk 
areas are then characterized by identifying operational risk  
 
Figure 2. ORDERED Process Steps 
 
 
attributes and scenarios to further describe the concern in a 
manner that helps bridge the gap between operational activities 
and engineering activities. These scenarios are then evaluated 
against current and future engineering activities to ensure that 
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requirements and development activities mitigate operational 
risk. 
2.1.1. Identify Operational Risks 
 
Risks are identified by having a clear understanding of the 
mission and business context of the operational organization to 
include mission-critical and mission-support tasks, objectives, 
and success criteria and then exploring areas of concern based 
on potentially failing to achieve, or fully achieve, operational 
mission success. 
There are many methods for identification of risk that 
include continuous risk identification by all members of the 
organization, structure risk identification sessions, and 
milestone or event-based risk identification3. Structured risk 
identification sessions are facilitated activities with 
stakeholders and subject matter experts available to help 
brainstorm operational risks. Individual risk statements are 
captured in a structured manner to allow for analysis. 
Regardless of identification method or methods used, 
sources of risk are explored by operational personnel and 
systems engineers. ORDERED uses a taxonomy to help with risk 
identification. A taxonomy is useful both when exploring sources 
of risk as well as when classifying risks after they are 
identified to help with the Analyze Operational Risks process. 
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The ORDERED Taxonomy is shown in Figure 3. The taxonomy was 
developed and simplified by considering several source 
documents11, 12, 13, 14 as well as personal experience. 
The ORDERED taxonomy consists of two categories: Mission 
and Business. The next level of the taxonomy contains elements 
such as Mission Planning, Operational Systems, and Culture. The 
final level of the taxonomy consists of attributes. 
Operational organizations use the taxonomy to help identify 
both mission-impacting concerns as well as business-impacting 
concerns. This allows a balance between short-term mission risks 
and longer-term business risks. 
2.1.2. Analyze Operational Risks 
 Analyzing operational risk is the same as analyzing risk in 
a traditional process. Risk Exposure (RE) is the product of the 




















































Figure 3. The ORDERED Risk Taxonomy 
 
 
the organization if the risk occurs: RE = P x I. The goal in 
1. Mission Planning 1. Resource Planning
a. Stability a. Workforce 
b. Completeness b. Budget
c. Clarity c. Facilities
d. Feasibility d. Organizational Structure
e. Precedents
f. Agility
2. Mission Execution 2. Governance
a. Efficiency a. Policies
b. Effectiveness b. Procedures
c. Repeatability c. Facilities
d. Agility d. Contracts
e. Affordability e. Analytics
f. Security f. Compliance
g. Safety g. Risk Management
3. Mission Outcomes 3. Strategic Planning
a. Predictability a. Vision and Mission
b. Accuracy b. Values
c. Usability c. Goals
d. Timely d. Objectives
e. Efficient e. Monitoring
4. Operational Systems 4. Stakeholder Management
a. Throughput a. Identification
b. Usability b. Stakeholder Mgmt Plan
c. Flexibility c. Engagement





5. Operational Processes 5. Culture
a. Suitability a. Integrity
b. Repeatability b. Values
c. Predictability c. Norms
d. Agility d. Rewards
e. Security
6. Operators 6. Continuous Improvement
a. Skill Level a. Problem Identification
b. Training b. Opportunity Identification
c. Turnover c. Root Cause Analysis
d. Affordability d. Improvement Planning
e. Implementation
ORDERED Taxonomy
A. MISSION B. BUSINESS
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determining risk exposure is to understand the relative 
criticality of a given risk in order to help decide which risks 
should be mitigated, in what order, and the number of resources 
that the organization is willing to expend on mitigation 
activities. 
Determining risk exposure is not an exact science and 
relies on the best judgment of individuals. For this reason the 
ORDERED approach keeps this step simple.  
The operational organization must decide how to assign a 
probability and impact score to each risk. ORDERED uses a simple 
1 to 5 rating for probability, with 1 being the lowest 
probability of occurrence and 5 being the highest probability of 
occurrence. 
  While probability of occurrence becomes a simple 
determination of likelihood of the risk occurring based on best 
judgment, impact of occurrence must take into consideration the 
impact of the risk to the mission or business needs of the 
organization. Each operational organization will adjust the 
impact definitions to meet its needs.  
Prioritizing risks provides decision-makers with the 
ability to allocate scarce resources to mitigate the most 
important risks to mission success. A simple risk matrix as 
shown in Figure 4 allows for a quick visual for decision-makers 




















Figure 4. Risk Matrix 
 
 
In this example, both RISK003 and RISK004 have a major 
impact on operations and are both likely to occur. Priority 
would be given to ensure that these two risks are mitigated by 
systems engineering activities and project design decisions.  
2.1.3. Identifying Operational Risk Attributes 
An operational risk attribute is a characteristic of the 
operational mission or business that will be judged negatively 
by stakeholders unless the operational risk is mitigated. The 
purpose of mapping operational risk attributes to risk 
statements is to further clarify operational concerns and to 
help when identifying mitigation actions.  
A starting point in mapping operational risk attributes is 
the ORDERED risk taxonomy. The lowest level of the taxonomy 
contains attributes describing the aspect of risk associated 
with the elements and categories of the taxonomy. Additional 
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Extreme












attributes to explore include quality attributes as described in 
Attribute Driven Design15 engineering approaches and the Method 
Framework for Engineering System Architectures16. 
In addition to understanding the attributes associated with 
the operational risk, additional insight into the actual concern 
is useful when determining mitigation actions. While it helps to 
understand that a given risk is associated with an ORDERED 
taxonomic element and attribute, the additional understanding 
from eliciting the area of concern from the individual or group 
who identified the risk provides more definitive focus. 
For example, an operator may have identified the following 
risk: Current systems were designed using nominal data loads; 
the system may not scale. The risk could be mapped to the 
Operational Systems element and Throughput attribute of the 
taxonomy.  
Simply knowing that Throughput is an attribute may not 
provide enough detail. The attribute concern in this example 
could be described as mission stress. The operator is 
specifically concerned about how the system will operate when 
the mission becomes much more intense and the system needs to 
operate effectively when additional source data are processed. 
2.1.4. Develop Scenarios 
 Scenarios are simply expressions of real-world 
interactions. They may be formal, structured and verbose, or 
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freer form and expressed simply17. The purpose of scenarios as 
used to influence engineering activities is to describe expected 
results of a system during development in terms of real-world 
behavior18.  
Scenarios describe how the system should behave under 
certain conditions when presented with certain stimuli19. 
Operational risk scenarios describe the unwanted behavior of the 
system that would cause mission or business impact to the 
operational organization. Similar to the concept of anti-
patterns in systems and software engineering20, operational risk 
scenarios describe undesirable outcomes that need to be 
mitigated as they increase operational risk.  
The ORDERED method uses a simplified format to describe the 
risk scenario based on the Architecture Tradeoff Analysis 
Method21. The operational risk scenario should describe a source 
that provides a stimulus to a system or operational task, the 
environment or artifact effected by the stimulus, and the 
unwanted response or outcome.  
Example operational risk scenarios are listed below: 
1. An operator requests fire suppression during a 
high intensity operation with degraded communications; 
and the request fails to transmit within five minutes. 
2. A resource manager attempts to re-assign a 
military member while the member is relocating to a 
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new assignment; and the system fails to locate the 
member. 
The key difference between engineering scenarios and 
operational risk scenarios is that operational risk scenarios 
describe negative or unwanted behavior or outcomes while 
engineering scenarios describe expected behavior or outcomes. 
2.1.5. Influence Systems Engineering 
 Informing systems engineering activities with operational 
risk scenarios becomes part of the project’s overall engineering 
activities. This is a continuous process of refining 
requirements, design and architectural decisions, implementation 
choices, testing approaches, and deployment strategies to 
mitigate operational risk so that the resulting behavior of the 
system, product, or capability avoids high priority operational 
risk scenarios. 
Boehm recommends a requirements approach that includes 
emphasizing value-driven, shared-vision-driven, change-driven, 
and risk-driven activities22. Central to these approaches is 
exploration of operational scenarios describing intended 
behavior.  
Risk-driven activities allow engineering leadership to 
apply resources to mitigate highest risks or to avoid performing 
activities that increase risk. The addition of operational risk 
scenarios to expected behavior scenarios allows engineers and 
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operational users to explore behavior that they want the 
resulting system, product, or capability to help mitigate or 
avoid. 
Informing architecture and design with operational risk 
scenarios is part of a larger architecture and design validation 
activity. Architecture is simply the highest level of design. It 
represents the first artifact that structures a system, 
component, or capability into its constituent physical or 
logical sub-parts. It also represents the first opportunity to 
ensure that the resulting design and implementation enables 
desired attributes and avoids undesirable attributes. The 
addition of operational risk scenarios during architectural 
development and validation allows architects and engineers to 
select or create architectural mechanisms and constructs to 
avoid operational risk. 
Using operational risk scenarios to influence 
implementation decisions allows for more robust trade decisions 
whereby selected implementation details are chosen to mitigate 
operational risk. Testing approaches and deployment strategies 
influenced by the end-user’s most critical operational risk 
scenarios are likely to improve operational acceptability of new 
systems, components, or capabilities.  
2.2. Operational Risk Survey 
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The purpose of using operational risk scenarios to 
influence systems engineering activities is to improve project 
outcomes. That is, systems and services delivered to end-users 
that meet cost and schedule expectations, meet all desired 
quality attributes, and fulfill operational needs thus lowering 
operational risk.  
The authors developed a survey instrument in an attempt to 
understand the relationship between operational risk 
considerations and project outcomes. Using a Likert scale 
consisting of Not At All, A Little, Moderately, Considerably, To 
A Great Extent, and Unknown, participants were asked to indicate 
how strongly they supported the statements shown in Table 1. 
Operational risk considerations were defined as actively 
eliciting operational risk from end-users during the early 
solution development stages of a program as well as actively and 
continuously involving end-user perspectives during development 
to identify and mitigate evolving operational risk throughout 
the program lifecycle (Questions 6 and 8). Program performance 
was defined as meeting cost and schedule expectations,  





1 My project team has a documented risk management 
process. 
2 My project team has an active risk register that 
reflects the team’s most critical current risks. 




4 My project team actively mitigates the project’s top 
risks. 
5 The leadership above my project actively elicits risks 
and helps mitigate risks to my project. 
6 My project team actively elicited operational risks 
and mission threats from customers and end-users 
during the capture phase. 
7 My project team actively elicited quality attributes 
(responsiveness, adaptability, evolvability, agility, 
scalability, etc.) during the capture phase.  
8 The customer actively participates with the project 
team during execution to identify and mitigate 
operational risk. 
9 The customer actively participates with the project 
team during execution to prioritize quality attributes 
(responsiveness, adaptability, evolvability, agility, 
scalability, etc.) and evaluate the ability of the 
solution or service to satisfy critical quality 
attributes during development. 
10 The customer interaction with the project team is 
positive. 
11 My customer would say that the solution or service we 
deliver mitigates operational risk or mission threats. 
12 My customer would say that the solution or service we 
deliver meets all critical quality attributes 
(affordability, agility, scalability, etc.). 
13 The project team consistently meets all customer cost 
and schedule objectives. 
 
delivering a system that satisfies the end-user’s most critical 
quality attribute requirements, and delivering a system or 
service that mitigates operational risk (Questions 11, 12, and 
13).  
In addition, the survey attempted was designed to allow the 
conduct of analysis to understand the relationship between the 
existence of an effective risk management process on the program 
and program outcomes (Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4). Additional 
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questions in the list were asked for purposes other than stated 
above.  
The survey was administered to 104 project managers on 
October 14, 2015. The projects were classified as solution 
development, service delivery, and professional services as 
shown in Figure 5.  
A solution development project is defined as a project 
where the team is responsible for developing and delivering a 
solution (typically a tangible product such as a 
software/hardware system) to a customer. A service delivery 
project is defined as a project where the team is responsible  
for developing and delivering a service to the customer and is 
expected to meet customer outcomes such as service level  
 
 
Figure 5. Project Type 
 
 
agreements. A professional services project is defined as a 
project where the project team is responsible for delivering 
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qualified staff that provides expertise and works at the 
direction of the customer to support the customer's mission. 
The projects ranged in size from small (under $5 million in 
annual revenue) to large (over $50 million in annual revenue) as 
shown in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6. Project Revenue 
 
 
The results were analyzed by first examining the variation 
in responses of the thirteen questions to determine if enough 
variation existed to allow further analysis. The analysis of the 
distribution of results shown in Figure 7 indicates enough 






Figure 7. Likert Analysis 
 
 
The two areas explored here are the relationship between 
the existence of an effective risk management process and 
project performance and the relationship between an operational 
risk focus and project performance. Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 
were combined to provide an aggregate score of risk process 
effectiveness. They measure the existence of a documented risk 
process, the use of a risk register, an active and continuous 
risk identification and mitigation process, and the project 
mitigating its most critical risks.  
Questions 6 and 8 were combined to provide an aggregate 
score of operational risk effectiveness. They measure active 
elicitation of the customer’s operational risks during the 
project’s capture phase (where early lifecycle solution 
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activities occur) and elicitation and mitigation of operational 
risk during project execution.  
Questions 11, 12, and 13 were combined to provide an 
aggregate score of project performance. They measure the 
customer’s perspective of the project meeting cost and schedule 
objectives, mitigating their most critical operational risks, 
and delivering a service or solution that meets all expected 
quality attributes.  
Each project’s aggregate measure for the three areas, risk 
process effectiveness, operational risk effectiveness, and 
project performance, were then divided into three categories 
indicating the lower third of effectiveness or performance, the 
middle third of effectiveness or performance, and the top third 
of effectiveness or performance. Figure 8 shows the result of 
risk process capability compared to project performance. 
 Simply looking at the chart, one might conclude that 
projects with a more effective or capable risk process perform 




Figure 8. Risk Process Capability and Project Performance 
 
 
percent of the projects with lower risk process capability 
exhibited lower project performance. That number decreased to 31 
percent for projects with medium risk process capability and 
down to 27 percent for projects with higher risk process 
capability.  
The number of projects exhibiting higher project 
performance across the low, medium, and high risk process 
capability stayed roughly the same, while the projects 
exhibiting medium project performance increased from 36 percent 
to 49 percent to 55 percent across the three groups. Performing 
ordinal logistic regression analysis of the data reveals a Gamma 
score of .23 and p-value of .088.  
268 
 
Gamma is a measure of association that expresses the 
strength of relationship between two ordinal variables23. Gamma 
values of less than 0.2 may be considered as weak, values around 
0.3 may be thought of as moderately strong, values near 0.5 are 
considered strong, and values over 0.6 are very strong.  
P-values measure the probability that the observed 
relationship in the sampled data occurs by chance alone. Values 
of p < 0.05 are used as a basis for rejecting the null 
hypothesis, that is having confidence that the relationship is 
not specious24.  
The Gamma score of .23 indicates a weak relationship 
between the two variables, and a high p-value of .088 decreases 
our confidence that the relationship observed is valid. In other 
words, it would be difficult to conclude with certainty using 
this data that projects with an effective risk process 
outperform projects with a less effective risk process.  
Figure 9 shows the results of comparing the existence of an 
operational risk process capability and project outcomes.  
Once again, simply looking at the chart, one might conclude 
that projects that focus on identifying and mitigating 
operational risk throughout their lifecycle perform better than 
projects that don’t focus on operational risk. The number of 
projects exhibiting lower project performance decreased from 50 





Figure 9. Operational Risk Process Capability and Project Performance 
 
 
percent for projects with medium operational risk process 
capability down to 21 percent for projects with higher 
operational risk process capability.  
Projects exhibiting medium project performance increased 
from 39 percent for projects with low operational process 
performance to 49 percent for projects with medium operational 
process performance and increasing to 52 percent for projects 
with higher operational risk process performance.  
Projects exhibiting high project performance increased from 
11 percent for projects with lower operational risk process 
performance to 15 percent for projects with medium operational 
risk process capability to 27 percent for projects with higher 
operational risk process capability. The Gamma score shows a 
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moderately strong to strong positive relationship between the 
two variables, and the p-value of .006 provides confidence that 
the relationship is valid.  
The caution here is that the ordinal logistic regression 
analysis performed provides only confidence that there is a 
correlation between an operational risk focus and project 
performance and an indication of the strength of that 
relationship. It does not provide a causal relationship. In 
other words, from the data alone, one cannot conclude that an 
operational risk focus causes project performance or that higher 
project performance causes higher operational risk process 
capability. One may only conclude that there is a positive 
correlation between the variables: they move in the same 
direction.  
2.3. Survey Conclusions 
 
Given the strength of the relationship and the low p-value, 
the authors are confident that projects within the sample that 
focus on operational risk during the project lifecycle also have 
better project performance than projects that focus less on 
operational risk during the project lifecycle.  
Further analysis may provide additional insights. Project 
type or revenue (size) may influence the outcomes of the 
analysis. Larger projects may have a more formal risk process in 
place or may have lower project performance due to the 
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inherently higher risk of larger projects. Solution development 
projects may have stronger risk practices in place versus 
professional services projects. 
 




Operational risk should drive systems engineering 
activities from concept development through deployment. The 
reason that a new system or capability is developed is to 
mitigate mission or business needs or threats. These needs and 
threats evolve over time, yet most engineering approaches ignore 
operational risk, allowing the chasm between the evolving need 
and the system under development to grow.  
This paper described ORDERED, a repeatable approach 
designed to influence systems engineering activities through a 
continuous focus on operational risk. Using operational risk 
scenarios, developed through operational risk identification and 
analysis activities, ORDERED intends to increase the probability 
of project success. Adding operational opportunity scenarios to 
operational risk scenarios may enrich the approach further by 
eliciting opportunities to enhance mission effectiveness during 
the engineering lifecycle.  
Many factors influence the success or failure of a 
development project. A structured focus on the evolving mission 
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and business needs and threats of end-users aimed at explicitly 
driving requirements and informing engineering activities should 
improve the operational acceptability of the system, component, 
or capability under development. The results of this survey of 
104 project managers indicate that an increased focus on 
operational risk during the project lifecycle correlates to 
better project performance outcomes.  
Additional research on methods and tools to elicit and 
analyze operational risk as part of the systems engineering 
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One measure of effectiveness of any given systems 
engineering practice is the ability of that practice to mitigate 
product or project risk. Product and project risk reduction is 
the focus of most risk management processes. When a project team 
has a robust risk management process, it continually identifies 
risks that may impact its ability to produce a product that 
meets requirements within cost and schedule constraints.  
One missing aspect of most systems engineering risk 
management approaches is a focus on operational risk. That is, 
the evolving risk to business or mission needs of the end-user. 
This lack of focus on operational risk during the engineering 
process encourages the creation of a chasm between evolving need 
and delivered product capabilities. The longer the development 
process, the wider that gap, and the end-user becomes less 
receptive to deeming the capability operationally effective.  
This research explores the use of operational risk 
identification and mitigation techniques during the systems 
engineering process and attempts to determine whether this 
increased focus would have a positive effect on systems 










Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and 
means to enable the realization of successful systems (Wiley, 
2015). The practices, approaches, methods, and tools of systems 
engineering have been codified over time and evolve as 
technology and system complexity increases. The purpose of 
having a set of proven practices for engineers to follow is to 
reduce system development risk and increase the probability of 
delivering a system that meets an operational need (Elm & 
Goldenson, 2012).  
The tools applied to a given problem are selected based on 
an understanding of certain quality attributes of the product 
under development or the management aspects of the team 
producing the product within cost and schedule constraints. 
Therefore, a given practice is only viewed as effective if it 
reduces product or project risk or improves product or project 
outcomes at the same risk level.  
Product-focused or technical risk is concerned with the 
technical performance and quality attributes of the end product. 
For example, a product may have stringent reliability 
requirements. Another product may have near real-time processing 
requirements. The systems engineering methods and tools for 
mitigating reliability risks may include using design patterns 
278 
 
such as redundant hardware and software or fault detection and 
remediation mechanisms. Products with real-time requirements 
might use design patterns with the ability to ensure 
schedulability and analyze process behavior.  
Project-focused or management risk is concerned with the 
management aspects of the development lifecycle. For example, if 
a project has multiple customers who are prone to having 
conflicting requirements, rapid-prototyping and user juries may 
be used as approaches to mitigate these stakeholder involvement 
risks. If the product is dependent on other components or 
products that are developed simultaneously, the project may 
select architectural patterns that separate concerns and allow 
independent evolution of components by separate teams or 
collaboration tools such as employing interface working groups or 
integrated product teams to mitigate the risk of the inter-
operating systems having deployment issues.  
One missing aspect of most systems engineering risk 
management processes such as those described in the Guide to the 
Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge (Pyster et al., 2012) or 
the INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook (Wiley, 2015) is a focus 
on evolving operational risk during system development. Wrubel 
and Gross describe this disconnect, stating, ...requirements for 
any given system are highly likely to evolve between the 
development of a system concept and the time at which the system 
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is operationally deployed as new threats, vulnerabilities, 
technologies, and conditions emerge, and users adapt their 
understanding of their needs as system development progresses 
(Wrubel, 2015).  
Some projects attempt to manage this risk by selecting an 
evolutionary approach that allows for an incremental commitment 
to design decisions and incorporates off-ramps and on-ramps for 
technology or addition of new requirements due to changes in 
mission need (Boehm and Lane, 2007).  
These threats, vulnerabilities, and technology changes 
could effect operational risk. When the operational risk is 
great, end-users bypass the traditional engineering process and 
create more streamlined avenues to acquire capability.  
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States Army 
faced a new and evolving threat. Enemy forces were no match for 
a traditional military, so they relied on asymmetric tactics. 
Improvised Explosive Devices became the weapon of choice because 
they were easy to build and deploy and were highly effective. 
The Army wasn’t prepared either in terms of detection and defeat 
systems or from a psychological perspective.  
Coupled with an acquisition process that was slow to react 
to the evolving operational threat and outcry from both service 
members and the general population, the Army created the Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) with 
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the sole purpose of defeating this new operational risk. JIEDDO, 
recently renamed the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, was 
able to bypass the Army’s acquisition process and get equipment 
and capabilities to field quickly.  
From a tactical perspective, the focus on defeating a 
specific operational risk was successful. Capabilities were 
fielded, and lives were saved. From a strategic perspective, 
these quickly-fielded systems lack certain quality attributes 
such as robustness, evolvability, and maintainability that would 
have been considered in a traditional systems engineering 
approach. The resulting quickly-fielded capabilities increased 
total cost of ownership and logistical complexity (Ellis, 
Rogers, & Cochran, 2007). 
When system requirements are created to solely reduce 
strategic risk such as affordability or other long-term 
efficiencies, the resulting systems could be less relevant from 
a tactical or operational perspective. The driving requirements 
are associated with cost reduction, reducing redundant systems, 
or integrating capabilities rather than mitigating near-term 
operational risk.  
The Air Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System had 
only a vague set of objectives when it began development in 2004 
(Aronin et al., 2011). According to a report by the United 
States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, these 
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objectives resulted in ...a new, fully-integrated logistics 
system that would replace an unspecified number of older, 
unconnected logistics systems.  
This lack of clarity and disconnect between solving 
critical operational threats and risks resulted in $1.1 billion 
in wasted funding and a system that was not deployable. 
According to Senator John McCain, (R-Arizona), The Air Force’s 
Expeditionary Combat Support System, or E.C.S.S., is a prime 
example of how a system designed to save money can actually 
waste billions of taxpayer dollars without producing any usable 
capability (McCain, 2014). This research explores the use of 
operational risk identification and mitigation techniques during 
the systems engineering process and attempts to determine 
whether this increased focus would have a positive effect on 






Operational risk is defined simply as the possibility of 
suffering mission or business loss. Mission loss in terms of 
less effective mission accomplishment or complete failure to 
accomplish mission objectives. Business loss in terms of 




An operational organization is any group of individuals 
teamed together with a common purpose to carry out a mission. A 
mission is comprised of a specific task or set of tasks carried 
out by operational personnel (Gallagher, 2002).  
Tasks may be described as either mission-essential or 
mission-support (Air Force Instruction 90-1 102, Performance 
Management, 2000). Mission-essential tasks directly contribute 
to mission execution. For example, if the operational 
organization was a community fire department, mission-essential 
tasks could include emergency response, firefighting, and rescue 
tasks. Mission-support tasks could include equipment 
maintenance, training, and fire prevention awareness.  
Mission risks would be driven by any number of conditions 
such as events, activities, processes, and systems that could 
impact the operational organization’s ability to perform its 
mission or could negatively impact the full accomplishment of 
the mission. The impact is tactical in that the mission is 
impacted directly.  
Business risks are also driven by similar conditions, but 
the impact is more strategic. A flat-tire on a fire truck is a 
risk to performing the mission task of fighting fires, and 
therefore, may be described as a mission risk. A lower tax-base 
in a community may impact the fire department’s ability to 
perform preventive maintenance or hire and train future 
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firefighters, and therefore, could be described as a business 
risk. This distinction is valuable when identifying operational 
risk.  
When a focus is solely on immediate mission risks, longer-
term considerations such as affordability or long-term viability 
of the organization are ignored. When the focus is solely on 
business risks, mitigation actions or system solutions may not 
be operationally effective in the short-term. The balance 
between mission and business considerations helps ensure that 
solutions and mitigation actions are both operationally relevant 
and support the strategic needs of the organization. 
 




The authors developed a survey instrument in an attempt to 
understand the relationship between operational risk 
considerations and project outcomes. Using a Likert scale 
consisting of Not At All, A Little, Moderately, Considerably, To 
A Great Extent, and Unknown, participants were asked to indicate 
how strongly they supported the statements shown in Table 1.  
Operational risk considerations were defined as actively 
eliciting operational risk from end-user during the early 
solution development stages of a program as well as actively and 
continuously involving end-user perspectives during development 
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to identify and mitigate evolving operational risk throughout 
the program lifecycle (Questions 6 and 8).  
Program performance was defined as meeting cost and 
schedule expectations, delivering a system that satisfies the 
end-user’s most critical quality attribute requirements, and 
delivering a system or service that mitigates operational risk 
(Questions 11, 12, and 13). In addition, the survey attempted to 
understand the relationship between the existence of an 
effective risk management process on the program and program 
outcomes (Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4). Additional questions in the 
list were asked for purposes other than stated above. 





1 My project team has a documented risk management 
process. 
2 My project team has an active risk register that 
reflects the team’s most critical current risks. 
3 My project team has a robust, continuous risk 
identification process. 
4 My project team actively mitigates the project’s top 
risks. 
5 The leadership above my project actively elicits risks 
and helps mitigate risks to my project. 
6 My project team actively elicited operational risks 
and mission threats from customers and end-users 
during the capture phase. 
7 My project team actively elicited quality attributes 
(responsiveness, adaptability, evolvability, agility, 
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scalability, etc.) during the capture phase. 
8 The customer actively participates with the project 
team during execution to identify and mitigate 
operational risk. 
9 The customer actively participates with the project 
team during execution to prioritize quality attributes 
(responsiveness, adaptability, evolvability, agility, 
scalability, etc.) and evaluate the ability of the 
solution or service to satisfy critical quality 
attributes during development. 
10 The customer interaction with the project team is 
positive. 
11 My customer would say that the solution or service we 
deliver mitigates operational risk or mission threats. 
12 My customer would say that the solution or service we 
deliver meets all critical quality attributes 
(affordability, agility, scalability, etc.). 
13 The project team consistently meets all customer cost 









The survey was administered to 104 project managers on 
October 14, 2015. The projects were classified as solution 
development, service delivery, and professional services as 
shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Project Type 
 
 
A solution development project is defined as a project 
where the team is responsible for developing and delivering a 
solution (typically a tangible product such as a 
software/hardware system) to a customer. A service delivery 
project is defined as a project where the team is responsible 
for developing and delivering a service to the customer and is 
expected to meet customer outcomes such as service level 
agreements. A professional services project is defined as a 
project where the project team is responsible for delivering 
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qualified staff that provides expertise and works at the 
direction of the customer to support the customer's mission.  
The projects ranged in size from small (under $5 million in 
annual revenue) to large (over $50 million in annual revenue) as 
shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Project Revenue 
 
 
The results were analyzed by first examining the variation 
in responses of the thirteen questions to determine if enough 
variation existed to allow further analysis. The analysis of the 
distribution of results shown in Figure 3 indicates enough 
variation within and between questions to allow further 
analysis.  
The two areas explored here are the relationship between 
the existence of an effective risk management process and 
project performance and the relationship between an operational 





Figure 3. Likert Analysis 
 
 
were combined to provide an aggregate score of risk process  
effectiveness. They measure the existence of a documented risk 
process, the use of a risk register, an active and continuous 
risk identification and mitigation process, and the project 
mitigating its most critical risks.  
Questions 6 and 8 were combined to provide an aggregate 
score of operational risk effectiveness. They measure active 
elicitation of the customer’s operational risks during the 
project’s capture phase (where early lifecycle solution 
activities occur) and elicitation and mitigation of operational 
risk during project execution.  
Questions 11, 12, and 13 were combined to provide an 
aggregate score of project performance. They measure the 
customer’s perspective of the project meeting cost and schedule 
objectives, mitigating their most critical operational risks, 
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and delivering a service or solution that meets all expected 
quality attributes.  
Each project’s aggregate measure for the three areas, risk 
process effectiveness, operational risk effectiveness, and 
project performance, were then divided into three categories 
indicating the lower third of effectiveness or performance, the 
middle third of effectiveness or performance, and the top third 
of effectiveness or performance. Figure 4 shows the result of 
risk process capability compared to project performance. 
     
 
Figure 4. Risk Process Capability and Project Performance 
 
 
Simply looking at the chart, one might conclude that 
projects with a more effective or capable risk process perform 
better than projects with an ineffective risk process. Fifty 
percent of the projects with lower risk process capability 
exhibited lower project performance. That number decreased to 31 
290 
 
percent for projects with medium risk process capability and 
down to 27 percent for projects with higher risk process 
capability.  
The number of projects exhibiting higher project 
performance across the low, medium, and high risk process 
capability stayed roughly the same, while the projects 
exhibiting medium project performance increased from 36 percent 
to 49 percent to 55 percent across the three groups.  
Performing ordinal logistic regression analysis of the data 
reveals a Gamma score of .23 and p-value of .088. Gamma is a 
measure of association that expresses the strength of 
relationship between two ordinal variables (Freeman, 1965). 
Gamma values of less than 0.2 may be considered as weak, values 
around 0.3 may be thought of as moderately strong, values near 
0.5 are considered strong, and values over 0.6 are very strong. 
P-values measure the probability that the observed 
relationship in the sampled data occurs by chance alone. Values 
of p < 0.05 are used as a basis for rejecting the null 
hypothesis, that is having confidence that the relationship is 
not specious (Elm, Goldenson, Emam, Donatelli, & Neisa, 2008). 
The Gamma score of .23 indicates a weak relationship between the 
two variables, and a high p-value of .088 decreases our 
confidence that the relationship observed is valid. In other 
words, it would be difficult to conclude with certainty using 
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this data that projects with an effective risk process 
outperform projects with a less effective risk process. 
Figure 5 shows the results of comparing the existence of an 
operational risk process capability and project outcomes.  
 
 
Figure 5. Operational Risk Process Capability and Project Performance 
 
 
Once again, simply looking at the chart, one might conclude 
that projects that focus on identifying and mitigating 
operational risk throughout their lifecycle perform better than 
projects that don’t focus on operational risk. The number of 
projects exhibiting lower project performance decreased from 50 
percent for projects with low risk process capability to 36 
percent for projects with medium operational risk process 
capability down to 21 percent for projects with higher 
operational risk process capability.  
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Projects exhibiting medium project performance increased 
from 39 percent for projects with low operational process 
performance to 49 percent for projects with medium operational 
process performance and increasing to 52 percent for projects 
with higher operational risk process performance. Projects 
exhibiting high project performance increased from 11 percent 
for projects with lower operational risk process performance to 
15 percent for projects with medium operational risk process 
capability to 27 percent for projects with higher operational 
risk process capability.  
The Gamma score shows a moderately strong to strong 
positive relationship between the two variables, and the p-value 
of .006 provides confidence that the relationship is valid.  
The caution here is that the ordinal logistic regression 
analysis performed provides only confidence that there is a 
correlation between an operational risk focus and project 
performance and an indication of the strength of that 
relationship. It does not provide a causal relationship. In 
other words, from the data alone, one cannot conclude that an 
operational risk focus causes project performance or that higher 
project performance causes higher operational risk process 
capability. One may only conclude that there is a positive 








Given the strength of the relationship and the low p-value, 
the authors are confident that projects within the sample that 
focus on operational risk during the project lifecycle also have 
better project performance than projects that focus less on 
operational risk during the project lifecycle.  
Further analysis may provide additional insights. Project 
type or revenue (size) may influence the outcomes of the 
analysis. Larger projects may have a more formal risk process in 
place or may have lower project performance due to the 
inherently higher risk of larger projects. Solution development 
projects may have stronger risk practices in place versus 
professional services projects. 
 




Operational risk should drive systems engineering 
activities from concept development through deployment. The 
reason that a new system or capability is developed is to 
mitigate some mission or business need or threat. These needs 
and threats evolve over time, yet most engineering approaches 
ignore operational risk, allowing the chasm between the evolving 
need and the system under development to grow.  
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Many factors influence the success or failure of a 
development project. A structured focus on the evolving mission 
and business needs and threats of end-users aimed at explicitly 
driving requirements and informing engineering activities should 
improve the operational acceptability of the system, component, 
or capability under development. The results of this survey of 
104 project managers indicate that an increased focus on 
operational risk during the project lifecycle correlates to 
better project performance outcomes.  
Additional research on methods and tools to elicit and 
analyze operational risk as part of the systems engineering 
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